



# INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY

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STRENGTHENING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TIES

EDITED BY  
MARÍA AMPARO CRUZ-SACO AND SERGEI ZELENEV



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
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## INTRODUCTION

*María Amparo Cruz-Saco and Sergei Zelenev*

This book grew out of the October 2007 meeting “Intergenerational Solidarity: Strengthening Economic and Social Ties,” organized by the Division for Social Policy and Development, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, in New York. The contributors met to discuss substantive issues, reflect on current trends, and make policy recommendations on ways in which existing and future policies could foster solidarity between generations and promote social cohesion. The main goal of the book is to add to the growing body of knowledge regarding intergenerational studies, through contributions that are written by leading experts. With its strong interdisciplinary focus, the present volume addresses intergenerational solidarity from a variety of perspectives and includes important global evidence.

Several unfolding societal changes are affecting relationships among generations, with as yet uncertain implications. Some of these transformations are associated with rapid demographic aging, widespread global poverty and inequality, increased income insecurity due to the softening of labor markets, stress on public budgets stemming from the impact of the 2008 financial crisis and the collapse of stock markets, changing family structures and living arrangements, increased mobility and geographical separation among family members, greater global awareness about environmental sustainability, and numerous other social developments. Leaders of both more and less affluent countries are coping with extraordinary political developments at the national level, including demands for increased efficiency and good governance on the one hand, and greater equity and social justice on the other hand.

The contributors to this book, representing a wide range of disciplines, were asked to frame their chapters in ways that could help readers better understand the role of intergenerational solidarity in today’s world and formulate forward-looking policy options. They were asked to address some of the following general questions:

- Are core family and societal values regarding respect for each other changing and leading to a redefinition of intergenerational solidarity?



- What is being done and what can be improved to ensure the well-being of vulnerable groups who need care in the home, such as small children and frail elderly?
- What types of intergenerational programs can help build stronger communities?

Following a unique opportunity for contributors to deliberate on what we believe are pressing issues facing cohesion and solidarity, we were able to agree on some fundamental notions regarding intergenerational relations. First, despite its evolution, intergenerational solidarity remains a major foundation for personal and social security and for human bonding. Second, policies and programs reinforcing it will produce social networks of care. These networks can ensure the creation of opportunities for the personal development and integrity of everybody, from helping with economic, emotional, and physical security to helping with job training and placement. Third, to expand solidarity among generations, societies need to facilitate human contact and interactions. It means that we all should begin or facilitate initiatives to promote intergenerational solidarity through the building of partnerships between youth and older persons' organizations, bringing together people from different generations in schools, in the workplace, and in recreational activities. The possibilities are numerous—if there is a will, there is a way. We just have to do it.

We also agreed on a few key recommendations: we need to “adopt” intergenerational lenses, build the capacity to design and implement policies and programs, and continue to further our evidence-based research. A more formal treatment of our findings, issues for further policy consideration and research, and recommendations are presented in the concluding chapter.

This volume was written in a way that makes it easily accessible to readers interested in knowing more about the themes chosen for discussion and analysis. At the same time, contributions can be read and used in college and graduate level courses that explore intergenerational relationships from different disciplinary perspectives. A brief description of each of the contributions is presented below.

The first three chapters elucidate the concept of intergenerational solidarity and its evolution and manifestations. In chapter one, Cruz-Saco provides a general framework for the meaning and interdisciplinary implications of the concept. She shows that intergenerational solidarity is ever changing and that societies are moving away from family-based care to more out-of-the-home care due to socioeconomic structural changes taking place everywhere. Bengtson and Oyama, in chapter two, define the sociological parameters of intergenerational solidarity and argue that

solidarity and conflict form a “unity of contraries.” Their main finding is that it does not appear that there will be severe generational conflict in the future, especially at the familial level. The reason is that families and communities are currently adapting to changes in demographics and socioeconomic developments as they struggle to provide adequate care to the growing aging populations. There is the risk, however, that insensible public policies and a lack of understanding of the meaning of intergenerational solidarity could tilt this outcome in the opposite direction. Finally, Lowenstein, in chapter three, reviews theoretical perspectives on intergenerational relations such as the life course, modernization, Bengtson’s intergenerational family solidarity/conflict model, and intergenerational ambivalence. These perspectives inform empirical work on aspects such as family responsibilities under the intergenerational contract, the stress experienced by the middle (or “sandwich”) generation, living arrangements, and the state-family balance. Based on empirical work conducted in England, Germany, Israel, Norway, and Spain, Lowenstein concludes that intergenerational solidarity is alive and strong.

In the next four chapters, contributors examine very specific ways in which intergenerational programming and interventions can lead to social cohesion. These chapters are hands-on analyses of organizational aspects and actions that can strengthen intergenerational relations. In chapter four, Butts reviews how reciprocity, interconnectedness, and the promotion of social cohesion can benefit societies. These benefits are grounded in solidarity among generations and in areas of intergenerational convergence such as education, employment, access to health care, dependent care needs, housing, poverty alleviation, immigration, and the environment. Butts shows that solidarity is a good that can be threatened by tensions and conflict among generations or reductions in the human capital of countries that lose their skilled labor force via emmigration. She recommends a paradigm shift in the way governments and stakeholders think about the roles of generations and proposes the adoption of an intergenerational public policy framework. Larkin, in chapter five, underscores the need to design and implement quality intergenerational programs that unite generations in caring for one another, with mutual benefits at all levels. These programs require the breakdown of stereotypes through education. Particular social problems can be addressed through adequate programming that provides child care, neighborhood safety, cross-cultural awareness, and support of older persons in need. Programs should also allow institutional collaborations and new ways of thinking. Educational systems, health care providers, community groups, and other grassroots organizations have a wonderful opportunity to work together in the spirit of increased intergenerational solidarity. Larkin explains that this type of work requires the

participation of professional specialists in the design, planning, implementation, and ongoing assessment of program impact.

In chapter six, Jarrott emphasizes that governments and stakeholders should intentionally plan and help create societies in which intergenerational solidarity is attained. To achieve this goal, Jarrott proposes the adoption of appropriate methodologies that help identify the needs and resources of communities. She underscores the need of intentional programming and the assessment of outcomes in a periodic and consistent manner. Programs that have been particularly effective are residential arrangements that provide foster care for families and support for low income older persons, home visits through service learning, provision of care at both ends of the lifespan, and community service as curricular learning vehicles. Chapter seven, coauthored by Sánchez, Sáez, and Pinazo, emphasizes the importance of relationships as the fundamental core of intergenerational solidarity. Building mutually beneficial relationships among individuals of different age groups should be the goal of social policy. They explain how intergenerational solidarity is a dynamic process affecting relationships throughout a person's life cycle and as a life project. Instead of conceptualizing intergenerational solidarity as occurring among individuals of specific age groups, Sánchez, Sáez, and Pinazo propose that for any given person, relationships evolve and have a place in that person's constantly changing life. For example, environmental and architectural policies shape the spaces in which intergenerational relationships exist and affect an individual's sense of belonging to a social place. Cultural and educational policies affect a person's life cycle and choices made along a continuum. And finally, economic, labor, and health policies influence people's capacity to live with dignity throughout their lifespans.

The last four chapters provide global evidence on the role played by intergenerational solidarity. In chapter eight, Cruz-Saco assesses Peru's demographic transition and documents a fall in the dependency ratio that ends circa 2025. This trend creates a window of opportunity that should be used to introduce policies to strengthen both the social security health care system and the public pension system, which currently cover only a small portion of the labor force (formal workers). Official records seem to have underestimated the number of migrants who have left the country, and the absence of these workers from the domestic labor force increases the actual dependency rate of the social security system. Remittances are increasing at a double-digit rate and, while more data is needed to assess how they are used by family members, preliminary information shows that approximately 5 percent of the total population received an average of \$570 in 2006. In chapter nine, Mazza provides a comprehensive analysis of the labor market in Latin America and the Caribbean. Job security is

a fundamental building block for social inclusion. Human capital is built in any society through high quality education and the experience derived from working productively. Mazza explores the distinct challenges that youth and older persons face, with an emphasis on the usefulness of matching programs to create a better balance between labor supply and demand. She recommends that public policy interventions should be based on good data, an adequate understanding of how the labor market functions, and the design of training programs for youth. Further, Mazza shows that governments should enforce antidiscrimination laws and secure labor protection, improve the educational system, and extend rights, services, and community development to migrant populations.

In chapter ten, Alam examines the erosion of family values in the context of India's aging population and evaluates the motivation of adult children to care for their aging parents. The study involved a survey of 1000 households in Delhi with elderly coresidents. The main findings are that there is a good degree of altruism among younger respondents, who believe that caring for an aging parent is a sociomoral and religious responsibility. A small portion of respondents, however, concede that caring for an older parent is a burden. Alam concludes that the provision of social security to older persons should be part of social protection systems in countries such as India to lessen the impact that caring for them has on families. In addition, Alam suggests that intergenerational bonding can be strengthened through education and spiritual development. In chapter eleven, Oduaran reviews the historical characteristics of family ties during precolonial times, underscoring the tight intergenerational relationships that were cultivated and maintained in sub-Saharan Africa through the extended family and the philosophy of extensive communal living. This tradition, however, has been negatively affected by socioeconomic changes and challenges, such as industrialization and urbanization. Particularly salient among these disruptions are the HIV/AIDS epidemic and civil wars. Child-headed households of orphaned children and grandparents taking care of their orphaned grandchildren are examples of care provided with minimal or nonexistent outside public or private support.

We would like to acknowledge the essential support we received from all the contributors throughout the process of preparing this volume. They collaborated with enthusiasm and with patience.

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We thank Connecticut College for the continuous support that was given in the form of sabbatical leaves and the R. F. Johnson faculty development funds that allowed María Amparo Cruz-Saco to carry out field work in Peru. Similarly, thanks to a Fulbright Scholarship, she was able to spend one semester at Universidad del Pacífico in Lima as a visiting scholar and faculty member in the fall of 2007.

Many national and international organizations have invited Sergei Zelenev to make key note presentations on aging and intergenerational solidarity. Recently and among others, invitations were issued by the United Nations NGO Committee on Aging to deliver a key-note statement on the 2008 International Day of Older Persons at the United Nations New York Headquarters; the International Network for Prevention of Elder Abuse and Canadian Network for Prevention of Elder Abuse to commemorate the 2008 World Elder Abuse Awareness Day (June 2008, Ottawa); the Czech Presidency of the European Union to deliver a statement at the European Conference on Care and Protection of Senior Citizens (May 2009, Prague), and the International Association of Gerontology and Geriatrics (IAGG) to deliver a key note lecture at the XIX IAGG World Congress of Gerontology and Geriatrics (July 2009, Paris). These events offered singular occasions to share his research findings and formulate policy recommendations for which Sergei Zelenev is thankful. In addition, special thanks go to the Club de Madrid for the opportunity to contribute to their ongoing Shared Societies project.

PART 1  
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

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# CHAPTER ONE

## INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY

*María Amparo Cruz-Saco*

### **Introduction**

Intergenerational (IG) solidarity is an intentional connection between two or more persons of different age groups. As will be explained and illustrated in this volume, their bonding reflects personal wishes and material goals, emotional bonds and rational justifications, altruism and self-interest, caregiving and care receiving. The study of IG solidarity requires a genuine interdisciplinary approach that can facilitate the intersection of professional expertise in related disciplines, including anthropology, demographics, economics, geriatrics, social psychology, and sociology. This chapter provides an entry point to this study. The goals of the chapter are the following: first, to investigate the meaning of intergenerational solidarity, its dimensions, and its evolution; second, to review the evolution of theoretical perspectives and the establishment of an independent field of IG studies; third, to present a simple model that can be used to assess the complex connections between cultural values, institutions, demographic and socioeconomic dimensions, and the arrangements, both private and public, that societies use to provide care to children and older persons; and finally, to highlight current trends that affect and can be affected by IG solidarity.

### **1. Intergenerational Solidarity**

Many analysts define IG solidarity as bonding between and among individuals in multigenerational family networks and among different age cohorts in the larger community (see Bengtson and Oyama, chapter two). The relationship between IG solidarity and social cohesiveness is one of a circular causality, as more solidarity results in more



cohesiveness and vice versa, allowing conflicts and tensions to be minimized. Representing a *de facto* social contract, IG solidarity does the following:

- Enables socioeconomic development, sustainability, endurance, and the ability to build bridges and overcome adversity within families and communities who share common identities and interests: “Humankind is interconnected and interdependent now and throughout time. IG programs were created in recognition of this compact and the importance of maintaining it, and to honor the strengths and abilities of each generation” (see Butts, chapter four).
- Bonds people together through values, associations and interactions, consensus and exchange, agreements, feelings of affective orientation, and similarities.
- Ensures the transfer of knowledge and culture forward through meaningful exchanges among persons of all age groups: children, youth, young adults, and those middle-aged and older.

All societies exhibit IG solidarity, a core element of IG relationships, which bonds generations that share common interests, feelings of affection and affinity, reciprocity, mutual care, and protection. IG solidarity is reflected in the love and caring that parents and children have for one another despite geographical distance and differences in life experiences. It ties individuals together and, most importantly, it enables mutual support, care, and exchange of services.

In the family, adult children care for their aging parents and are also concerned about the well-being of older relatives and friends, assisting them with chores and visiting them periodically. Parents support their children when they are young and into adulthood. There are many instances when grandparents provide care to grandchildren because parents are absent due to work or for a variety of other reasons, such as migration, divorce, death, and incarceration. As a result of population aging, an increasing number of older adults and grandparents are available in families to provide support to younger relatives, performing housekeeping chores, assisting in raising children, and ensuring that traditions and values are passed from one generation to the next. More importantly, they have become an adaptive resource ensuring the integrity of nuclear families (Silverstein, Giarusso, and Bengtson, 2003).

IG relationships exist within a broad universe of social systems and networks, from individual families to larger communities and nations. Similarly, solidarity among generations connects individuals with kin and

the nuclear family, and within and among communities and nations. It is only natural that feelings of mutual sympathy and respect promote positive relationships and interactions. Solidarity among generations is an outcome of social processes that are affected by age, gender, culture and ethnic background, socioeconomic status, religion, values, and other factors, along with world views that are constantly evolving. Generations themselves are diverse and multicultural and affected by the context in which they are evolving, sometimes in unexpected ways. Socioeconomic background and differences in culture, ethnicity, or religion are important attributes that can create differences in generational culture and social behavior. Major social disruptions such as natural disasters or civil war may have lifelong effects on the future of one or more generations by forcing displacement, reducing years of schooling, destroying endowments, and promoting strategies to overcome adversity.

In view of large differences in networks and context, the social cohesion implied by IG solidarity may be an elusive goal. Dissociations between generations may be caused by dissimilar interests, lack of affection, conflicts around issues of distribution and equity, geographic separation, catastrophic events, and demographic changes that negatively impact the sustainability of formal and informal social protection systems (United Nations, 2001, part four). Given that relationships change and evolve, interactions between generations may often include negative feelings, apprehensions, tensions, and even open conflicts that are natural within families and larger communities. Negative interactions may be inevitable and may develop into difficult situations that affect the existing trust and affection between generations. While they may present opportunities for dialogue and the amicable resolution of conflict, they may also cause open confrontation, ruptures, and the ensuing erosion of the social cohesion of families and communities.

Bonding among individuals, however, is a force that can create unity even in a context of difference and tension. Bonding can be strong or weak depending on the ability and opportunity of stakeholders to use IG solidarity as a societal resource. There is a feeling of optimism in the opportunities that lie ahead for greater integration of all ages in all spheres of life—at work and at home, within the family and in communities—with the aid of public policies that encourage a better balance between work and family life. If governments and stakeholders are able to promote greater flexibility in the job market and greater support for vulnerable persons, then, as Bengtson and Putney (2006) indicate, “In such a context, we predict that complaints of generational inequity and threats of generational conflict will have little resonance in twenty-first century society.” (p. 29).

## The Positive, Normative, and Collective Action Dimensions of IG Solidarity

In the last two decades, IG solidarity has received enormous attention among scholars and development practitioners who have contributed meaningfully to the literature on several topics—such as the study of living arrangements for older persons around the world (United Nations, 2005a), issues of IG equity, age and gender discrimination, neglect and abuse of vulnerable segments of the population (including children, teenagers, and older persons), and the evolution of the family as well as the security and health of family members. The analysis of all observable and measurable aspects of IG relationships, which I will call the positive or factual dimension, helps us better understand how people bond. The values and ideologies that inspire people to bond hold societies together. An inquiry into these core principles, which I call the normative dimension, provides us with clues on why people bond the way they do. And finally, programs that are intentionally designed to promote IG exchanges and solidarity, or ways to improve how different generations support each other, will be called the collective action dimension. An analysis of these programs helps us better understand how societies can gain or enhance cohesion through the fostering of IG relationships.

### *The Normative Dimension*

IG solidarity is, in itself, a noble aspiration. The belief that IG solidarity helps make “better societies” is a core value that is associated with responsible active citizenship and fraternity (Schindlmayr, 2006).<sup>1</sup> Moral duty and social ethics (normative dimension) influence people, for example, to give care and help smooth the consumption of their families and be attentive to community needs (Aboderin, 2006).<sup>2</sup> Beyond the realm of family, the belief in the power of solidarity encourages individuals to collaborate in the creation of cooperatives, associations, and other forms of joint efforts to pursue goals that strengthen society and the economy, and that improve the allocation of resources. Thus, normative justifications relate motivations for actions to the effectiveness and performance of said actions.

In the liberal tradition, solidarity has been part of the set of principles, such as freedom, equality, and fraternity, that form the foundation of democratic societies. For example, social security systems based on the Bismarckian model of tripartite contributions from government, employers, and workers reflect recurring IG solidarity from active workers to beneficiaries. Contributions help fund benefits for pensioners, the sick and disabled, widows, orphans, the unemployed, and the poor through social assistance programs. This model has been prominently instituted

and continues to be one of the social protection pillars in most developed countries. In developing countries, there is ample evidence that caring for older persons is regarded as a moral responsibility, even when younger adults may not have the financial means to provide the needed care. They would still help in accessing hospital care or seeking ways to support older ailing persons (see Moneer, chapter ten).

Societies with a strong sense of morality and strong religious beliefs seem to foster the value of elder care across age, gender, and socioeconomic backgrounds. Religion as a motivational factor in sustaining the notions of filial duty is an important community value that often nurtures IG relationships. Faith leaders who are in close contact with their communities can play a leading role in strengthening the bonds between older and younger persons. In such ways, values, beliefs, and traditions help shape IG solidarity.

Timely conceived and successfully implemented policies and programs that promote IG relationships also impact IG solidarity outcomes. They can improve attitudes, sentiments, and behavior, and move society closer to the goal of being a better integrated society. Such a society is characterized by responsible acts and socially aware people who appreciate constructive and sensitive actions from others toward themselves, from themselves toward others, and from others toward others (Kolm, 2000, p. 2). In fact, policies that enable the realization of human rights and the individual freedoms of all people complement educational programs that underscore social justice.

In societies with strong social democratic traditions, social policy aimed at universal coverage of basic needs is an important goal. Here, public transfers of funding for special subsidies that target the vulnerable (jobless single mothers, old people without support, the sick and disabled, orphans, and ethnic minorities) result in a higher level of integration than in countries that lack these provisions. To advance the well-being of specific socio-demographic groups, the United Nations has adopted global normative initiatives, such as the *World Programme Action for Youth* (United Nations, 1995; 2005b) and the *Madrid International Plan of Action on Aging* (United Nations, 2002), that seek the mainstreaming of concerns regarding youth and aging in the design and implementation of national development strategies and social policies.

### *The Positive Dimension*

Research on IG relationships can answer questions such as how much IG solidarity exists in families and communities, how bonding evolves, and impact on society. Analysts and policy makers gather data across ages, filial or nonfilial relationships, gender, socioeconomic class, types

of communities, and so on to assess the degree of social cohesion, reciprocity, harmony, tension, stress, or happiness in any given social group. Using a variety of methodologies (such as focus groups, interviews, surveys, questionnaires), researchers can measure and appraise IG solidarity; they can map the impact of transformations in the family structure, as well as appraise socioeconomic and demographic changes and the effect of public policy interventions. This information is crucial to understanding how much solidarity exists and whether interventions are effective.

### *The Role of Collective Action*

People use IG solidarity to mobilize, advocate, and promote change through collective action on issues that are of interest to members of one or more generations. Through the use of voting rights to support a particular political action, citizens can defend their personal interests, seek to join people having similar interests, define agendas, and push for public policy changes to attain common goals. The strongest movement in support of aging and intergenerational solidarity is represented by AGE Platform Europe, which constitutes a network of more than 150 organizations. AGE represents the interests of 150 million people aged 50 and over in the European Union. In 2009, AGE helped form the European Intergroup on Ageing and Intergenerational Solidarity that represents approximately 40 members of the European Parliament. This organization is pushing for legislative changes that can ensure greater IG solidarity and collaboration among generations in the European Union's social agenda. In the European context, the commitments to end elder abuse and develop high quality long-term care services for older persons are high priorities. AGE has also proposed that 2012 be the European Intergenerational Solidarity Year to promote greater awareness of the importance of solidarity.

In addition to ensuring income security for old age and ending elder abuse, climate change is another focus of the IG dialogue. It has emerged as a uniting core interest for young and old activists, scientists, stakeholders, and policy makers around the globe. According to current research, it is expected that the negative effects of climate change will be greatest in developing countries in terms of loss of life and negative economic impact. The least developed countries have less adaptive capacity to prepare for the risk of damage from both present climate variability and future climate change (including temperature increases, increases in floods and droughts, irreversible damage to natural systems, and vulnerability of human systems—health, human settlements, energy, industry, insurance, and other financial systems; McCarthy and others, 2001). In these countries, pressures from other development challenges, such as resource depletion, unequal access to resources, economic impact of globalization,

conflict, poverty, and the incidence of diseases such as HIV/AIDS, augment climate change vulnerability (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007).

In addition to including climatic risks in the design of development strategies, countries will need to increase the effectiveness of resource management and poverty reduction efforts. Reforms will require the use of approaches that take into consideration IG collaborations at the national and international levels in the areas of education, professional guidance, technical expertise, and programs that ensure food and health security by improving environmental conditions and public health infrastructure. Adaptive policies to address climate change will need preparedness and coordination among governments, communities, and stakeholders of all ages to support settlements that may become affected, protect physical infrastructure, and, in some cases, assist with migration. In this sense, combating perils associated with climate changes, now and in the immediate future, is a major challenge for all generations.

Collective actions to promote IG dialogue have taken place in the area of education through service and community learning. This type of experiential learning allows students at any level (high school, college, and graduate) to integrate an academic curriculum with reflective practice in real world contexts with persons from different ages. Service and community learning courses can be designed in a variety of disciplines, such as gerontology, sociology, economics, education, and social psychology, to address IG communication and generational conflict. They enable volunteers age 50 and over to serve in schools and community-based organizations and to assist with youth service activities and other educational programs. Schools and local communities are powerful settings for the interaction of different generations. Through community-based learning and curricular offerings, older persons can lead class discussions or serve as advisors and mentors while, for example, younger students can teach computer skills, language, or physical education to older persons. These interactions are a two-way street that prepare young people to live and learn in multigenerational societies and provide older persons the opportunity to better understand and learn from younger students. Bringing persons from different generations together in academic and extracurricular activities has enormous educational value and promotes the values of an IG society.

Institutional changes, produced by either collective action or sanctioned directly by governments, can affect IG solidarity outcomes (positive or factual) and how people conceptualize their moral or social obligations to each other and the common good (normative). In Latin America and the Caribbean, traditional social security systems were established in the twentieth century based on the social-democratic principles of solidarity and

redistribution. Some countries, such as Argentina and Chile, were early adopters, while Central American countries were latecomers. Social security pension schemes were partially funded or pay-as-you-go, with defined benefits and with social security offices working as clearing houses for IG transfers. In 1981, Chile privatized its pension system and closed down the public social security scheme, thus eliminating the IG transfers of the traditional pay-as-you-go system. With the adoption of fully funded individual pension accounts with defined contributions, workers rely solely on their personal savings and capitalizations of financial earnings for their retirement pensions. In the nineties, several other countries in the region adopted fully funded individual pension accounts under various model options that give workers the possibility of deciding between the private and the public scheme (Peru) or that supplement a basic pay-as-you-go public pension (Argentina) or a basic social pension (Bolivia and Brazil). In some countries, a “solidarity tax” pays social pensions for those individuals whose pension funds are not sufficient to earn a benefit that is above the guaranteed minimum amount.

The reforms privatizing pensions in Latin America ended IG transfers of the public-led pension systems. Reforms targeted fulfilment of development goals that were articulated, in the “Washington Consensus” era, on market principles rather than on redistribution, IG transfers, and solidarity. Reforms also responded to the tremendous deficits, inequities, and corruptions that many social security institutes experienced. Introduction of personal pension accounts were deemed necessary to create a culture of long-term personal savings, to structurally reduce public deficits caused by the actuarial disequilibria of old public pension systems, and to promote the development of domestic financial markets and the creation of domestic financial investors.

Two decades of reforms have shown mixed results. There has been an impressive increase in the size and sophistication of domestic financial markets and a reduction in public deficits, which are highly welcomed. However, actual coverage of the labor force (formal and informal) has decreased due to the transaction costs of private pension programs that cause evasion and elusion. Some countries in the region are adopting further reforms that enable workers to enrol back in the public pay-as-you-go system after having opted for the private scheme (Peru). Others are implementing non-contributory pensions, following the examples of Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile. A drastic move was taken by Argentina in 2008 in the spirit of resorting back to public control of the pension system. On the argument that the privately administered pension system was plundering, President Cristina Fernández nationalized the private pension scheme.<sup>3</sup>

### Reciprocity and Giving

Through reciprocity people establish mutually dependent associations of influence and exchange. In contrast to market transactions that are determined by prices and usually motivated by self-interest, relations of reciprocity are voluntary and independent. Reciprocity characterizes families and communities that exchange services and goods under patterns of giving and receiving that are socially sanctioned. These exchanges are two-way transfers that are mostly oriented to attain a higher level of joint satisfaction, instead of focusing on individual selfishness.

Giving differs from reciprocity in that it is a one-way transfer that is also voluntary, independent, and oriented to the other person (Gérard-Varet, Kolm, and Mercier Ythier, 2000). The motivations for giving are altruism, emotions, moral duty, norm following, image building, and, sometimes, a person's self-interest in being perceived as generous and philanthropic (Kolm, 2000). Often, psychological and social motivations for giving and reciprocity are based on values and normative beliefs about social justice. Gift givers may feel that they ought to intervene in order to ameliorate market failures and unfair socioeconomic and political processes that generate social exclusion. Even tributes, taxes, and other contributions can be considered to be means to address poverty and inequality. Within the family, concern and care for the well-being of relatives mobilize different types of giving and reciprocities, motivated by factors as varied as love, sense of duty, gratitude, obedience, and justice. In some societies, philanthropy and volunteerism are encouraged by institutionalized incentives, from community service requirements for school graduation to tax deductions for giving. In the United States, for example, financial giving under the form of transfer of private wealth amounts to between one fifth and one fourth of household net worth (Brown and Weisbenner, 2004, chapter 4), which is a sizable portion relative to other countries. IG solidarity has allowed people of all ages to address challenges and contribute to each other's reciprocal well-being, educationally, emotionally, and financially, through a variety of personal services and time-related resources.

### Distributional and Relational Effects of IG Solidarity

From a political economy perspective, it is possible to extend Bhalla and Lapeyre's analytical framework (2004, chapter 2) and identify two types of effects of IG solidarity, a distributional (economic) and a relational (social and political) effect. The distributional effect of IG solidarity is represented by the transfers of assets and resources among generations (giving) that enable access to goods and services that are needed for survival. Transfers can originate in income from work or financial and other assets; pension



benefits, other transfers and gifts; and other income generating activities that individuals perform to function in society. Adequate levels of income throughout the lifespan are necessary, and parents typically fund the consumption of their children until they become economically independent. There is a debate on whether they pay for their children's consumption because of altruism or because of self-interest or reciprocity (expecting a service in return). Pure altruism (the opposite of egoism) is equivalent to pure love without expectation of a payback. Some form of self-interest, which may be covered and subtle, seems to be frequent. It may be related to the notion of chain reciprocity, by which grandparents helped parents and parents helped children and in return each generation will give some support or care to the previous one. The forms of distributional IG support vary geographically and historically and are also affected by the normative causes of IG solidarity and public policy. For example, in a study that compared motivational factors for parental transfers, whether altruism or self-interest (exchange), in a population of migrants to France, the authors found evidence that supports the altruism hypothesis (Wolff, Spilerman, and Attias-Donfut, 2007). The same study showed that distance from the parental home does not reduce parental giving.

The relational impact of IG solidarity refers to social dimensions such as education, health status, property rights, norms, trust, political participation, civic engagement, representation, and other institutional factors that affect social relations and the political structure. Family life develops in specific and dynamic socioeconomic contexts that affect how families function and the roles they have. Market economies in developed countries typically exhibit more economic exchanges, and their IG solidarity is represented in the nuclear family, in the redistributive role of government through welfare and social assistance, and in volunteerism and philanthropy. In the developing world, a large portion of social interactions assume the form of reciprocity and giving within extended families in the absence of a strong public sector infrastructure that could support older persons and other vulnerable groups.

### Intergenerational Ambivalence

Ambivalence results from conflicting or mixed feelings leading to uncertain or contradictory behavior. Sometimes people may not know exactly why they give or reciprocate, whether due to altruism, self-interest, or ambivalent feelings that oscillate. When adding the emotional ties that are implicit in family relationships, members of the same kin may feel closer to one or more members than to others and discriminate their giving and reciprocity accordingly. Scholarly work on IG solidarity and the diversity

of issues that families and communities confront suggests, however, that another concept in the analysis of IG relationships is ambivalence, rather than solidarity. Confusion on IG relations is explained by the plurality and diversity of family conceptualizations that affect patterns of caregiving, dependence and independence of family members, and the evidence that notwithstanding solidarity, communities are impacted by elders' neglect and abuse (Lowenstein, 2005) and by violence against children.

## 2. Main Theoretical Contributions

### Bengtson's IG Solidarity Concept

The theoretical foundation of IG solidarity was developed by Dr. Vern Bengtson in the late 1960s and 1970s. He was interested in conceptualizing and measuring patterns of cohesiveness among three generations (grandparents, parents, and children) within the family. Since then, his research, that of his students, and that of scholars influenced by his work has led to the development of the field of IG studies, which is profoundly interdisciplinary.<sup>4</sup> Antonucci, Jackson, and Biggs (2007) call Bengtson's model the "Solidarity and Conflict Model of Generational Relations" because it explains ties between and among individuals from togetherness and affection to conflictive relationships (see Bengtson and Oyama, chapter two).<sup>5</sup> Bengtson and his colleagues<sup>6</sup> defined generational levels (which use individuals differentiated by ranked generational position as the basic unit of analysis) and lineage levels (in which several individual family members are linked into a single analytical unit with positions defined by genealogical status within the vertical family system) to measure cohesiveness of the family. They argued that there is often more solidarity from parents to children (downward relationships) and more conflict from children toward parents (upward relationships). Although various layers of solidarity may exist between and among generations, conflicts and tensions are only natural (Bengtson, 2001). In fact, solidarity and conflict are manifestations of human nature and the complex balancing of bonding.

Bengtson's work has contributed in a profound way to our understanding of how generations live and feel. It has carved the path for important research on the positive dimensions of IG solidarity everywhere. The classical way of measuring solidarity, which was established by Bengtson and Schrader (1982), includes six "conceptual dimensions" (see also Bengtson and Oyama, chapter two):

- *Affectual or affectional solidarity*—feelings of closeness among family members and the degree of reciprocity of these sentiments

- *Associational solidarity*—frequency and pattern of contacts and interactions in various types of activities
- *Consensual solidarity*—agreement in worldview, attitudes, values, and beliefs among family members
- *Functional solidarity*—financial and nonfinancial exchanges among family members
- *Normative solidarity*—sense of obligation to care or perception and enactment of norms of family solidarity
- *Structural solidarity*—cross-generational interaction promoted by geographic proximity<sup>7</sup>

Bengtson and his colleagues' work have provided impetus for further empirical and theoretical research. They encouraged and recommended using measurements to assess these six categories, to develop measures to enhance assessments, and to continue theoretical progress and scientific research (Bengtson and Mangen, 1988). The development of the concept of solidarity in the family, the smallest social unit, was also extended to other groups and communities, making the approach multicultural and multiethnic.

### IG Solidarity as Social Support

According to Antonucci, Jackson, and Biggs (2007), another important model of IG solidarity is the so-called “Convoy Model of Social Relations.” Developed by Kahn and Antonucci (1980), this model uses the analogy of a “convoy” to illustrate people’s propensity to form networks or associations. A “convoy” provides protection and support (either objective or subjective) and influences the person’s health and well-being in the short- and long-term. The nature of the social supportive infrastructure is dynamic and flexible, because both people and society evolve over time. The security and protection that people need in order to grow is the cornerstone of IG relationships. The “convoy” symbolizes this protective home base, which is critically important.

Antonucci et al. (2007, pp. 681–685) consider three factors in the analysis of social relations and IG solidarity. The first factor is context, which is determined by life experience, relationships, and well-being. These are, in turn, dependent on variables such as race and ethnicity, social and economic class, gender, age, national origin, religious and political beliefs, and processes of acculturation, particularly among migrants. Context is important because it provides the setting that affects people’s behavior. For example, children are taken care of by their parents or other caregivers; young adults get married and form new families; older persons require support and, as they age, their interactions with peers decrease. Situations

and life experiences are affected by people's identities—who they are socio-economically, ethnically, culturally, and so forth. For example, the care needs of an older woman who lives in poverty in a distant rural area and who has limited access to health care services differ greatly from the needs of a woman who is of the same age but who lives in an urban, middle-income neighborhood. Issues of migration, socialization, and assimilation, and how they affect the network of support, are part of the contextual basis affecting the person's health and well-being.

The second factor is the structure of generations, and how solidarity and conflict contribute to more or less social cohesion within the nuclear or extended family. The structure of generations refers to the number of living generations in a family, which in certain countries is increasing from the traditional three, child-parent-grandparent, to include great-grandparents. And then, there are issues associated with types and frequency of IG relationships in the family in any given context, which depend on whether there is geographical proximity among generations as well as the affection and caring needs that characterize families and cultures.

Finally, the third factor is individual and family outcomes. At the individual level, research aims to understand how stress affects the health and well-being of individuals, including migrants and individuals of diverse cultural and socioeconomic background. In terms of special groups, research goals include the examination of how people with common social and demographic characteristics eliminate or reduce their vulnerabilities or how they cope with chronic and acute vulnerabilities.

### IG Solidarity and Altruism

In economics literature, scholarly work on giving, altruism, and reciprocity constitute theoretical translations of IG solidarity. From this disciplinary perspective, individuals are assumed to understand their environment and act rationally to maximize their own welfare given the predicted behavior of others (Ermisch, 2003). Cooperation between parents on how they allocate their private consumption creates an efficient allocation of expenditure for their child. Altruism, in economic analysis, is equated with "caring" and "love" and caused by feelings of affection and empathy. It is also produced by moral values (normative) and rationality. The welfare of the altruistic person depends on the welfare of the beneficiary. The evidence on the motives that persuade parents to pay for what their children consume is mixed basically because it is difficult to completely separate caring and love from image building, earning respect, and wanting one's descendents to do well. Self-interest in perpetuating the genetic content and cultural conditioning of one's own descendents can be another normative motivation for altruistic behavior.

Individuals and families are free to decide how much they want to care for one another. Although it may sound paradoxical, motives for political and public choices in the area of social and public services usually imply both self-interest and altruism. The reason for that is simple: the nature of these activities is such that they concern social, moral, political, environmental, and other aspects of a society's context, about which people have their own individual preferences, but also normative concerns about the common good and the good society. Some of these activities are of individual concern because people want them for themselves and for others. And there are other issues that affect the particular interests of individuals who get together under interest groups and in political actions of all types. "You favour and help them as they favour and help you—this is solidarity" (Kolm and Mercier Ythier, 2006).

### IG Studies and the Life Cycle

A review of analytical approaches and of the rich and diverse literature on IG solidarity acknowledges the challenges inherent in IG research. It is clear that, given the wide range of phenomena that is included in this research and the changing trends of dynamic relationships, the themes, conclusions, and policy implications will be equally broad. A series of economic, demographic, political, and social factors have converged to generate a focus of attention on IG relationships and have given rise to interdisciplinary academic and professional studies in this area, also known as IG studies.

Larkin and Newman (1997) argue that IG studies is a new, emerging interdisciplinary field that has grown out of IG programming carried out by practitioners in the fields of early childhood education and gerontology working in partnership in the 1960s and 1970s. IG programs are interventions that provide support or services to combined age groups by caregivers who rely on each other's expertise and competence to make a positive impact. In 1963, the Foster Grandparent Program established in the United States the first federally funded program that created an interactive two-way scheme for low-income older adults and at-risk children and youth.

Since then, IG programming has expanded in meaningful ways: "Intergenerational programs have been developed as a vehicle to effectively connect older and younger generations by providing them with opportunities to develop meaningful and productive relationships. In addition, they enable communities to promote civic responsibility, as an alternative to self interest. IG programs that have emerged during the past two decades are changing the way education is provided to children and youth, and

how services are provided to older adults and others in our communities” (Larkin and Newman, 1997, p. 7). Examples of programs are in the area of education from pre-K through K-12 schools, trained older adults provide services as caregivers, mentors, and resource persons; retired professionals serve as mentors and provide technical assistance in developing countries; community-based learning curricula in colleges and universities train students using real-world situations as labs to test theoretical propositions. These projects bring together instructors, undergraduate and graduate students, and people of all ages. In health care, older persons are helpers or volunteers who visit young patients and help them feel more at ease in health care establishments. In nursing homes, children and youth develop recreational activities for older persons. Other more ambitious IG programs are projects for multigenerational housing and recreational facilities. In all of these examples, there are mutual benefits for both younger and older persons.

Proponents of IG studies as a new academic discipline contend that, similar to gerontologists who specialize in the study of the life and needs of aging people, professionals in IG programming and learning are needed to address the increasing demands of social interactions and exchanges among multiage populations in the twenty-first century. It has been argued that professionals graduating with a degree in IG studies will be needed to develop careers for working with young people or older adults in schools, long-term care settings, community organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and government offices that provide services to young and older persons. The training of these professionals should be part of an IG studies academic program that would be genuinely interdisciplinary, that is, education, human development (early childhood, child and adult development, lifespan), and gerontology, with a strong experiential component and an equally strong partnership with the community. The arguments set forth are that IG studies has already created a distinctive body of knowledge; can be housed in schools of education; combines and integrates research, professional practice, curriculum design, and program evaluation; offers a variety of alternative academic learning options and outcomes; involves the participation of faculty from related disciplines; and promotes strong community partnership in its development and implementation (Larkin and Newman, 1997, pp. 12–14).

Others, however, consider that it may be too early to establish IG studies as a stand-alone academic discipline, but that eventually it may acquire independent academic status. Rather, the field should remain as an interdisciplinary program analogous to environmental studies, gender and women studies, or the comparative study of race and ethnicity. Rosenberg, Layne, and Power (1997) agree that both gerontology and IG studies grew

out of a need to provide services to vulnerable populations. In the case of gerontology, it was necessary to create a body of knowledge and skills to understand the developmental processes of aging and provide guidance to the creation and management of field community programs. Gerontology developed into an academic discipline in the 1920s and was stimulated in the 1960s and 1970s with United States federally funded career training grants and the creation of multidisciplinary centers of aging (Rosenberg, Layne, and Power, 1997, p. 22). According to this view, IG studies courses can be part of a gerontology degree the same way courses on demographics and the lifespan are either integrated into the syllabi of existing courses or established as an area of concentration within gerontology. While some agree that IG studies is in the process of becoming a discipline with a solid theoretical framework, it is not clear that it has reached its maturity stage yet. Rosenberg, Layne, and Power (1997) state: “But IGS [intergenerational studies] is still busy building the solid empirical knowledge base and literature necessary to a scientific discipline, and much of the literature is not theoretically grounded. As has occurred in other disciplines, this “first-generation” knowledge/literature base emerges from the less rigorous, less systematic, less representative, more speculative, and relatively untested works indicative of a nascent field. Similarly, the methodologies and vocabulary evident in IGS literature are drawn from other disciplines and fields of study. Perhaps most importantly, “attempts to build a unique theoretical framework are still in their infancy” (Rosenberg, Layne, and Power, 1997, p.27).

Debates about the timing of an independent academic discipline of IG studies show growing need to create more research and expand the knowledge base for IG learning and IG studies through the establishment of disciplinary degrees. The latter would endorse and legitimize careers in IG programming. While initially IG studies evolved from gerontology concerns and questions, the field has been evolving and now encompasses human development and the entire lifespan, of which gerontology studies is one component. There has been a paradigmatic shift away from sole concentration on a particular age group, that is, young children, youth, and older persons, toward increasing interest in the design of programs and approaches that combine and integrate developmental aspects throughout the lifespan.

### 3. A Model of IG Solidarity

IG solidarity finds its expression in support and caregiving among persons from different generations. In this section, caregiving is analyzed in the context of IG solidarity representing its pragmatic side. Two types of

societies, traditional and modern, will be highlighted as opposite poles of a caregiving continuum.

In traditional societies, the family functions through kinship networks and is based on marital heterosexual union. Notwithstanding the complexities of rigid generalizations, it is possible to say that values and morals in these societies often promote a sense of togetherness and mutual caregiving. Most often, women are the main caregivers for small children, older persons, the sick, and persons with disabilities. This function can be daunting within extended families, but particularly so in instances when women work outside the household. As societies industrialized and modernized, family structures began to change, fragmenting and leading to a situation where members found themselves without a crucial social network. As result of structural changes and ensuing dismembering of extended families, the traditional system that formed the basis for informal family- and community-based care eroded.

In modern welfare states with well developed social protection programs, income security and caregiving are provided through a variety of programs and institutions, from publicly funded social assistance and nonprofit establishments to private, for profit organizations specializing in caregiving. These services are intended for children, older persons, sick persons, persons with disabilities, and other persons who need to be supported and for whom family members can not provide care directly. In contrast to traditional societies, an important portion of caregiving has moved out of the home to specialized caregivers. There is, however, still a lot of caregiving at home, particularly to children. And as women have increasingly joined the labor market, families have become more dependent on the communities in which they live for the provision of care for both young and old (see Larkin, chapter five).

In developing countries, there is no easy replacement for waning family support. In sub-Saharan Africa, the HIV/AIDS epidemic and civil war have altered the pattern of IG relationships as the middle generation has been decimated. On an increasing scale, grandparents provide care for their orphaned grandchildren, and there are many cases in which in orphan families, the eldest child provides support to siblings (see Oduaran, chapter eleven). In other African countries, the establishment of cash crop economies and other economic transformations has led to major social changes that include disintegration of the traditional families, increase in the number of female-headed families, and in the number of divorces. The effect is that the support that the traditional extended family used to provide has declined considerably (Oheneba-Sakyi and Takyi, 2006; and Oduaran, chapter eleven). In many Latin American countries, including Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, conditional cash transfer programs are geared at



supporting mothers and children and pulling them out of poverty. The lack of a solid web of social assistance programs in these societies puts vulnerable persons such as children and older persons in a precarious situation.

For simplicity, it is possible to think of caregiving along a continuum that goes from family caregiving, or the private sphere, to institutional caregiving by governmental institutions or organizations (for profit or nonprofit) in the public sphere. In the private sphere, families (based on nuclear, extended, kin, or quasi-family relationships) fulfil caregiving functions to each other and to their immediate neighborhoods and communities. These services are based on solidarity (often IG) and, in the long run, provide much-needed cohesion. Over time, as societies evolve and become industrialized, caregiving moves away from the immediate households due to the increased mobility of families, their restructuring, and the increased numbers of women leaving home and joining the work place. More and more, caregiving moves to the public realm, to organizations outside the home, and eventually, to the market. The latter is true in more advanced countries where caregiving for older persons, for example, can be delivered by professional institutions working for profit.


The continuum described above is presented as an idealized representation only, since societies do not necessarily move from the private sphere to the public sphere in a linear manner. And often, in the case of developing countries, they have moved from the private sphere to positions of mixed presence of social security programs for a small portion of the population (usually salaried labor force and their dependents), professional caregiving for a small segment of affluent persons, and informal community- and family-based caregiving that is unstable and inadequate giving the context of poverty in which caregivers live.

It is useful to underscore the unique role that government plays in the public realm. Governments are expected to be responsible for the support and care of all members of society, guarantee their physical integrity, and formulate and implement social policies in partnership with nongovernment actors. They set social integration benchmark goals and develop the capacity to guide and monitor progress. In developed countries, governments administer a diversity of programs that ensure a basic level of well-being and social protection. In developing countries, this quest is often elusive.

Building on the three dimensions of society presented in section 1, namely the normative, the positive, and the collective actions, one can think of society as a circle with concentric inner circles each representing a separate dimension, from values (red circle), facts (blue circle), to collective actions (red circle). Societies are constantly evolving, and these three dimensions interact constantly. In figure 1.1 society, as a whole circle, moves as if it were a pendulum from the private to the public sphere along this idealized

continuum. This movement, indicated by the grey arrows, is an outcome of structural changes in the social fabric that are linked to socioeconomic development and institutional shifts. It shows how caregiving moves beyond the family to other social arrangements, which may include combinations of community care and some social assistance programs or to the main use of social services if the pendulum were to swing to the far left.

Presently, welfare states are facing sustainability challenges due to aging, sharp fertility decrease, and high public debt. In Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy, the introduction of parametric reforms are aiming at cuts in transfers and more stringent eligibility conditions for benefits to alleviate the financial burden of publicly led social protection programs. In the United States, where the welfare system is relatively less generous compared to some European countries, the social security system is also under a lot of stress. In addition, in both Europe and the United States, it has become apparent that caregiving can be provided by family members if enough incentives are in place. Families with small children can be



**Figure 1.1** Intergenerational Solidarity Pendulum of Society along the Public / Private Continuum

supported in ways that could reverse the drop in fertility rates and, at the same time, allow children to grow in a stable and loving environment.<sup>8</sup> Similarly, working adults could be better prepared to care for their aging parents if governments were to acknowledge, financially, their caring role. These and other examples, involving caring functions for persons with disabilities and chronically sick persons, are situations that are prompting stakeholders to advocate for policies and programs that can bring back the family or tight communities of friends to their traditional roles of main care providers. In figure 1.1, this move is represented by society swinging back from the public sphere pole toward the private one.

The sole purpose of figure 1.1 is to model in a simple manner the steady evolution of society driven by changes in ideologies and values, outcomes of social policies and interventions to affect caregiving and IG solidarity, and the impact of advocacy and efforts to address caregiving needs. More importantly, figure 1.1 also aims at representing how the basic function of caregiving, the quintessential evidence of IG solidarity, has moved outside the realm of the home and the family. It shows that although IG solidarity may have been built into the “pay-as-you-go” social security systems, in which younger active workers, through their contributions, provide benefits for retired older persons, relationships and caring have become more professional and detached. There may be additional value in this new paradigm as tensions and conflicts from within family interaction has been suppressed. At the same time, in cases in which the dismembering of family has not been supplemented by effective institutional caregiving vulnerable persons, a majority of the population in developing countries, render a net loss.

Clearly, societies with weak governments and institutions face enormous challenges ahead. The family structures that used to provide care to persons in need have eroded. And, in contrast to welfare states, social protection systems have not developed enough to hold vulnerable persons and adequately support them, both at the beginning and at the end of life, as well as through sickness and other types of need. Adding to this complex situation, societies are also facing major demographic and socioeconomic processes that they will need to manage satisfactorily. I shift now to a brief review of the nature of these unfolding processes.

#### **4. Poverty and Inequality, Jobs, and Aging**

Societies today are facing numerous challenges, including pressures from climate change and natural disasters and the effects of the 2008 global financial crisis, which originated in the United States. In what follows, I will focus on three long-term processes only. They are the global incidence of poverty and inequality, rising job insecurity, and accelerating aging.

## Poverty and Inequality

In a world of rapid socioeconomic and technological changes that have disrupted traditional relationships,<sup>9</sup> more and more people are experiencing an unprecedented process of social dislocations, often leading to greater vulnerability of different segments of society. The distribution of income, assets, and opportunities is becoming more skewed. One fifth of the world's population still lives in poverty. Poverty reduction efforts and employment generating programs attempt to eliminate the causes of poverty, but, despite these efforts, a large number of communities struggle to provide care to their vulnerable members with increasingly fewer resources and more institutional constraints. In addition, economic insecurity and new challenges of a long-term nature associated with climate change are spreading, particularly in the developing world (United Nations, 2008). A study on international and global inequality found that in 1960, there were 41 rich countries, of which 19 were nonWestern. Four decades later, there were only 31 rich countries, and only 9 of them were nonWestern (Milanovic, 2005, p. 65).

In view of this, developing countries need to implement proactive social policies to end poverty and reduce inequality. However, they have felt the pressures of keeping their public budgets under control to promote financial stability and economic growth. To maintain fiscal balance, governments have reassessed their social policies, seeking cost-effectiveness and efficiency, which has led in many cases to reforms in the area of social protection. These reforms have sought to give the market a greater role in the provision of social services such as health care and pensions. Evidence shows, however, that social provision channelled through the market and wider use of market instruments can only partially replace public social provision. For example, private insurance policies—the pillar of social protection through the market mechanism—can only be purchased by those who can afford payment, usually formal salaried workers. This leaves a broad segment of society, mostly informal and rural workers and their families, without the needed coverage for health care, disabilities, old age, professional training, and unemployment.

## Job Insecurity and Labor Markets

The 2008 global financial crisis increased unemployment everywhere, but proportionally more in developed countries. Double-digit unemployment rates in Europe and rates close to 10 percent in the United States added to concerns about creating job security in a world that is increasingly more competitive and flexible. In the developing world, more than open unemployment, the main issue is productive and stable job opportunities and

the reduction of low-skilled informal work. Youth employability and the training of young persons for jobs that do not exist at the present time is one of the critical areas for social policy.

The earlier younger workers obtain gainful employment and insert themselves productively in the labor market, the higher the likelihood that they will build a strong foundation for lifelong work. Programs and community based networks that link families, religious and youth organizations, and firms in support of internships and contracts for recent graduates constitute important strategies to increase youth employment. Mentoring, apprenticeships, and training programs for young workers are also effective tools to facilitate entry into the labor market (see Mazza, chapter nine). In some cases, pressure is exerted on senior workers to leave their jobs to allow greater job mobility. But weak social protection systems, particularly in the developing world, push them to continue in their jobs for as long as they can afford to work.

### Aging

In an aging world, in which people are living longer, new demands for large-scale health and pension schemes are emerging. This is a major economic challenge that practically all societies are facing or will be facing soon. In the United States, precautions are being taken to meet this challenge, but its extent and the proposed reform programs are varied, and they often depend largely on shared values as much as on economic forces (Shactman and Altman, 2002). Health care and pension programs are vital, and access to them through employment and contributions payments constitute one of the main social protection pillars.

Antonucci and Jackson (2007) state: "It has become clear that as life expectancy increases, the number of generations within each family is increasing, while the number of people in each generation is consistently decreasing." This process is happening everywhere, including the developing world where the pace of aging is rapidly accelerating. The developed world has been aging for quite a while, but its high income level helps find solutions in a more flexible way. The story is completely different for the developing world that has not been able to accumulate necessary resources to meet the new needs due to aging.

Aging and longer lifespans are transforming the age structure of societies from a triangle into a rectangle (Bengtson and Lowenstein, pp. 6–9). This transformation shows that the proportion of children, youth, the middle-aged, and older persons very soon will be approximately the same. With the continuous decline in fertility rates and rapid growth of older cohorts, the age structure of the population will eventually become a

polygon with a shorter base and a larger top. Hence, dependency rates will rise substantially, with the predictable result that there will be fewer adults available to provide care for an increasing number of older persons. In developing countries, a large proportion of older persons with no income security will need care services, but their extended families will be increasingly less capable of supporting them.

### Conclusion

IG solidarity is admittedly a relationship that is resilient and only natural, today as it has been historically. The needs of our time are such that collaborations among generations are of paramount importance in order to find solutions to pending issues and craft a future of greater social cohesion. Many efforts from local and global leaders are unfolding, and some collective actions are inspiring because they are leading to awareness about the needs of young and old persons, persons with disabilities, sick persons, and other vulnerable groups. Actions are needed, from community-based organizations to the legislative and executive levels, to adopt the kind of IG lenses that lead to adequate social policy. The field of IG studies is growing, and the literature on the normative and positive levels of society, as well as on collective actions, is expanding. It is expected that IG professionals will continue to plan and implement programs that pull generations together.

### Notes

1. Schindlmayr, Thomas, 2006, "Reconsidering intergenerational concerns," in *International Journal of Social Welfare*, vol 15, pp. 181–184, indicates that "there is a degree of moral obligation across generations in every society," p. 181. He also states that younger and older generations are bound by an implicit social contract that supposes that each generation should take care of others at different stages of the life cycle. In societies where governments are not the main providers of institutionalized forms of the contract, families and communities maintain the contract.
2. Within the family, Aboderin 2006 distinguishes the material (*factual or positive*) from the normative justification for IG support in her analytical framework.
3. In 1994, Argentina privatized a portion of its public pay-as-you-go pension system; see Isuani, Ernesto Aldo and Jorge Antonio San Martino, 1998.
4. A review of the literature on cohesion and solidarity is presented in chapter 1, Mangan, Bengtson, and Landry, Jr. eds., 1988.
5. McChesney, Kay Young and Vern L. Bengtson, 1988, "Solidarity, Integration, and Cohesion in Families: Concepts and Theories," in David J. Mangan, Vern L. Bengtson, and Pierre H. Landry, Jr. eds., 1988, chapter 2. Authors conclude that: Solidarity is complex and multidimensional; too often,

mechanical (positive) aspects are emphasized rather than organic (normative) solidarity; that conceptualizations of solidarity are not clear thus requiring additional critical analysis; and that it needs to be adequately measured.

6. See also Bengtson, Vern and Robert Roberts, 1991.
7. See also Mangen, Bengtson, and Landry, Jr. eds., 1988, p. 23.
8. These family (and parenting) programs exist in many Northern European countries.
9. Among grandparents, parents, and children due, for the most part, to geographical separation.

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## CHAPTER TWO

# INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY AND CONFLICT

WHAT DOES IT MEAN AND WHAT ARE THE BIG ISSUES?

*Vern L. Bengtson and Petrice S. Oyama*

This chapter describes some of the sociological parameters of intergenerational solidarity. We argue that there are two levels of analysis, the macro- and microsocial; the macrosocial is reflected at the level of society and groups (what we will call “macrogens”) and the microsocial at the level of families and individuals (“microgens”). Similarly, we argue that it is impossible to discuss solidarity without considering its opposite, conflict, and vice versa.

Sociologists have generally focused more on conflict than on solidarity, and with the coming age boom marked by the aging of the “baby boomers,” many observers have warned about a “war between generations” as the young begin to protest what they see as an inequitable distribution of public resources favoring the elderly. Will there be generational conflict in the future? What about intergenerational solidarity? To what extent will transmission be blocked across the macrogens and the microgens, so the best from the past cannot continue to flow to future generations?

### **Intergenerational Solidarity**

Perhaps the simplest definition of intergenerational solidarity is “social cohesion between generations” (Bengtson, Olander, and Haddad, 1976; Katz and others, 2003; Roberts, Richards, and Bengtson, 1991). But what kind of cohesion? And between which, or what kind of, generations? These are crucial questions. In common language, the term generation can be used to

describe a group of youth, the relationship between a father and a son, or “the baby boom generation,” but the three obviously are not the same.

### **Macrogens and Microgens**

We begin by noting there are two levels of analysis, two levels of society, involved in the problem of generational solidarity. The first is the macrosocial level of populations and societies with age groups such as “youth” and “the elderly.” These are, as demographers (Ryder, 1965) point out, properly called “age cohorts” since they are groups that share one common characteristic, that of year of birth. Usually, they are grouped by demographers into 10-year intervals, a somewhat artificial and arbitrary grouping that nevertheless provides useful comparisons between age groups. In common, popular usage, they are grouped according to major events, such as “baby boomers” (sharing a dramatic rise in the birth rate compared to cohorts before and after them) or the “depression generation” (note the use here of the term generation instead of cohort).

The second social level of age groups is the microsocial, that of small groups, most notably the family. Here generation refers to ranked descent within a lineage, and here the term is least ambiguous: mothers and daughters, grandmothers and granddaughters, great-grandmothers, and so on. In biblical times such lineage descent was used to mark the passage of time, rather than chronological years; this is still true in some premodern societies.

There is yet a third use of the term, one suggested by Mannheim (1928/1952) almost a century ago: generation as a social unit in the forefront of social change (Bengtson and others, 1985). Mannheim argued that youth, having “fresh contact” with status quo political and economic institutions, saw the deficiencies and hypocrisies of adult society and marshaled themselves to reform them. Thus, youth were at the forefront of revolutionary movements. The “generation unit” usage is beyond the scope of this chapter and we will not comment on it further.

Thus, it is very important to be clear about what we mean when we use the term generation. Is it “macrogens,” cohorts of age groups in the broader society? Or is it “microgens,” age-ranked positions within a family with their implications of power and warmth?

### **Solidarity and Conflict**

Another distinction that should be noted is more obvious: that between solidarity and conflict. Solidarity, however, has sadly received very little attention from social scientists—in contrast to conflict, which some would

say is the foundation of sociology. Indeed, this volume may be one of the first to focus on intergenerational solidarity rather than conflict.

But the most fundamental questions in sociology pertain to the nature of the social bond: ties that link individuals to groups and one group to another. Inquiry into substantive concerns as diverse as mate selection and interorganizational linkages have in common a concern for the bonds created and sustained between individuals. Issues of warmth, affection, attraction and interaction, and providing assistance when needed are part of this bonding. And this is what we mean by solidarity.

Conflict is more than simply the absence of solidarity; high conflict and high solidarity can coexist. For example, it is difficult to escape conflict in intergenerational relations. At the macrosocial level, there is both conflict and solidarity between youth and age, at the microsocal level, between fathers and sons; such are the themes of Western civilization's oldest literature.

Solidarity and conflict are both difficult to measure in social science research, and this may be one reason why solidarity has been ignored by many researchers. But at the macrosocial level, solidarity can be measured by public opinion items, such as, "Members of my age group have been deprived of the opportunities that are available to other age groups" (Garstka, Hummert, and Branscombe, 2005). At the microsocal level, intergenerational family solidarity can be measured by items that ask, for example, "How close do you feel to your father," and "How often do you see your father?" (Bengtson and Mangen, 1988).

### **The Problem of Generations**

When discussing generational or age group relations and their implications for intergenerational solidarity, it is also important to conceptualize the *problem of generations*—the renegotiation of the balance between continuity and innovation over time through the succession of one generation by another. The recurring problem of generations and age groups in human society involves the challenge of ensuring group continuity over time as well as adaptability and innovation in the face of time-related changes (Mannheim, 1928/1952). As products of unique sociohistorical influences, younger generations are the carriers of new perspectives and commitments that represent the potential for change as they encounter the existing social order (Elder, 1978; Ryder, 1965). However, despite change in both participants and the social environment, the inertia of tradition persists through the decades. This is seen in historical comparisons, which suggest more stability through time in groups and societies (Allen, 1952).

Intergenerational solidarity is best understood within the context of shared expectations and obligations regarding the aging of individuals and the succession of generations. This contract across generations and age groups represents the norms operating at the micro and macro levels of social structure in a given sociohistorical context. Three sets of normative expectations and obligations characterize the traditional contract across generations: (1) biosocial generation and socialization norms reflect the primary involvement of families and public education in the socialization of each successive generation; (2) norms of *gerosocial succession* are associated with the availability of resources in the form of financial and emotional support provided to the younger generation by older generations in families, and in public transfers involving the passing of older generations in death or retirement; and (3) there are norms regarding *geriatric dependencies*, which reflect the expectation that family caregiving and public support from welfare programs will be provided for the old.

Three concepts have been used to examine change and continuity in intergenerational comparisons: cohort effects, lineage effects, and period effects (see Bengtson and others, 1985, for a more comprehensive discussion). Although these three effects are interrelated, each provides a slightly different perspective for viewing the succession of generations and subsequent social change, while also taking into account change and development occurring at the individual, family, and historical levels (Aldous, 1978; Elder, 1984; Hagestad, 1984).

One explanation for contrasts between individuals who differ in chronological age focuses on factors related to cohort experiences. *Cohort effects* refer to particular sociopolitical events that occurred to a group born during a certain time period and were therefore experienced at a common level of the group's biosocial development, usually childhood or youth. Members of successive cohorts grow up at different points in historical time and are products of different sets of personal or sociopolitical concerns, as well as life experiences that are encountered at different stages of lifespan development. Population trends, economic indicators, and relationships among demographic groups and social positions are relevant variables (Riley, 1985) for studying the birth rate, dependency ratio, economic conditions, and political trends that influence the sociohistorical experiences of cohorts across the life course. Other social structural variables, such as social class, race, and geographic location, influence intra-cohort differences.

*Lineage effects* represent the bidirectional nature of intergenerational socialization, which can lead to continuities despite cohort and maturation differences. The face-to-face negotiation of generational turnover and its social manifestations at the microstructural level are reflected within

the context of the family, in which the paradox of continuity and change is most immediate among individuals who differ in chronological age and occupy different positions in the unfolding succession of generations. The family is a prototypical structure of social organization, in which there is a series of statuses defined by ranked descent that form successive links in the flow of biological and social generations.

*Period effects* are seen in the impact of sociopolitical events, such as wars, economic shifts, and political causes, which affect all groups within a society. The analysis of period effects involves comparisons of perceptions, events, or attitudes at a given point in time to those of another time.

### **Macrogens: Solidarity and Conflict Between Age Cohorts**

Four global trends suggest that the contract across generations is changing around the world: (1) the extension of the life course; (2) changes in the age structures of nations; (3) changes in family structures and relationships; and (4) changes in governmental responsibilities (Bengtson and others, 2003). These demographic and sociopolitical trends have contributed to growing policy debates over “generational equity” in macro level public policy discussions in the United States (Achenbaum, 1989; Bengtson, Marti, and Roberts, 1991; Kingson, Hirshorn, and Cornman, 1986; Quadagno, 1990; Thomson, 1993; Walker, 1993).

At the microsocal level of families, the provision of care for the elderly and changing intergenerational reciprocity norms are concerns facing families in both developed and developing countries. Gender role differences and ethnic differences in socioeconomic status and cultural norms also influence the intergenerational contract and reveal inequalities in social structures. Changes in living arrangements reflect shifting values and norms and affect opportunities for intergenerational exchanges of affection and instrumental support. In addition, migration from rural to urban areas and across national borders involves renegotiations of intergenerational expectations and obligations across geographic space. These changes suggest two competing possible consequences: (1) greater conflicts between age groups; or (2) greater solidarity between adult generations within the family and across age groups in the broader society.

#### The Changing “Contract Across Generations” and Equity Across Macrogens

In the mid-1980s, a political issue emerged in several Western industrialized nations that illustrates the new debate regarding the “contract across generations.” The issue concerns potential inequities between age groups

in the distribution of economic advantage and the desirability of redrafting public policy legislation to produce more “equity” among age groups. The issue has arisen from profound demographic changes involving the aging of societies and from concerns that younger age cohorts will not receive the same level of benefits when they retire that today’s older people receive.

The basic argument made by “generational equity” advocates can be summarized as follows: (1) In recent years, there has been a growth of public resources directed toward older members of the population, resulting from legislation meant to counter previous levels of poverty among older persons and from effective political lobbying. This has led to substantial improvement in the economic status of older persons and in their access to health care. Older persons are becoming better off as a group than the nonaged population, especially children, and the proportion of federal funds directed to the oldest age group is increasing every year. At the same time, the flow of resources to children and other dependent populations has decreased, proportionally. Thus, to continue the flow of federal resources to older persons is inequitable and will be the source of intergenerational conflict.

A major critique of the generational conflict hypothesis is that this perspective relies largely upon projected demographic trends and theoretical conceptualizations that have not been empirically demonstrated by public opinion polls and other research (Cook, Barabas, and Page, 2002). Instead, critics argue that the generational conflict debate is merely a “symbolic battle” created and disseminated by the mass media and political interests (Binstock, 2005; Williamson, McNamara, and Howling, 2003).

Critics of the generational equity perspective proposed an alternative frame, the generational interdependence perspective, which argues that the gains of one generation are not necessarily achieved at the expense of others, and that different age groups have common, rather than competing, interests (Williamson, McNamara, and Howling, 2003). For example, age-based policies benefit the multigenerational family since they reduce the financial burden of families providing economic support for their aging parents. In addition, there is a bidirectional exchange of social support between the generations, in which adult children function as caregivers for their elderly parents and grandparents, who serve as primary caregivers for their grandchildren. However, the generational interdependence perspective has not gained popularity in the American mass media, as its focus on community obligation for vulnerable populations resonates less strongly with dominant American cultural values upholding individualism (Williamson, McNamara, and Howling, 2003).

### Research on Macrogens Solidarity and Conflict

Nationwide survey data suggest that no age group is perceived as receiving an inequitable amount of government benefits and that most people do not feel that programs that provide benefits are too costly (Bengtson and Murray, 1992). In a study conducted by the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), the potential for intergenerational conflict was found in a small proportion of the public (five to ten percent), and perceptions of intergenerational tensions were found in only 15 to 20 percent of the public (Schlesinger and Kronebusch, 1994).

Garstka, Hummert, and Branscombe (2005) found that the framing of intergenerational comparisons in the news media influenced public support for age-based social programs. However, contrary to the generational conflict perspective, it was found that media portrayals of the "greedy geezer" approach were more likely to elicit support for increased federal spending for age-based programs, rather than drastic cuts to federally funded programs that tend to unequally favor older adults. Dowd (1980) suggests that intergenerational support for the continued funding of age-based programs, across members of all age groups, may occur when the advantages and disadvantages held by certain generations are portrayed in the media.

### Macrogens Solidarity and Conflict Around the World

Further evidence against the intergenerational conflict hypothesis has been found in European countries. In a comparative study of the United States, France, Italy, and Germany, Wisensale (2005) describes how intergenerational equity, in terms of economic support and caregiving for the elderly, is becoming a global issue and how intergenerational conflict (or lack thereof) differs in these countries due to the sociohistorical context and existing social policies of each nation. In France, there is more of a conflict between public and private pensioners. In both Germany and Italy, there is more opposition to the cessation of early retirement and dissatisfaction over sluggish economies. In Norway, Gulbrandsen and Langsether (1999) suggest that intergenerational transfer patterns are not the basis for conflict. Instead, they suggest that the intergenerational conflict hypothesis is based on financial inequalities between the generations at the macro level, rather than the voluntary support transfers from parent to child at the family level.

The intergenerational equity debate has not been as significant in Canada, compared with the United States (Marshall, Cook, and Marshall, 1993). In the United States, this issue is debated in the mass media, academic research, and among policy groups, but is largely absent from political agendas in Canada, where universal programs for incomes offer income security and medical care regardless of age. Together with the provision of



family allowances, these contribute to a lesser sense of intergenerational inequity. In contrast, there is greater receptivity to interest group politics.

### **Microgens: Solidarity and Conflict within Family Generations**

The problem of generations at the microsocial level of families emanated from concerns about generational relations that emerged in the early 1960s, which included the specter of "the decline of the family" and its corollary "the abandonment of elder family members." Mass media portrayals of the family focused on the disintegration of traditional family forms and the inability of families to provide care and support to dependent elders, who were placed in nursing homes.

However, many studies have shown the strength of families as functioning social support units with frequent and regular intergenerational contact and assistance (see Rossi and Rossi, 1990). Far from being abandoned by family, the elderly in industrialized societies are in close contact with kin, engage in warm relationships with them, and are both givers and receivers of support and assistance (see Bengtson, Rosenthal, and Burton, 1990).

Intergenerational solidarity evidenced at the societal level may reflect the close interpersonal ties seen across the generations within families (Garstka, Hummert, and Branscombe, 2005). At the family level, intergenerational relations are often characterized by interdependence and mutual support (Mancini and Blieszner, 1989; Norris and Tindale, 1994) and are rarely observed to be in overt conflict (Aquilino, 1999).

The construct of intergenerational solidarity at the family level characterizes the behavioral and emotional dimensions of interaction, cohesion, sentiment, and support between parents and children, and grandparents and grandchildren, over the course of long-term relationships. Six conceptual dimensions have been used to measure intergenerational solidarity (Bengtson and Schrader, 1982; Roberts, Richards, and Bengtson, 1991):

1. Affectual solidarity: the sentiments and evaluations family members express about their relationship with other members
2. Associational solidarity: the type and frequency of contact between intergenerational family members
3. Consensual solidarity: agreement in opinions, values, and orientations between generations
4. Functional solidarity: the giving and receiving of support across generations
5. Normative solidarity: expectations regarding filial obligations and parental obligations, as well as norms about the importance of familistic values

6. Structural solidarity: the “opportunity structure” for cross-generational interaction reflecting geographic proximity between family members

It is important to point out that most of the economic research and writing about intergenerational relationships has focused on only one of these six dimensions of solidarity, that of functional exchange—the giving and receiving of support, usually financial, across generations. If other dimensions are considered, they are the structural (how far apart parents and children live) and the associational (how often they have contact with one another).

The intergenerational solidarity perspective is one of ongoing development, which has adapted to include conflict and negative effects in family relationships in order to reflect empirical and theoretical developments in family studies (Bengtson and others, 2002; Katz and others, 2005). Marshall, Matthews, and Rosenthal (1993) found that the dynamic interplay of positive and negative affect, and conflict and negotiation in intergenerational family relationships was largely overlooked in sociological family research. Luscher and Pillemer (1998) describe intergenerational ambivalence as the irreconcilable contradictions that operate at the socio-structural and individual level and influence the experience of mixed emotions in relationships between parents and adult children.

Along with the protracted nature of parent-child relationships, structural tensions between autonomy and independence, along with dissimilarities in developmental life stage, status, cohort socialization, and gender roles, give rise to intergenerational ambivalence in late-life families. Incorporating the life course perspective, ambivalence theorists take into account the historical and structural influences that shape intergenerational relations across time (Connidis and McMullen, 2002; Luscher and Pillemer, 1998). Unlike the solidarity and conflict perspectives, the ambivalence approach recognizes the interaction of both solidarity and conflict in intergenerational family relationships. Bengtson and others (2002) argue that these models are not necessarily competing perspectives, asserting instead the complementary nature of the solidarity-conflict and ambivalence models. Along with solidarity, Katz and others (2005) suggest that ambivalence and conflict are also aspects of strong, harmonious intergenerational relationships.

The “task-specific theory of organizational effectiveness” (Litwak and others, 2003; Messeri, Silverstein, and Litwak, 1993) describes the interaction between families and formal organizations and bridges macro and micro perspectives of intergenerational solidarity. According to this perspective, multigenerational families and larger formal organizations are

engaged in a public-private partnership. Although formal organizations have taken on certain traditional family functions, the family continues to play an important role in facilitating and managing this joint partnership. From this perspective, the “generational contract” within families has changed to cope with contemporary socioeconomic realities, but nevertheless remains a salient structural construct that is suggestive of the enduring nature of intergenerational bonds in families today.

### Research on Microgens Solidarity and Conflict

Using longitudinal data from the Longitudinal Study of Generations (LSOG), we have been able to chart the course of intergenerational solidarity dimensions over time. One consistent result concerns the high levels of affectual solidarity (reflecting the emotional bonds between the generations) that have been found over six measurement periods, from 1971 to 1997 (Bengtson, Biblarz, et al., 2000; Bengtson, Giarrusso, and others, 2000). We find that average solidarity scores between grandparents and parents, parents and youth, and grandparents and grandchildren are high, considerably above the expected midpoint of the scale. These scores are remarkably stable over the 26 years of measurement.

There is also a “generational bias” in these reports: parents consistently report higher affect than their children do over time, as do grandparents compared with grandchildren. This supports the “intergenerational stake” hypothesis first proposed 30 years ago (Bengtson and Kuypers, 1971; Giarrusso, Feng, and Bengtson, 2004; Giarrusso, Stallings, and Bengtson, 1995). That is, the older generation has a greater psychological social investment, or “stake,” in their joint relationship than does the younger generation, and this influences their perceptions and evaluations of their common intergenerational relationships.

At the same time, it should be noted that not all intergenerational relationships display such high levels of emotional closeness. We find that about one in five relationships are characterized by either significant conflict (Clarke and others, 1999) or detachment. Diversity and complexity are inherent features of family networks across generations.

### Microgens Level Solidarity Around the World

Intergenerational family relationships are also influenced by subgroup membership, that is, racial, ethnic, cultural, and historical contexts (Antonucci and Jackson, 2003). The cross-national Old Age and Autonomy: The Role of Service Systems and Intergenerational Family Solidarity study (OASIS) compared data from Germany, Norway, Spain, Israel, and the United

Kingdom and found cross-cultural support for the intergenerational cohesion of the extended family despite social change (Katz et al., 2005). Katz et al. (2003) also found that differences between countries were larger than differences between age groups within each country in terms of the underlying beliefs and preferences regarding intergenerational family solidarity.

Intergenerational solidarity between family generations is also seen in the contemporary context of transnationalism, which requires the crossing of national borders to maintain intergenerational ties. The endurance of generational ties across geographic space in transnational families shows the ability of the family to adapt to the challenges associated with geographic separation due to migration. Transnational expressions of intergenerational solidarity take the form of associational contact with family members abroad and functional exchanges in the form of remittances and financial aid. For example, South Asian immigrant elders in the United Kingdom continue to fulfill their intercontinental obligations by sending remittances to their families and community in their country of origin, and family members maintain intergenerational ties by visiting relatives abroad (Burholt and Wenger, 2004).

Ethnographic accounts from anthropologic studies suggest that there is much evidence of intergenerational solidarity in nonindustrial societies. Sentiments of affection and obligation, as well as expectations of economic benefits, are reinforced by cultural values, religious beliefs, and negative sanctions at the macro level. When the informal contract between the generations fails, it is not due to a decline in intergenerational solidarity. Instead, Foner (1993) argues that the neglect of incapacitated elders may be seen as a "fulfillment" of the contract and a tacit understanding between the generations. Elders themselves may also request death-hastening treatment.

From this perspective, the harsh conditions faced by the elderly in developing nations are related to several factors. Childlessness is considered a terrible misfortune in nonindustrial societies. Childless elders are left to rely on distant kin, with whom weaker bonds are shared due to the provision of fewer resources and exchanges from the older generation to elicit a strong sense of obligation from the younger generation. Even among those with children, "defacto childlessness" may occur due to the migration of younger generations to urban areas to work in an increasingly modernizing society. Times of limited resources induce a cost/contribution balance between the generations. Environmental factors, such as drought and famine, as well as the struggle of adult children to care for both their aging parents and their own children, contribute to the lessened flow of resources to the older generation. The mobility demands of herding and horticultural societies also influence the abandonment of frail elders, as do cultural and religious beliefs.

According to Foner (1993), a worsening position of older persons in developed nations is only one possible outcome of modernization. Families in developing countries continue to meet caregiving obligations and filial duties. Despite increasing modernization, families in developing parts of the world continue to struggle to meet the obligations to the older generation. Children continue to be the main support for elders without the safety net of a government administered benefit system.

### The Future of Generational Solidarity and Conflict

What about the future? Will there be more, or less, solidarity between generations in the coming decades? We can explore some reasons why macrosocial solidarity will be less likely by 2020, as well as reasons why it will be more likely.

There are several reasons to suggest that there may be less intergenerational conflict, and that solidarity between generations at both the micro- and macrosocial levels may be high:

1. *The cultural (or structural) lag hypothesis.* Social structures and cultural values are evolving to reflect our changing age composition, with the result that we will have created more, and more effective, mechanisms to deal with large numbers of older persons.
2. *Norms of solidarity and support.* Many studies have described significant intergenerational solidarity at the family level, with relations between generations solid and rewarding and with a great deal of mutual support taking place (Rossi and Rossi, 1990). This solidarity reflects norms of filial piety, reciprocity, altruism, and self-interest (individuals' expectations for their own future) that may continue to be expressed at both the microsocial level of families and the macrosocial level of society.
3. *Norms of reciprocity.* Life course and intergenerational norms of reciprocity are very high. People continue to believe in a cyclical process of helping and being helped throughout life. The burdens of caregiving for a child are taken for granted; so, too, are many of the burdens of elder caregiving, although normative expectations and obligations are changing along with global economic realities. Family contact seems to have high value, especially in terms of generational relations.
4. *New roles for the aged.* We may also see the development of collective change in the definition of what older persons can and should contribute to society. For example, they may be seen as the resource for noneconomic capital—knowledge about relationships and history.

In light of global changes that threaten to break apart seemingly tenuous generational connections, older adults provide a bridge to the past, keeping families together and reminding us that our society has dealt with the problem of generations across time.

There are three overarching reasons why there might be a decrease in age group or generational solidarity between now and 2020:

1. *Increases in the dependency ratio.* The decline in fertility translates into fewer workers left to support aging retirees.
2. *Increased perceptions of “generational inequity.”* If older persons become better off as a group than the nonaged, or if the cost of living of the nonaged increases significantly, then the elderly are more and more likely to be perceived as “greedy geezers.” It will be increasingly argued that public support for older persons comes from funds that could be allocated to other segments of society, such as youth, and to affordable housing for young families. This is the “generational equity” scenario as discussed above.
3. *Increased “ageism.”* There will probably be a continuation of negative stereotyping that sees older persons as rigid, terribly old-fashioned, unable to cope, irrelevant, and worthless. As more of the older population of the future live past 85, and as more live with mental impairments like Alzheimer’s disease and strokes, it could be that aging itself will be more negatively viewed. Moreover, if technological advances become even more a part of personal life, those who cannot or will not adapt to these new techniques may be left behind. On the other hand, there may be even greater emphasis on the virtues of youth. With fertility low and children proportionately less common, youth will be valued more highly, and attention will be turned to the young at the expense of the old.

### **Conclusion**

In this chapter we have attempted to define the sociological parameters of intergenerational solidarity. We have argued that there are two levels to the analysis, the macrosocial and microsocial, one reflected at the level of society and groups (what we have called “macrogens”) and the other at the level of families and individuals (what we have termed “microgens”). Similarly, we argue that it is impossible to discuss intergenerational solidarity without considering its opposite, conflict, and vice versa.

Sociologists have generally focused more on conflict than on solidarity, and, with the coming age boom and the uncertainty of financial markets,

many observers have warned about a “war between generations” as the young begin to protest what they see as an inequitable distribution of public resources favoring the old. The generational equity perspective, however, overlooks the bidirectional exchanges of social and economic support that occur between generations in families, which flow mostly downward from older to younger generations. Multigenerational family bonds are a valuable resource for individual well-being and support over the life course. We have reviewed the research concerning intergenerational conflict at both the macro and micro level, and come to a somewhat unexpected conclusion. On the basis of the evidence, it does *not* appear that there will be marked generational conflict in the future, and it is likely that intergenerational solidarity will remain at a high level. This is particularly true at the microgens level, where multigenerational bonds become increasingly important in the context of uncertain economic times.

The contract between generations is changing, but there are also many indications of continuity in the contract, not only within the family, but also at the macrosocial level of age populations and policies. Around the world, intergenerational solidarity persists despite the stresses placed on aging families in developed and developing nations, which struggle to cope with the increasing demands of caring for the older generation as the population ages. Despite political rhetoric about intergenerational equity and the decline of the family, which suggests that intergenerational solidarity at both the societal and familial level is on the decline, both continuity and change is representative in the contract between the generations as it adapts to cope with contemporary demographic realities.

The succession of each generation throughout history indicates that society has been able to adapt to changing internal and external forces that threaten to divide its members along various lines. Yet events that occur in the economic and sociopolitical areas—exogenous to the process of aging and succession—could still determine much of the fate of generational and age group conflicts and solidarities in the future. However, greater conflict between age groups is only one possible consequence of these changes, whereas increased solidarity is another.

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# CHAPTER THREE

## DETERMINANTS OF THE COMPLEX INTERCHANGE AMONG GENERATIONS

COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT

*Ariela Lowenstein*

### **Introduction**

The couple and family orientation of social life and the value attached to sociability make the family a main reference point in the aging process, and aging needs should thus be explored within the context of the family (Brubaker, 1990). Thus, in order to assure the quality of life of older people, and contribute to family cohesion and intergenerational family solidarity, societal and familial changes should be discussed and examined. These include changing demographics, particularly the phenomenon of global aging; changing family structures and support patterns; changing family preferences for care; increased participation of women (the traditional caregivers) in the labor force; changing economic patterns; changing living arrangements of older people; and globalization and technological changes. This chapter addresses most of these changes and their salience to intergenerational family solidarity and social solidarity.

The new millennium confronts us with numerous challenges regarding the aging societies of the modern world. In the last thirty years, there has been unprecedented growth in the number and proportion of older persons in most countries around the world—a trend that is expected to continue. This reflects a “globalization” of aging, even though the pace is more gradual in some countries and more rapid in others (Bengston and others, 2003; Kinsella, 2000). The proportion of people aged 60 and over is increasing faster than any other age group. In 2025, there will be a total of about 1.2 billion people aged 60 and older (WHO, 2007; UN, 2006).

The pace is faster for the developing countries: the proportion of persons over 60 in the developing world as a proportion of total world population was 52 percent in 1950, 63 percent in 2005, and will be 79 percent in 2050 (UN 2007; UN Population Division, 2008).

This global phenomenon raises fundamental questions and issues about the definition of old age, the micro experiences of older people and their families, and the macro responses of societies to the needs of these aging populations. Population aging, however, is not necessarily apocalyptic for individuals, families, societies, and their social systems—it means a changing balance between older and younger people in society and the challenge of establishing new generational relations, of supporting each other, and of social inclusion and social integration. Aging can be a risk factor or an opportunity for realizing new potential.

Moreover, in 2000, 31 countries had populations of at least 2 million who were 65 years of age and older. Projections indicate that by the year 2030 more than 60 countries will have 2 million or more people over the age of 65 (Kinsella and Velkoff, 2001). The “aging of the aged” means that a growing number of the frail elderly will need more care and support. Caregiving by adult children to their older parents is, thus, a major social issue because families in modern societies are still the main source of care and support for older people (e.g., Lowenstein, Katz, and Gur-Yaish, 2008). However, the inability or unwillingness of societies to continue to meet the needs of older cohorts alters the balance between family and societal systems in terms of responsibility for elder care (Lowenstein and Daatland, 2006; Walker, 2000). Such a situation creates sociopolitical and policy challenges to social cohesion. A generational contract and innovative responses are needed on the individual, familial, and societal levels.

Along with population aging, marked changes are evident in family structures, relations, and behaviors. There has been a sharp decline in fertility, changes in the timing of family transitions, increased rates of divorce, and changes in family structures from pyramids to “beanpoles,” with an increased availability of extended, intergenerational kin as family resources (Bengtson, 2000). Changes in patterns of family formation and dissolution and the ensuing diversification of families and households lead to more complex and “atypical” household formations. This diversity is related to what Stacey (1990) has labeled the postmodern family, characterized by “structural fragility, and a greater dependence on the voluntary commitment of its members” (Lowenstein, 2005).

The diversity of family formats creates uncertainty in intergenerational relations, along with new expectations and has specific effects on life-course role transitions (e.g., retirement, grandparenthood). The structural organization of the family is particularly critical for those in

middle age—a phase in life when individuals are likely to play multiple roles. Family structure shapes opportunities for engagement, defining and reinforcing both meaningful social roles and those roles that are burdensome.

Increased life expectancies imply that some individuals will be members of a three or four generation family for longer periods of time, while declining fertility rates and delayed parenthood suggest that others will never be members of such multigenerational families. Sociologists have long recognized that forms of social organization affect well-being. The family constitutes perhaps the most basic social institution, representing the very first group into which one enters at birth, and these ties remain primary over the life course (Hoff and Tesch-Röemer, 2007).

In light of these changing demographic structures and changing family forms, intergenerational bonds among adult family members may be even more important today than previously, because individuals live longer and thus can share more years and experiences with other generations (Bengtson and others, 2000; Connidis, 2001; Lowenstein and others, 2003). Some basic questions, however, must be addressed. What is the impact of these changes on (1) the amount of help and support that is really exchanged between family generations, (2) the strength of the bonds of obligations and expectations between generations, (3) the potential for intergenerational family conflict and ambivalence, (4) the impact of generational ties on the well-being of older people, and (5) the role of society, through its service system, in enhancing family relations?

This chapter contributes to the theory, research, and policy on the linkages between intergenerational family support, and the health and well-being of older persons and their families, as well as to the strengthening of social cohesion. Indeed, as Lomas stated, “individuals and their ill-health cannot be understood solely by looking inside their bodies and brains; one must also look inside their communities, their networks . . . their families and even the trajectories of their life” (Lomas, 1998, p. 1182).

### **Cross-National Data and Research**

However similar the challenge of population aging is cross-culturally, different ways of relating to this challenge have emerged. Bengtson and others (2002) note that we need explanations and understanding of family relationships and their diverse processes across time and place. We must look outside national borders to construct global conceptualizations of families and age. As M. Kohn (1989) observed: “Cross-national research is always a gamble; one might as well gamble where the payoff is commensurate with the risk” (p. 45).

As a region, Europe represents a unique opportunity to study some of the above topics, for two main reasons. First, because Europe is at the forefront of demographic transitions such as decreasing fertility, increased life expectancy, and postponement of childbearing (Kohler, Billari, and Ortega, 2002), it is possible to learn from the European experience and inform policy development in other countries. Second, and perhaps more importantly, variations in policy across several European countries promote a better understanding of the interplay between factors at the societal, familial, and individual levels (Wolf and Ballal, 2006), potentially informing family policy development.

In response to the call by Glaser, Tomassini, and Grundy (2004) for incorporating more comparative cross-national data on family support in research, the data from several European projects will allow the consideration of the different complexities of the cross-European variations. Accordingly, cross-national and cross-cultural results from four European studies—OASIS, SHARE, SOCCARE, EUROFAMCARE—will be presented and analyzed as empirical sources from which to answer the above questions.

The OASIS project<sup>1</sup>—Old Age and Autonomy: The Role of Service Systems and Intergenerational Family Solidarity—was a cross-cultural, cross-national five country (Norway, England, Germany, Spain, and Israel) study. It aimed to enhance cross-cultural knowledge about the interplay between personal, familial, and social service factors and their impact on the quality of life of aging Europeans in diverse family cultures and welfare state regimes. Data were collected from a stratified random sample of 1,200 urban dwellers aged 25 and over in each of the five countries, with an oversampling of those 75 and older, for a total of 6,000 individuals.

The Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE)<sup>2</sup> was a multidisciplinary and cross-national database of micro data on the health, socioeconomic status, and social and family networks of individuals aged 50 or over. Eleven countries have contributed data to the 2004 SHARE baseline study. They are a balanced representation of the various regions in Europe, ranging from Scandinavia (Denmark and Sweden) through Central Europe (Austria, France, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands) to the Mediterranean (Spain, Italy, and Greece). Further data were collected in 2005–2006 in Israel. Two new European Union member states—the Czech Republic and Poland—as well as Ireland joined SHARE in 2006.

EUROFAMCARE<sup>3</sup>—Services for Supporting Family Carers of Elderly People in Europe—was based on data from six national surveys in Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, from a socioeconomic evaluation that was based on personal interviews with

about 6,000 European family carers, who provided at least four hours of care a week to a dependent older person of at least 65 years. In addition, 23 National Background Reports were summarized in a Pan-European Background Report.

The SOCCARE<sup>4</sup> Project—New Kinds of Families, New Kinds of Social Care—was a qualitative study of care arrangements in Finland, France, Italy, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. It focused on four key family types that all are heavily affected by the ongoing demographic, socioeconomic, and structural changes within European societies: single-parent families, dual-career families, immigrant families, and “double front carer” families (those that have young children and, at the same time, elderly family members in need of care). The project interviewed almost 400 European families in detail about their opportunities for and difficulties in making flexible and responsive care arrangements and their ability to combine these arrangements with participation in paid employment. Countries represented in the study all vary from one another with regard to their level of economic development, the organization of their economy as either a more focused welfare state or a market economy, the level of their sociocultural and ethnic diversity, their cultural norms about family and filial relations, and their policies and legislation concerning the aged.

This chapter focuses on the outcomes of the various changes described above, both in demographic terms and in terms of the structure of the family, with an eye to examining how these changes affect the personal and familial lives of older persons and their families, and impact their quality of life and well-being. This chapter examines these outcomes using the theoretical perspectives of the life course, modernization theory, family intergenerational solidarity-conflict (based on social exchange theory), and intergenerational ambivalence.

## Theoretical Perspectives

### Life Course

According to the life course approach, which relates to aging as a general process of intergenerational interactions in changing historical circumstances (e.g., Hareven, 1995), there is room to hypothesize that a common link can be found that bridges the psychological needs of older adults and young people. Such a common link may exist because both live in a challenging historical period that is characterized by the breakdown of social structures and confusion about values. Melucci (1996) addresses this issue when he states that the young are not in touch with the last stages of life because a central characteristic of their “culture” is life in



a virtually chaotic reality without meaning. Becoming acquainted with older people is a way for young people to put some meaning into their lives. Thus, elders can use the social capital they have accumulated during their life course.

The main assumption of the life course approach is that human development is a continuum, and the timing of social roles is shaped by various social contexts, including the family and the state. The life course is composed of many courses that are interdependent on life events and role transitions, such as retirement (Hagestad 2003; Macmillan and Copher 2005). The modern role transition of not working in retirement will need to be reformulated, enabling more people to earn an income well beyond current retirement ages. This reform will also answer the need to expand a shrinking workforce, a pressing need in many European countries.

From a life course perspective, it follows that an alternative formulation of generational equity is generational interdependence. This view emphasizes what different generations have to offer one another, as opposed to what one generation consumes at the expense of the other. Such contributions include transfers of income, child care support, personal assistance, formal volunteering, psychological support, and advice. The overall pattern is that the public generational contract, in which younger generations provide transfers to the older generations, is partly balanced by a private contract in the opposite direction. Family transfers function, to some extent, as an informal insurance system for periods of special needs. It should, thus, be acknowledged that the potential for distributional conflicts among generations certainly exists and is fuelled by the current challenges of public finance and changing demography.

### Modernization

Modernization theory postulates that the more advanced the economy of a society, the lower the status of its older citizens (Cowgill, 1986). In an economy characterized by rapid increases in knowledge, especially technical knowledge, adult children are compelled to move away from their families of origin in order to maximize their educational and occupational opportunities and achievements. Moreover, the political, social, and economic ideologies of the twentieth century focused on opportunity and achievement, with development based on merit and superiority. Large families with many filial obligations were perceived as overly demanding and as blocking opportunities for economic and social mobility. The small nuclear family was better suited to this setting than the large multigenerational one, and its dominance over the extended household coincided with economic growth (Sussman, 1991).

In the 1950s and 1960s, concern about family solidarity was rooted in the isolated nuclear family thesis. More recently, however, it has been connected to the debate on the expanding individualism of late modernity. The isolated nuclear family thesis assumed that a loss of function made the family retreat to the nuclear unit, while both horizontal and vertical family lines outside the nuclear family had lost their importance and, consequently, were weakened (Parsons, 1955; Popenoe, 1993).

Empirical studies, however, fail to support either of these two hypotheses. Intergenerational relationships are affected by modernization, but the changes are not uniformly in the direction of weaker ties. Moreover, studies from several countries, like the OASIS study, indicate that family solidarity is still strong, but may seek other expressions when circumstances change (e.g., Katz and others, 2005). This point was further corroborated by Lowenstein and Daatland (2006), whose study explored family norms and ideals as part of intergenerational family relations. The data from this study are presented in table 3.1.

Filial responsibility represents the extent to which adult children feel obligated to meet the basic needs of their aging parents. The data indicate that the majority in all five countries acknowledge some degree of filial obligation, but more so in Spain and Israel than in Germany, England, and Norway. Differences among countries are rather moderate, so if we take the assumed family-oriented Spain as a criterion, we may conclude that filial obligation norms are quite strong, too, in northern European countries. In addition, strong filial obligation to the elderly has been noted in rapidly developing Asian nations, such as the Philippines (Domingo and Asis, 1995) and Thailand (Knodel, Saengtienchai, and Sittitrai, 1995). A United Nations study of seven developing countries (India, Singapore,

**Table 3.1** Percent in agreement (agree or strongly agree) with filial obligations\*, by item and country (n).<sup>a</sup>

		<i>Norway</i>	<i>England</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Spain</i>	<i>Israel</i>
Item 1	should live close to	29	31	40	57	55
Item 2	should sacrifice	41	47	36	44	37
Item 3	able to depend on	58	41	55	60	51
Item 4	entitled to returns	38	48	26	55	64
Agree with at least one item		76	74	68	83	83
(n)		(1,195)	(1,172)	(1,255)	(1,173)	(1,183)

Source: Lowenstein and Daatland (2006).

Notes: \* All differences are significant at the .001 level

<sup>a</sup> Percent in agreement (agree or strongly agree) with each item and the total scale (agree with at least one item). Weighted samples, population aged 25+ living at home in large urban settings (100,000+), n≈1,200 for each country. The scale is adopted from Lee, Peek, and Coward 1998.

Thailand, South Korea, Egypt, Brazil, and Zimbabwe) concluded that older people were likely to favor coresiding with their children, despite rapid urbanization and economic growth (Hashimoto, 1991).

Indeed, beliefs may supersede the influence of economic development and urbanization on family structure and function, as is evidenced by highly modern Japan, where duty to older relatives is still reinforced by norms of filial piety (Koyano, 2003). Pervasive cultural beliefs about families may overwhelm other population distinctions, for instance, in Spain where older people in both urban and rural areas expect similarly high levels of contact with, and help from, their adult children (Katz and others, 2003).

### Intergenerational Family Solidarity-Conflict Paradigm

In modern societies today, the family is perceived as an arena of negotiations, in which there are not only close emotional relationships, but also conflictual and ambivalent ones (Antonucci, 2001; Lowenstein, 2007). These varying elements introduce a certain degree of instability into interpersonal relationships (Phillipson, 2003). It is presumed that older parents will be autonomous and independent as long as possible, and there is less willingness today among both older parents and adult children for coresidence. However, there is a lack of empirical data to explain how the variability in the structure of social systems impacts the activities and perceptions of the individuals in these structures.

Intergenerational relations within families represent complex social bonds, and family members are linked by multiple types of solidarity that may be contradictory. Bengtson and associates (Bengtson and Mangen, 1988; Bengtson and Roberts, 1991) have developed a comprehensive conceptual framework for studying intergenerational relations—the Intergenerational Solidarity Model, based on social exchange theory. This paradigm has guided much of the research on adult intergenerational relationships over the past three decades (e.g., Lee, Netzer, and Coward, 1995; Lowenstein, 2007; Rossi and Rossi, 1990). The model conceptualizes intergenerational family solidarity as a multidimensional phenomenon with six components that reflect exchange relations: structural, associational, affectual, consensus, functional, and normative solidarity. Three salient dimensions of solidarity identified by Bengtson and Harootyan (1994) were: opportunities for interaction, or structural and associational solidarity; closeness and warmth, or affectual solidarity; and helping behaviors, or functional solidarity.

Despite findings showing the measures of the dimensions of solidarity to be valid and reliable tools for assessing the strength of intergenerational family bonds (e.g., Bengtson and Roberts, 1991), other work has shown

that these component dimensions of solidarity were not comprehensive and complete (i.e., they were not “additive” and did not form a “unitary scale”). This theoretical impasse was bridged by the addition of conflict as a principle dimension to the solidarity-conflict paradigm. In developing the intergenerational conflict model, Bengtson and others (Clarke and others, 1999; Parrott and Bengtson, 1999) argued that conflict is a normal aspect of family relations, that it affects the way family members perceive one another, and that, consequently, it affects their willingness to assist one another. Solidarity and conflict do not represent a single continuum from high solidarity to high conflict. Rather, family relations can exhibit both high solidarity and high conflict, or low solidarity and low conflict, depending on family dynamics and situations (Lowenstein, 2007).

Intergenerational solidarity and conflict are manifested at two different levels, as suggested by Bengtson and Murray (1993). They differentiate between the macro-public arena level and the micro-intergenerational family level. On the macro level, attention should be given to the larger social context, in which social norms are created and activated, and state policies and responses of various welfare regimes to the needs of the growing elderly populations are shaped. On the micro-family level, attention should be given to issues of filial obligations, expectations of different generations in the family and the actual flow of help and support between the generations.

### Solidarity and Transfers

Exchange of help and support is an integral part of daily life in nearly all families, but patterns and dependencies change over the life course. Members of the parent generation are usually the net providers in such exchanges during most of the life course, but in old age, they become the recipients of such exchanges. Older parents are, however, also providers of support; hence exchanges need to be examined from several angles—from the provider and receiver perspective, and from the perspective of both elder parents and adult children.

In the *Old Age and Autonomy: The Role of Service Systems and Intergenerational Family Solidarity* (OASIS) study (Norway, England, Germany, Spain, and Israel), relatively high levels of instrumental, emotional, and financial transfers between the generations were found, even though they differed in the five societies (Lowenstein and Daatland, 2006). The data presented in tables 3.2a and 3.2b respectively show the perspectives of both the adult children and the older parents on these intergenerational transfers.

Table 3.2a shows that most adult children had provided one or more types of support to older parents (aged 75 and older) during the

**Table 3.2a** Adult children's perspective: (a) help provided to, and (b) received from, older parents (75+), by type of help and country

	Norway	England	Germany	Spain	Israel
<i>a: Provided to older parents</i>					
Emotional support	71	62	74	65	69
Transportation/shopping	58	45	49	26	41
House repair/gardening	48	31	31	21	22
Household chores	27	29	34	22	18
Personal care	9	5	9	16	12
Financial support	4	14	7	18	23
Total help (at least one)	87	76	83	70	74
(n)	165	133	99	138	147
<i>b: Received from older parents</i>					
Emotional support	46	39	53	42	59
Transport/shopping	6	6	0	3	1
House repair/gardening	9	2	3	1	5
Household chores	7	4	4	6	5
Baby sitting	18	—	4	6	10
Personal care	0	1	1	1	1
Financial support	26	8	11	7	47
Total help (at least one)	59	44	54	45	67
(n)	165	133	99	138	147

Source: Lowenstein and Daatland (2006).

preceding year. Rates range from 70 percent (Spain) to 87 percent (Norway). Emotional support is provided by the majority (62–74 percent) of adult children, instrumental help (for transport and household chores) is also fairly frequent, and is seemingly equal, or even more frequent, in a high-service-level country such as Norway as in low-service-level countries such as Germany and Spain. High service level refers basically to social services for the elderly, which are not so well developed in Germany, but not to medical or health services.

Few adult children provide personal care, probably because few parents are frail enough to require it, and if they do, they may have already moved to an institution. Low levels of institutional care and high cohabitation rates between parents and children probably help explain why personal care rates are highest in Spain.

As indicated by Lowenstein and Daatland (2006), adult children are the net providers in the relationship: they give more than they receive. This situation is acknowledged as well from the perspective of the parents, who receive more than they give (table 3.2b). Older parents, however, are not only on the receiving end, although the support they offer is mainly

**Table 3.2b** The older parent's (75+) perspective: (a) Help received from, and (b) provided to, adult children, by type of help and country

	<i>Norway</i>	<i>England</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Spain</i>	<i>Israel</i>
a: Provided to adult children					
Emotional support	39	46	49	44	41
Transport/shopping	7	8	8	6	2
House repair/gardening	9	7	9	3	1
Household chores	2	7	8	10	2
Child care	20	8	7	11	11
Personal care	0	1	3	2	0
Financial support	23	11	13	9	20
b: Received from adult children					
Emotional support	47	56	57	63	56
Transport/shopping	42	56	52	42	37
House repair/gardening	34	35	44	28	16
Household chores	16	31	38	39	15
Personal care	2	10	16	14	7
Financial support	3	9	3	13	12
Total help (at least one)	70	75	81	75	69
(n)	333	322	355	325	341

Source: Lowenstein and Daatland (2006).

emotional and, in some countries (Norway, Israel, and Germany), financial as well. When pension levels and living conditions allow, instrumental help flows upward to older parents and financial support downward to adult children. While there is no standard or norm by which to judge these exchange levels, when we consider that the levels are fairly similar across five otherwise very different countries, in terms of family traditions and welfare regimes, it seems reasonable to judge the exchanges as considerable. However, some reservations are necessary, as these measurements are rather crude and do not indicate volume or frequency of help.

The harmony or congruence between the parent and child perspectives should also be noted. The general patterns seem fairly similar from both perspectives, although the children state they have provided more help than the parents admit to having received. The contrast varies between the countries: it is greatest in Norway and least, or even biased in the opposite direction, in Spain (Lowenstein and Daatland, 2006).

Traditionally, research in the area of intergenerational relations has tended to emphasize shared values across generations, normative obligations to provide care, and enduring ties between parents and children. Empirical data, however, show equivocal results regarding the costs and benefits of intergenerational family solidarity to different generations. Some studies indicate that the contribution to the adult children is larger (Barnett, Marshall, and Pleck, 1992), while others point to the contrary, the contribution to the older parents is larger (Kauh, 1997; Yoo and Sung, 1997). Data in still other studies show the “rewards” that both generations (and even three generations) reap from the exchange relations (Ikkink, van Tilburg, and Knipscheer, 1999; Lowenstein, Katz, and Gur-Yaish, 2008). These studies suggest that for both generations, giving is no less important than receiving, as it impacts on the continued interaction and well-being of the partners involved.

Further studies relate to the specific effects of generational exchange on the health and well-being of family members from diverse cultural backgrounds (e.g., Litwin, 2006). This is important because generational flows of support are known to vary across different ethnic groups (Goodman and Silverstein, 2002) and across societies with differing cultural, economic, and policy contexts (Torres-Gil, 2005). In particular, we know little about these experiences and how these trends intersect to shape family health and well-being, both within countries as well as comparatively across societies with diverse economic and policy environments. In the last decade, there has been more cross-cultural research regarding intergenerational exchange and its linkages to the physical and psychological well-being of young and old generations (Litwin and Shiovitz-Ezra, 2006; Lowenstein, 2007).

### Intergenerational Ambivalence

Pillemer and colleagues have proposed that the experience of intergenerational relations in adulthood is characteristically ambivalent (Pillemer and Lüscher, 2004; Pillemer and Suito, 2002; 2005). That is, rather than operating on a basis of affection, assistance, and solidarity, or being under threat of conflict or dissolution, the dynamics of intergenerational relations among adults revolve around sociological and psychological contradictions or dilemmas and their management in day-to-day family life. Indeed, scholars from a variety of orientations have argued in recent years that to understand the quality of parent-child relations, studies must begin to incorporate both positive and negative elements in a single study (Bengtson and others, 2002; Clarke and others, 1999; Connidis and McMullin, 2002; Fingerman, Hay, and Birditt, 2004; Lüscher and Pillemer, 1998; Willson, Shuey, and Elder, 2003).

In the OASIS study, an attempt was made to test the two conceptual frameworks of intergenerational solidarity-conflict and ambivalence and their impact on quality of life for older family members across different nations. Table 3.3 presents the means and standard deviations of the different dimensions, compared across the five societies. Anova and Duncan Multiple Range statistical tests were conducted to test the differences (Lowenstein, 2007).

The data indicate that the strength of the structural-behavioral dimension (proximity and contact) was very similar in four of the countries, while significantly higher in Spain. The affective-cognitive dimension (affection and consensus) was high in all countries, though there were differences—Israel had the highest score, and Germany and Spain the lowest. The functional dimension of solidarity regarding the receipt of help from adult children was relatively low, but, again, with differences between countries. Germany was the highest, with Norway and Israel being the lowest. Regarding help provided, however, no differences between the countries were found. Levels of conflict and ambivalence

**Table 3.3.** Means<sup>a</sup> and Standard Deviations of the Family Relationship Dimensions<sup>b</sup>

<i>Intergenerational family relations</i>	<i>Country</i>									
	<i>Norway</i>		<i>England</i>		<i>Germany</i>		<i>Spain</i>		<i>Israel</i>	
	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std</i>
Solidarity S (proximity + contact)	3.6	1.4	3.8	1.4	3.7	1.4	4.5	1.3	3.8	1.2
Solidarity A (affect + consensus)	4.4	0.9	4.5	1.0	4.2	0.9	4.2	0.8	4.7	0.9
Solidarity H-1 (Help received) <sup>c</sup>	1.4	1.3	2.0	1.7	2.1	1.6	1.9	1.7	1.4	1.4
Solidarity H-2 (Help provided) <sup>c</sup>	1.0	1.1	0.9	1.2	0.9	1.2	0.8	1.2	0.8	1.0
Conflict	1.4	0.7	1.3	0.6	1.6	0.7	1.4	0.7	1.7	0.8
Ambivalence	1.7	0.0	1.6	0.8	1.7	0.8	1.7	0.8	1.7	0.9
Base	378		368		390		370		356	

Source: Lowenstein (2007).

Notes: <sup>a</sup> Mean scores on a scale of 1–6, with 6 indicating high feelings of solidarity and conflict. For ambivalence the scale is 1–5, a higher score indicating higher feelings.

<sup>b</sup> Based only on observations with no missing data.

<sup>c</sup> Receiving or providing help from/to at least one child, in at least one of the following areas: shopping, transportation, household chores, house repair and gardening, and personal care.



appeared to be low in all countries. Thus, a general conclusion is that family intergenerational solidarity appears to be strong in all five countries. This finding indicates that older people are firmly embedded within their families across these societies, although there are variations in the strength of the various dimensions in the different countries. The affective-cognitive dimension and the exchange of support predicted a positive quality of life, while ambivalence predicted a negative quality of life.

Some of the key components of ambivalence may be harder to capture with survey measures than with in-depth interviews, as may be the case with conflict (Clarke and others, 1999). Within the qualitative data of the OASIS study, the salience of conflict and ambivalence was mostly reflected during periods of transition (older parents moving toward dependency) in the life course, when older parents and their children were attempting to renegotiate roles (Katz and others 2003). How, then, are families coping with the need to provide care to dependent and frail older members?

### **Social Support and Caregiving**

Studies have provided evidence that social support influences mortality and morbidity, including lower rates of heart disease and depression, and better coping with illness and disability (Berkman and Kawachi, 2000). Social support and reciprocal exchange between generations were also found to be related to better psychological well-being (Lowenstein, Katz, and Gur-Yaish, 2008; Silverstein and Bengtson, 1991). Indeed, support relations are critical to health and well-being at all ages (Antonucci, 2001).

The changes in demographics of developed societies, and in family structures and patterns of behavior, however, impel a reassessment of family support and family responsibility for its older members (Biggs and Powel, 2003; Lowenstein, Katz, and Daatland, 2004). Structural changes affecting the lives of older people include the growing number of elderly single households, an increase in the proportion of childless women, and the increased mobility of adult children. All of the above contribute to a shrinking pool of family support (Wolf, 2001). In addition, the relative scarcity of children and grandchildren, and the time constraints of working women—the traditional caregivers—create a shortage in available family caregivers (Guberman and Maheu, 1999).

Growing old within a global community is resulting in hybrid forms of generational ties within the various global networks, creating new forms of care relations and, at the same time, undermining existing forms of support (Phillipson, 2003). While the family continues to carry the major responsibility for elder care in most modern welfare states (Katz, Daatland, and Lowenstein, 2003), patterns of intergenerational solidarity and support are

becoming more complex. Thus, one of the challenges is to maintain the intergenerational contract. The intergenerational contract is based on the notion that each generation invests in the human capital of the next and is taken care of at the end of life by the generations in which it has invested. Hence, each generation cares twice (once for the previous generation and once for the next generation) and is taken care of twice (in childhood and in old age). Within a family context, women are the traditional brokers of the intergenerational contract, providing most of the informal care to children and aged relatives.

Data from the EUROFAMCARE project (Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) indicate that the overwhelming majority of family caregivers (over 80 percent) felt caring was worthwhile and that they coped well even under difficult circumstances. The positive value attached to family caregiving is probably the most critical element in ensuring good quality care for dependent older people.

The concept of the "sandwich generation" appeared in the professional gerontological literature in the 1980s. It described the middle-aged generation, most typically middle-aged women, as "caught in the middle" (Brody, 1981) between two important tasks: caring for children and caring for adult parents. Early literature (Brody, 1981) described this condition of dealing with multiple competing demands, along with paid work and being married, as detrimental to the well-being of middle-aged individuals as well as possibly to their aging parents, who might not have their needs met by their overburdened daughters or sons. However, these reports were usually based on convenience samples, and the results could not, therefore, be generalized to the broader population. In fact, demographic studies in the 1980s and 1990s suggested that the likelihood of women or men being caught in the middle between care for young children and care for aging parents in their eighties and early nineties was small (Himes, 1994).

While some studies addressed the prevalence of the "sandwich generation" phenomenon, other studies (Loomis and Booth, 1995) challenged the nature of its potential adverse effects on those allegedly "caught in the middle." Using a national sample of married individuals, Loomis and Booth (1995) essentially showed that multigenerational caregiving does not have adverse effects on the middle generation. This topic has been periodically revisited by other researchers (Spillman and Pezzin, 2000), producing somewhat of a mixed picture, but without producing alarming results about either the magnitude or the gravity of a "sandwich generation."

In spite of the lack of empirical support for the notion of an at-risk middle-aged generation, the media and the popular press still frequently discuss the "sandwich generation," providing anecdotal evidence about the difficulties of mainly women, but also men, who are caught in the middle

between caring for young children, caring for frail parents, and working full time. Given that these stories seem to resonate with the public, and given a combination of unique current and predicted future demographic trends, perhaps the “sandwich generation” phenomenon deserves to be revisited. While it may not necessarily be middle-aged women (or men) who are at risk, we should ask whether it is possible that some individuals are likely to be caught in the middle.

An important trend for this discussion is that of healthy life expectancy, meaning the number of years of life free of disability. While disability rates have been declining, it seems that Fries’ (1983) view of the “compression of morbidity,” whereby individuals will live longer and healthier and morbidity will be limited to the last short period of life, might be too optimistic. Instead, Crimmins (2004) suggested that the rate of chronic conditions that might lead to functioning loss and disability were still high and that people were likely to live longer lives, but would spend a majority of those added years with chronic conditions or disabilities. In addition, Suthers, Kim, and Crimmins (2003) predicted that a large portion of those added years would be accompanied by cognitive impairments. As a result, it is likely that older parents will require help from their middle-aged children for extended periods of time.

At the same time, fertility rates have shown a constant decline (except for the “baby boom” years—1946–1964), suggesting that there are fewer adult children in families to care for their aging parents. In addition, the age of marriage has risen for both men and women, and childbearing is increasingly delayed (Casper and Bianchi, 2002). Moreover, the literature describes an additional trend of what is described as a lengthening of adolescence, or “the incompletely launched young adult syndrome” (Skolnick and Skolnick, 1997). Because of various economic trends and the ever-increasing importance of higher education in a postindustrial society, the traditional pattern of education, career, and marriage in the early twenties is no longer the norm. Instead, young adults often spend more time in the educational system and delay the start of their career, as well as the start of their families. As a result, young adults may return home numerous times before they “successfully” leave the nest, and middle-aged parents may have to support their “boomerang children” for extended periods of time.

Another important factor to consider is the different financial era that the baby boom generation and future cohorts are aging into. Raising the retirement age as one form of preparing for population aging at the societal level has been discussed and suggested by economists and policy makers in all OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries (Duval, 2004). It is likely that the state, as well as the private sector, will develop programs that provide incentives for older workers to

stay in the workforce. While this is a very important trend, it has not been brought up for discussion in the context of family caregiving and multigenerational caregiving situations.

The unique combination of these trends and the different timings in which they play out may lead to several multigenerational caregiving situations that were less common in earlier times. If the "baby boom" generation does indeed work longer, they are theoretically likely to be in a unique position, whereby they are still working while having grandchildren. Because of increased life expectancy, they are also likely to still have surviving parents who would probably be suffering from chronic conditions, possible cognitive impairments, and some disability. Because both the younger and older generations are likely to experience longer periods of dependency, the number of years of shared lives within a family will probably grow. This combination of demographic trends and policy responses in the public and private sectors (in the form of retirement and pension programs) may create opportunities for multigenerational caregiving that involve four generations, for example, in a given household care receiving and caregiving among grandparent, parent, children, and grandchildren. Thus, the prevalence of various possible forms of multigenerational scenarios, the individuals likely to be in such multigenerational caregiver groups, and the consequences of caregiving should be further explored. Added to the caregiving challenges are other societal trends, such as changing employment patterns, especially those of women, which impact family relations and force us to analyze and question more traditional patterns of living arrangements and family intergenerational solidarity (Lowenstein, 2000).

### **Living Arrangements of the Elderly and of Immigrant Families**

The living arrangements of the elderly are the outcome of complex processes involving sociodemographic characteristics such as age; gender; psychological, economic, and health-related factors; ethnicity; and cultural values. Research shows that the living arrangements of older persons can be grouped into three broad categories, namely, independent households (including living alone in the community); shared households with adult children, other relatives, and nonrelatives; and residential settings (Basavarajappa, 1998). The most common reasons for joint intergenerational living arrangements cited in the literature are the health problems of the older parent, the death of a former caregiver, financial hardship, and a desire for companionship (Brackbill and Kitch, 1991).

Although there is a substantial body of literature on the antecedents of elderly parent/adult child coresidence, much less is known about the

quality and dynamics of family relations and the well-being of family members living in multigenerational households. Many of the extant studies in this area deal with the impact of caregiving in this type of living arrangement, emphasizing the issue of family conflict (e.g., Lieberman and Fisher, 1999; Pruchno, Burant, and Peters, 1997). Most research of this nature is based on data gathered from one generation only, usually the older generation (Litwin, 1997), with few studies comparing two or three generations (exceptions are Harrigan, 1992; Kauh, 1997; Slonim-Nevo, Cwikel, Luski, Lankry, and Shraga, 1995).

Most studies of multigenerational households have focused on describing the characteristics and circumstances of the persons involved that lead to or predict their formation. Much less is known about the multigenerational living arrangements among immigrant families. A key question, for example, is whether elderly immigrants in Western countries follow the trend of the native-born elderly toward independent living. A study analyzing the composition and living arrangements of 11 ethnic groups of immigrants to the United States in comparison with native-born families found that elderly immigrants from developing countries are significantly more likely to be living with children, or with others, and less likely to live alone. However, considerable heterogeneity was found when all immigrants were considered. Factors related to the tendency to live alone were the degree of integration in the host country and availability of economic resources (Kritz, Gurak, and Chen, 2000). Further research on patterns of immigrant elder-child coresidence will broaden our understanding of the positive and negative aspects of this type of living arrangement.

Studies on more than one generation of immigrant families living in multigenerational households are sparse. Some of these have found that multigenerational households can reduce loneliness and stress levels, although one study (Katz and Lowenstein, 1999) indicates that these results are relevant only for the older generation. Others, by contrast, show that multigenerational living is likely to increase stress and conflict and cause dissatisfaction (Litwin, 1997). Still others present mixed results on the relation between coresidence and well-being (Litwin, 1995; Moon and Pearl, 1991).

A valuable contribution is made by comparative cross-cultural studies of different types of living arrangements in four Asian countries (Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand) using focus groups made up of older parents and their adult children, which provide insights into both generations' perceptions of the advantages and disadvantages of their living arrangements (Knodel, 1995). Coresidence was a predominant preference in all four countries studied, although some respondents

preferred independent living. Both the elderly and their children reported more benefits from the arrangement than liabilities, and support was reciprocal.

Positive aspects of joint living arrangements have been identified in the literature in several areas—economic, social, emotional, and psychological, both for the individual and the family. Research assessing the advantages and disadvantages of multigenerational living arrangements shows variations in the perceptions of different generations (Harrigan, 1992). The positive aspects of coresidence emphasize low levels of conflict and supportive social interaction. In contrast, coresidence can result in numerous strains, such as loss of personal space and privacy, especially if the coresiding child assumes caregiving responsibilities (Lieberman and Fisher, 1999). Moreover, the quality of life of older parents and their psychological well-being was found to be negatively affected (Umberson, 1992). Feelings of loneliness in coresidence were found to vary: De Jong Gierveld and Van Tilburg (1999) found less loneliness in Italy and more in the Netherlands. Clearly, however, the paucity and inconclusiveness of data in this area calls for further research.

### **State-Family Balance**

For potential and actual caregivers and care receivers, a key issue is the preferred balance between family care and (formal) services. To assess the future demands for family care, it is important to look at family values and attitudes toward family care. These values will have an interacting and moderating effect on demographic changes. What older people receive in terms of family support and services affects—and is affected by—societal and governmental notions of what families “should” provide and the extent to which they should be responsible for caring for older relatives. There is, thus, a complex interaction between intergenerational behaviors, expectations, political ideology, and the level of formal care provision (Motel-Klingebiel, Tesch-Röemer, and Kondratowitz, 2005).

Data from the OASIS project show that more generous welfare-state services have not crowded out the family, but have contributed to a change in how families relate and have helped the generations establish more independent relationships. The findings also suggest that family solidarity is not easily lost, considering the fundamental and often existential character of these relationships (Daatland and Lowenstein, 2005). Somewhat different conclusions, though, were presented by Motel-Klingebiel, Tesch-Röemer, and Kondratowitz (2005), who found that formal services seem to encourage family support, providing empirical backing for the notion of crowding-in.

Judged on the basis of these data, it can be concluded that the respondents in the OASIS study do not have a clear-cut preference for family care, nor do they reluctantly make use of services as a secondary option, as implied in the substitution argument. The attitude of respondents toward care follow more or less the same pattern as general societal attitudes, but seem to favor welfare state arrangements to support elders in need. It seems reasonable, then, to say that a welfare-state containment policy does not seem to have support in any of the five countries (Norway, England, Germany, Spain, and Israel; Daatland and Lowenstein, 2005).

Data from EUROFAMCARE indicated that family caregivers need support from integrated, formal care services, both to aid in the provision of good care to older people as well as for the protection of the family caregivers' own health and well-being. Thus, complementing family care, the provision of good service support for family caregivers is essential and should be a part of all public policies.

The SOCCARE project identified two main types of care networks for older persons. The first were those composed of "weak ties," where the network is minimal or even absent, and caregiving falls on one person. The second type, in contrast, has relatively rich and polycentric networks that share care responsibilities. Both networks have connections with professional and nonprofessional services.

The range of professionally provided services is vast, ranging from less intensive health-related services and home services to "total assistance," such as nursing homes or assisted living centers. Families in Finland, France, and England most often use combinations of informal care and publicly provided formal care. Only Portuguese and Italian families use mostly third sector care, such as assistance from nongovernmental organizations and private care facilities. There are marked differences, however, between Italy, Portugal, and France in the relationship between families and paid services. In the former two countries, private assistance, especially for the elderly, is used to substitute for public services. In France, it is used only to complement public services.

Concerning the general organization and control of care arrangements, the family, in particular the main caregiver, remains the most important resource everywhere. It is he or she who, even in the richer and more cooperative networks, assures the coordination of the various activities. However, if too little help—or none at all—is available to the main caregiver from the outside, this fundamental resource tends to become quickly exhausted. From this point of view, formal and informal services need to be combined in a complementary way, in terms of an integrated system or network of care.

### **Summary: Implications and Recommendations**

This chapter asked whether there was a good reason for concern about family and societal solidarity. It also looked at techniques for maintaining intergenerational solidarity in aging societies. Empirical data presented show that intergenerational solidarity is strong, but we must invest in it in order to maintain it. Older parents are not only passive recipients of support, but also active agents in family relationships, both as providers and receivers of support. Given that they are active in the negotiation of generational responsibility and exchange, we need to study what motivates or discourages the older parties in the relationship as providers and as recipients.

It is evident that population aging will bring prolonged periods of elder care. Parental support is a normal part of the life course, even though there is a complex relationship between the motivations for, and the commitment to, parental support and actual supportive behavior. Affectual ties of solidarity with parents strengthened the commitment of adult children to provide support and predicted higher levels of both instrumental and emotional support, but the principle of reciprocity operates in families over time. Investing in individual life courses and adopting age-sensitive policies and programs are essential in responding to the growing intergenerational family relationships. Ensuring workplace flexibility, lifelong learning, and promoting healthy lifestyles, especially as young people make the transition to adulthood, are particularly important from the life course perspective. Also important is the strengthening of the social and economic environment of families, neighborhoods, and communities and the preventing of the intergenerational transmission of poverty, a topic that has received a lot of attention in the past two decades.

This chapter discussed the usefulness of a life course perspective in developing proactive approaches to social policy that better fit the changing nature of social risks over the life cycle. Special attention should be paid to the accumulation and maintenance of human capital over the life course, as well as the reconciliation of work and family. Increasingly, human capital becomes the key to personal fulfillment, stable personal relationships, and social inclusion, on a micro level, and to high levels of employment and labor productivity, as well as to social cohesion, on a macro level.

This discussion outlined the need to study intergenerational relationships in context, looking at family cultures and values as, for example, the data from several of the European studies presented show that filial obligations are comparatively stronger in southern, family-oriented welfare states, while filial independence is comparatively stronger in northern, individualist welfare states. The south gives priority to the older generation; the



north gives priority to the younger generation. It is also important, thus, to address the different welfare state regimes (opportunity structures) where older people and families reside. In addition, it is important to understand support and exchange relations, as well as caregiving, from both sides of the relationship, i.e., from the perspective of both the older parents and the younger generations.

We have to bear in mind, though, that intergenerational relationships are situated in a field of contrasting norms and expectations, in which filial obligations and parental concerns play a role. Thus, we must look up and down the generational ladder and also consider other commitments of the caregiving generation, as well as cultural and structural (opportunity) factors. Older parents are often ambivalent, trying to strike a balance between the family and the individual, the parent (self) and the child (others), and between ideals and opportunities. Formal support for the informal caregivers is much needed in order to complement informal caregiving.

Future generations of the elderly play a key role in renegotiating intergenerational relationships, and both they and adult caregivers need to be supported by active welfare state policies, based on individual needs and rights.

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PART 2  
MAIN ISSUES AND PROGRAMS



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## CHAPTER FOUR

### KEY ISSUES UNITING GENERATIONS

*Donna M. Butts*

*You aren't just the age you are. You are all the ages you ever have been.*

—Kenneth Koch, poet, professor, and playwright

#### **What Is Intergenerational Solidarity?**

Christopher Buckley's satire, *Boomsday*, opens with Gen Xers attacking a gated retirement community in protest of the taxes they must pay to support aging "baby boomers" who do nothing but play golf during their long, leisurely retirement years. Encouraged by blogger Cassandra Devine, a new plan is introduced in Congress to address the growing conflict. Adults 65 and older will be given a package of incentives, including tax breaks and free medical care, if they sign an agreement that they will "voluntarily transition" at age 70. In other words, younger generations would foot the bill for five years of retirement if elders promised to commit suicide at the end of the term of the agreement (Buckley, 2007). The book sparked chuckles, but also some serious discussion about justice between generations. Fortunately, *Boomsday* is just a novel, but the continuing rhetoric of the press and policy makers can be even more damaging to the age-old compact between generations.

The social compact is based on reciprocity and the belief that society progresses because of the investments past generations have made in carrying knowledge and culture forward. It recognizes that people of all generations—past, present, and future—are bound together in order to survive and thrive. Humankind is interconnected and interdependent, now and throughout time (Kingson, Hirshorn, and Cornman, 1986; Kingson, Cornman, and Leavitt, 1997). Intergenerational programs were created in recognition of this compact and the importance

of maintaining it, and to honor the strengths and abilities of each generation. The International Consortium of Intergenerational Programmes defines these programs as “social vehicles that create purposeful and ongoing exchange of resources and learning among older and younger generations.” Intergenerational programs play an important role in contributing to sound public policy by promoting social cohesion, national unity, and shared responsibility (Hatton-Yeo, 2002). When people are engaged in each other’s lives, they recognize a shared interest in their neighborhoods, villages, and world. Solidarity between generations then includes the giving and receiving of resources throughout the life course. Generations are joined together in their desire for safety, security and their own usefulness (or meaning). Discussions about intergenerational solidarity are often explored from the context of familial, rather than nonfamilial, relations. This chapter focuses on the solidarity that exists between generations when people are connected by global citizenship and not blood.

### **Examples of Intergenerational Solidarity**

*Generations are not competitors for life’s satisfactions; they are partners in the search for well-being.*

—Harold L. Sheppard, former professor of gerontology,  
University of South Florida

Examples of intergenerational solidarity and the policies and practices that support this concept can be found both locally and nationally. Yet the media thrives on strife, providing us with images of kids versus canes, and greedy geezers and benefits for seniors eating up children’s share. All are taglines and headlines pointing readers to conclude that intergenerational conflict is inevitable. The press is less likely to cover stories like the one from Mesa, Arizona, that led with the headline, “East Valley retirees invest in schools.” This article highlighted a retirement community that repeatedly voted in favor of higher property taxes to support the local schools. The school district worked to develop and maintain a relationship with older residents by inviting them into its schools as tutors and mentors, hosting barbeques before sporting events, and sending students to perform at senior gatherings. The elders, in return, strongly supported investing in local children, even though their biological children and grandchildren lived miles away (James, 2005). Other examples of intergenerational solidarity abound; however, many members of the press continue to recycle the myth of intergenerational conflict.

## Champions

World leaders play a significant role in promoting intergenerational solidarity. These champions share important messages and demonstrate through their personal actions the importance of the bonds between generations. Queen Elizabeth II highlighted this when she called for bridging the generation gap in her Christmas 2006 message. She said that modern life was loosening traditional ties and bonds between generations. She continued:

The pressures of modern life sometimes seem to be weakening the links which have traditionally kept us together as families and communities. As children grow up and develop their own sense of confidence and independence in the ever changing technological environment, there is always the danger of a real divide opening up between young and old, based on unfamiliarity, ignorance and misunderstanding. (*New York Times*, 2006)

Other notable older adults are weighing in as well. In July 2007, Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu announced the formation of The Elders. This group of world leaders has vowed to use its collective years of wisdom and high profiles to address serious world issues that current elected officials seem to be struggling to solve. Mandela said The Elders “will support courage where there is fear, foster agreement where there is conflict and inspire hope where there is despair” (Mandela, 2007). As distinguished elder statesmen, the members of this group could have sat on their collective laurels and enjoyed their remaining years at leisure. Instead they are working to mend the world and to leave it in a better state for generations to come.

Young people can also be key champions for intergenerational solidarity. In 1997, Hans Reimer founded the 2030 Center with the goal of strengthening social insurance programs, such as social security, for younger workers. As a member of Generation X, Reimer found himself speaking out against efforts to erode the social compact and on behalf of a program normally associated with elder advocates. Matthew Albert founded the Sudanese Australian Integrated Learning Program (SAIL) when he was 19 years old. Its purpose is to help Sudanese refugees learn English and build the literacy skills needed to assimilate into Australian life. Most of the organization’s administrators are people under the age of 30, while most of its volunteers are elders.

Another example of youth leadership can be found at ManaTEEN, founded by Laura Lockwood in 1994, when she was 12 years old. Bored, she tried to volunteer with a senior meal delivery program in Florida but was told she was too young. She went on to recruit other young people and to develop volunteer programs, many of which are elder serving.

ManaTEEN is now the largest locally based teen volunteer initiative in the United States, boasting thousands of teens who volunteer more than 1.7 million hours of service each year. Pet Awareness for Seniors (PAWS), Home Safety Inspections for Seniors, Adopt a Grandparent, and Nosey Neighbors are all programs that engage young people, ages 8 to 21, in the lives of elders, demonstrating solidarity between generations.

At the level of local government, leadership can make a difference when seeking to connect generations. In 2001, the city of Falcon Heights, Minnesota, began to take steps towards becoming a community for all ages when Mayor Sue Gehrz committed to making intergenerational interaction a high priority. The mayor gathered a diverse group of 87 people, from the ages of 12 to 88, to participate in a dialogue in response to the tragedy of 9/11. The group, representing all faiths, ethnicities, and nationalities, developed 126 action steps to improve safety in the community and to prepare for future acts of terrorism and naturally occurring disasters, such as tornadoes and hurricanes. The city created the "Intergenerational Commission on Homeland Security." This group laid the foundation for the "Neighbourhood Commission," now one of four permanent Commissions or advisory groups that help to guide city government in Falcon Heights. Every effort is made to incorporate the voices and concerns of each generation into policy decisions made by the mayor. This is done, in part, by creating formal structures within the city government that facilitate communication between and decision making by all generations. Intergenerational participation is encouraged in all Falcon Heights activities and programs, as well as in private events held in public spaces. Specifically, the city requires that: intergenerational interaction must be a public policy goal of the City Council; policy proposals must incorporate the ideas and concerns of multiple generations; there is intergenerational participation on city advisory boards; and use of city facilities is free to intergenerational groups (Generations United, 2004).

### **Issues that Unite Generations**

Social policy reflects the value societies place on those generations most likely to be marginalized. Intergenerational intersections can be found in many policy areas and provide venues to connect generations and to encourage the mutual web of support between them. While areas of intergenerational convergence include, among others, access to health care, education, employment, dependent care needs, housing, poverty, immigration, and the environment, three issues that unite the generations will be highlighted in this section.

## Health Care

In the United States, the need to reform health care reached a critical stage in 2010. After a year of robust and contentious debate, the United States finally passed comprehensive health reform. The Affordable Care Act makes a number of important changes to help extend health insurance coverage for people of all ages. The new law will extend coverage to 95 percent of all children through expansion of Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Program. Millions of adults under the age of 65, not covered through the Medicare program, will now have new access to affordable coverage through the establishment of health care exchanges. These exchanges will help pull individuals together in large bundles to negotiate affordable coverage. In addition, insurers will no longer be able to deny coverage to people based on preexisting medical conditions, or include lifetime caps on coverage. Seniors will also receive significant assistance to help pay for their prescription drugs. The changes will have a profound effect on the health and economic security of millions of American families. Grandparents raising millions of grandchildren will no longer face the prospect of having to choose between health care and potential bankruptcy. It will also help curb the rising costs of America's health care system, which threaten America's future fiscal outlook.

Passing health reform was not easy. Throughout the debate, interest groups attempted to pit generations against each other to erode support for reform. America's Health Insurance Plans, a powerful association that represents nearly 1,300 health insurance companies, launched a campaign to try to frighten older adults into believing they would lose vital coverage if the changes were enacted. Partisan commentators told seniors that the bill would create "death panels" that would arbitrarily decide which elders would receive treatment and which ones would be left to die. Similarly, advocates for children were told that the bill would bankrupt the country and pile trillions of dollars of future debt onto our children. Opponents carefully crafted their message in a way that accused Congress of playing intergenerational politics and robbing seniors to cover children, a claim advocates have shown to be false. In the end, advocates for children and seniors held together to support health reform for all ages.

## Access to Education

Education is another area that connects the generations. The Network of Intergenerational Learning in Europe (NIGEL) was founded to develop a strong foundation for intergenerational learning, with the vision that such learning can contribute to building a stronger social fabric by uniting the generations. An example of this can be found in Cyprus, where the

Ministry of Education and Culture supports a national program called “Interaction of students and Cypriot Senior Citizens,” that facilitates older adults returning to primary and secondary schools. At the same time, the program encourages younger students to study the aging process and learn from the experiences of their older classmates (Mercken, 2004). Learning about ageism at an early age exposes young people to a vulnerability they, too, could face if they live long enough. In the United States, state and local education policies have been broadened to encourage older adults to continue their education and keep their minds active through lifelong learning. The state of Kentucky, for example, allows older adults to take classes for free at state colleges and universities. Several universities have opened their campuses or nearby locations for the development of senior housing. Older adults are invited to join campus life and take classes for zero or reduced tuition. To preserve limited resources and encourage intergenerational interaction, one school district in Kentucky has also placed senior centers in public schools. The older adults volunteer in the classrooms, sew costumes for school plays, and attend sporting events.

### Protecting the Environment

The environmental movement is rooted in intergenerational solidarity. The first Earth Day, held in 1970, was designed to engage people across generations as environmental citizens. Earth Day continues with the aim of broadening the movement, and provides educational activities and programs to foster environmental stewardship. By their very nature, environmental concerns, such as climate change, are inherently intergenerational issues. The strength of the environmental movement across generations is a testament to the core intergenerational concern of society. When Al Gore expresses concern about global warming and travels the earth to raise awareness, he’s doing so for his grandchildren. He is focusing attention on the need to change habits and policies now, so that future generations will be able to enjoy a quality life on earth. Former Vice President Gore may just be a distant memory when the ozone layer is depleted. What drives him is what he once called his most important role, that of grandfather. In 2007, at the United Nations, Gore closed his remarks by saying, “Our children will ask us one of two questions. What were you thinking or how did you find the moral courage to rise and solve this problem?” (Gore, 2007).

Protecting the environment is attracting global interest as people speculate about climate change and diminishing natural resources. Many cultures have understood the importance of protecting the environment for

future generations, but much of this lesson risks being lost when people fail to take the long view. Japan, which has a history of using its natural resources conservatively, has lately been making a renewed effort to encourage conservation. One creative author, Moriko Shinju, published a book to help parents and grandparents who, like her, were having trouble conveying the value of conservation to the youngsters in their lives. Her book, *Mottainai Grandma*, has sold over 400,000 copies. Its purpose is to remind new generations of the Japanese tradition of *mottainai*, or not being wasteful (Shinju, 2005). Environmental awareness and protection are integral to protecting the compact between generations.

### **What Are the Key Issues and Threats to Intergenerational Solidarity?**

*The generation that destroys the environment is usually not the generation that suffers. If they go to the forest, they will be digging their own graves and that of their children and grandchildren.*

—Wangari Maathai, Nobel Peace Prize, 2004

Threats to intergenerational solidarity include changes in demographics and family structure, poverty and income disparity, framing aging as a burden and not a benefit, and mobile societies. Developed countries are home to aging populations with increased life expectancies and decreased fertility rates. Developing countries are home to younger populations, and some countries, such as many in Africa, have lost an entire middle generation due to HIV/AIDS, war, and civil unrest. By the middle of the century, the world's population will be evenly split between young and old. While there are many dynamics to this shift in population, intergenerational solidarity is impacted especially hard in the areas of immigration and increased longevity. Developing countries are losing their educated younger citizens, who leave to seek higher paying positions in developed countries. The Philippines, for example, has become a great exporter of trained nurses. While many countries need the labor and services immigrants provide, tension can grow between subcultures that are new to each other. Intergenerational approaches can help to bridge these differences. Inspired by a project of the same name in Baltimore, Maryland, Magic Me is an intergenerational arts program in London that engages younger and older people in a variety of projects, from poetry to drama to music. The makeup of one of its sites in London's East End reflects the cultural and ethnic differences among the participating generations. There the school population is about 70 percent Bangladeshi Muslim, whereas the 70 plus generation is about 70 percent white indigenous. Participants entered the



program with questions such as: How do I connect with my neighbors? Are they going to speak my language? Why do they wear those clothes? The program provided a safe and comfortable place to ask those questions. Soon groups found many similarities. Many participants lived just down the street from each other, for example. Others shared a mutual concern about drug dealing in their neighborhoods. The program provided a venue and structure for people to find out what their commonalities were and to take pride in their differences (Brown, 2007).

### **Framing Longevity**

Older age is being recast. While the 2002 Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing included the goal of moving older persons “from social exclusion to integration and participation” (Sidorenko and Walker, 2004), there is a danger that older adult advocacy efforts will threaten intergenerational solidarity. While celebrating longer life expectancy, additional years bring additional responsibility. It is not a time-out, but a time to contribute to society. Changes in the perception of aging need to cast this new time in life as a time to connect with future generations, increase social capital, and foster reciprocity.

How issues are framed can adversely affect intergenerational solidarity. In the United States, child advocates have released reports intended to support increase federal funding (or programs) for children. Unfortunately, the reports have had some negative ramifications. In stating the argument that children’s programs deserve more funding to help the next generation grow up to become healthy, contributing citizens, the report writers have used a frame of “seniors’ versus children’s” spending. Even a simple language change to “seniors’ and children’s” spending would have given a different perception. However, rather than tackle the more difficult issue of how federal tax dollars are raised and allocated, they have chosen to turn against another vulnerable population. Worldwide, as more attention is given to changing demographics, misguided efforts like this are sure to increase.

Silo funding and fragmented regulations also infringe on intergenerational solidarity. Government offices charged with elder affairs and those charged with the welfare of children and families are seldom housed together. Some funding streams in the United States restrict the use of funds based on age. Regulations are developed independently and without cohesion. Because of this, rules governing services for elders and those governing services for children and youth can be out of harmony. This inhibits intergenerational program development and causes generations to be unnaturally segregated by age.

## Recommendations for Protecting Intergenerational Solidarity

*The web of mutual obligations between generations is essential for a civilized society.*

—Thomas Jefferson, President, United States of America

Support between generations has existed throughout time. Whether grandparents stayed behind to feed and watch babies while parents went to hunt and gather or children returned as adults to work on a family's land, generations cared for each other. However, because of shifting demographics, artificial age segregation, and globalization, attention must now be paid to bolstering intergenerational solidarity. Significant efforts must be made to find common ground and develop equitable public policy agendas.

### Guiding Principles

Guiding principles can be developed that will assist governments at all levels as they draft and review policies. Generations United has suggested the following guiding principles to help begin the debate:

- We're stronger together. This is not about "us" and "them": there is only "us," and we should think, talk, and plan that way.
- Some risks are simply too great for anyone to face alone.
- Society represents a lifetime commitment: we give and receive in different ways at different life stages.
- Public policy should meet the needs of all generations.
- Intergenerational approaches have a positive relationship to economic growth and value creation.
- Resources are more wisely used when they connect the generations, rather than separate them (Generations United, 2007).

### Intergenerational Public Policy Framework

Generations United encourages others to use an intergenerational framework when reviewing public policy. This lens helps to determine if the policy uses an intergenerational approach to address an issue and if it has impact across the generations. This approach provides for better use of resources and uses those resources to connect, rather than separate, the generations. Intergenerational policies answer yes to these questions:

- Are people of all ages being viewed as a resource?
- Does the policy promote the interdependence of the generations?
- Is the policy sensitive to intergenerational family structures?

- Does the policy encourage intergenerational transfers through shared care or services?
- Does the policy prevent unfair burdens on and favoritism towards one generation? (Generations United, 2006).

Although many groups have called for a common policy agenda, no one has systematically reviewed the complexities, realistic trade-offs, opportunities, and barriers that exist concerning local and national policies that impact solidarity across generations.

### Ministries and Offices

Intergovernmental working groups can be established to monitor threats and opportunities for intergenerational solidarity. Using intergenerational guidelines and principles, generation impact statements can discuss the virtues and potential pitfalls of proposed public policies. This generational analysis should take into consideration the broad scope of social policies that support different generations, and view social policies at all levels of government.

Some countries are creating offices and ministries with explicit intergenerational implications, although these appear to be fuelled by concern for the welfare of an aging population. For example, Croatia has a Ministry of Family Affairs, War Veterans, and Intergenerational Solidarity. Family Affairs includes children and youth while the intergenerational solidarity division is focused on safeguarding the rights of the elderly. The government of Singapore created the Taskforce to promote grandparenting and intergenerational bonding in its Ministry of Community Development, Youth, and Sports.

In Wales, the Welsh Ministry became the first European nation to address intergenerational practice as a funded policy area linked to a national strategy. The strategy was developed out of a partnership between the children's commission and the older people's division. The effort is a direct response to changing demographics, a perceived distancing and growing distrust between generations, and changes in the family structure. The strategy called for establishing a Welsh Center for Intergenerational Practice, which would hold an annual conference, support and document intergenerational projects, review public policy, and disseminate information (Beth Johnson Foundation, 2003).

### National Intergenerational Networks

Networks link people with common concerns and interests. They foster greater collaboration and increase social capital. Recent years have seen an

increase in the number of national and regional networks concentrating on intergenerational practice. The USA-based Generations United (GU) is most likely the oldest of these efforts, having been founded in 1986 by leading child, youth, and senior advocates concerned about the growing potential for intergenerational conflict. One of the founders, Jack Ossofsky said during the press conference announcing GU formation in 1989, "We formed Generations United to argue for a caring society." Today GU continues as the only national organization focused on promoting programs and public policies that connect generations. The organization works to identify emerging issues impacting children, youth, and older adults, and responds with practical programs and policies. Currently GU has three areas of concentration: grandparents and other relatives raising children or grandfamilies; intergenerationally shared sites; and Seniors4Kids, a civic engagement project that mobilizes older adults as advocates for quality early childhood education. The organization benefits from a strong, committed board of national leaders who take their role of protecting intergenerational solidarity very seriously. Their success is based on the fact that key children, youth and aging advocates gather around the same table during times when resources are plentiful and when they are scarce.

New networks are beginning to thrive. The Spanish Intergenerational Network resulted from the first nationwide conference in 2005, *Intergenerational Programmes in Spain: Analysis of the Situation and Potential for Development*. To date they have attracted over 200 members, conducted assessments and training programs, and developed or translated materials to support program development and evaluation. Recently the network launched a website devoted to intergenerational work in Spain (Sanchez, 2007).

The Center for Intergenerational Practice at the Beth Johnson Foundation supports intergenerational practice across the United Kingdom. The Center holds a regular conference, is a repository for model programs and best practices, conducts studies and pilot projects, and assists others in establishing national intergenerational centers. It also houses the International Consortium of Intergenerational Programmes (ICIP), which is the international membership organization promoting intergenerational practice.

The Japan Intergenerational Unity Network was launched during a 2006 conference and seeks to support budding intergenerational work in that country. As a result of the 2006 ICIP conference, talks are underway to establish an Australian Intergenerational Network and interest has been expressed in a network in Africa, as well. These networks are intent on supporting intergenerational solidarity and can play a key role in keeping NGOs, governments, and individuals focused on protecting the ties that bind generations.

### Shift in Thinking

New parameters must be created that respect the commitment between generations and reflect the compromises that will be needed to sustain longer life. Better social policy can make greater use of scarce resources. For example, the greater Phoenix, Arizona, area faced difficult decisions and limited tax dollars when planning for future facilities for seniors, teenagers, and other community members. Rather than split the available tax dollars and fail to adequately meet the needs of any generation, they decided to begin retrofitting existing sites and building new recreation centers to serve as multigenerational centers. The facilities are used from the early dawn hours until well into the night. In the morning elders can walk on an indoor track that will be used for jogging by people on their way home from work in the evening. Senior meals are served in the same multipurpose room that is used for karate and line dancing at night (Generations United, 2007).

Increased life expectancy also calls for revisiting and rewriting the social compact between generations. Investments in education, which often end when a person reaches adulthood, need to take into consideration life long learning opportunities and age integration in existing educational settings. The workplace will need to adapt to allow older workers to continue to contribute and to make entrée for younger workers more accessible. Flexibility and accommodation will promote workforce cooperation and decrease the likelihood of conflict. Investing in human resources through education, retraining, and workplace flexibility can result in higher productivity.

Youth advocates and organizations need to be more involved in the discussion. The UN 2004 International Youth Day had the theme, "Youth in an Intergenerational Society." The *World Youth Report 2003* included a chapter on intergenerational relations (United Nations, 2004). Yet intergenerational practices that support solidarity between generations are, for the most part, championed mostly by researchers and practitioners in the field of aging.

### Longer Productivity versus Leisure

In the middle of the 1900s developers and marketers systematically worked to change the perception of old age and retirement. Along with longer life and better health came the opportunity to pursue leisure and focus on individual interests. While some may choose this lifestyle, longer life should also be viewed as an opportunity for pursuing productivity with purpose. Civic Ventures, a San Francisco-based think tank, has begun promoting "encore careers" for older individuals at the intersection of maintaining an income stream, finding new meaning in their work,

and making a significant contribution to the greater good. They promote the view that retirement affords a time in life to pursue a career you always wanted to, but could not, whether because of salary, education, or benefits considerations (Freedman, 2007). Policies that inhibit an older individual's ability to continue to engage in the workforce will need to be revisited and revised so that countries can benefit from increased longevity coupled with productivity.

Volunteer work and civic engagement offer other possibilities for continued contributions. Public policy can support these efforts through tax abatements, educational scholarships, discounted prescription drug programs, and other incentives. Policies should be written to explicitly include opportunities for civic engagement. Most notable is the recent inclusion of language in the Older American's Act (OAA) designed to encourage inter- or multigenerational programming. In the 2006 reauthorization of the OAA, advocates were able to work with policy makers to include language that specifically supports these types of programs. The OAA authorizes grants to fund opportunities for multigenerational civic engagement. Examples named in the Act include the following:

- Support for grandparents and other older adults who are raising children
- Involving older volunteers in providing support to families who are in need, perhaps because a child is ill or disabled
- Promoting multigenerational activities

### Family Caregiving and Grandfamilies

Family caregiving touches all generations. In some cases it may include the young caring for dependent older family members, but in many cases it involves older adults as the caregivers. Many grandparents are being called on to raise a second and, in some cases, a third family. Whether due to HIV/AIDS, as seen most widely in Africa, or substance abuse, as experienced in many developed countries, these individuals take on the burden of caring for their grandfamilies at great personal sacrifice. Public policies can support them in their efforts to raise children, which will result in healthier children and increased assistance for the caregivers as they age and become more frail. Examples of good social policies include the National Family Caregiver Support Program, which allows local governments to use funds to provide support groups, counseling, information, and access to services. The new Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 will provide, among other things, subsidized guardianships to provide financial support to grandfamilies.

The Lifespan Respite Act recognizes caregiving across the lifespan, and recently received its first appropriation of funds to help states implement the program.

### Conclusion

Changes in the world can erode an already weakened social compact. Facebook, an Internet social networking site, has a group called “I don’t wanna be Facebook friends with senior citizens!” that boasted 231 members in 2008. Chances are its members did not grow up relating to elders invested in fostering intergenerational solidarity. All generations have a stake and a role to play in dealing with demographic and societal changes to protect the environment and the world we live in. This includes redefining and strengthening the cohesion between generations. Interventions at the local, regional, and national level are needed to ensure the ongoing commitment between young and old that fosters the transfer of culture, skills, and experience. Stronger, more just communities mean that all generations receive the supportive services they need, and allows each individual to share their skills, talents, and interests to enrich society. Intergenerational practice and policies have been shown to work and provide an avenue for protecting societies’ values. These values include caring for the most vulnerable and easily marginalized populations, the young and the old. Adjusting to change will require compromise, investment, and long-term planning. Generations are meant to relate to each other through connections, not conflict. After all, it is about building a world that values and engages all generations in a community, not a competition.

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# CHAPTER FIVE

## WHO IS NEEDY AND WHO SHOULD GIVE CARE?

PROMOTING INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY

*Elizabeth Larkin*

### **Why Do We Need to Promote Intergenerational Solidarity?**

Regardless of where we live or what our economic circumstances are, every generation needs the next, and caring for one another is essential if we are to thrive as a people. When older adults are surrounded only by their own age peers, their relationships inevitably begin to dwindle, and loneliness looms large. When young children do not have caring adults to protect and nurture them, their future appears scary indeed. Moreover, young children need multiple role models to envision their own aging process in a positive light. In today's world, it often takes targeted policies and specialized programming to connect and support people across ages, so that they can recognize mutual benefits in caring for each other and continue to live interdependently.

In 2006, in the United States, there were approximately 37 million people over the age of 65, or 12 percent of the total population. By 2030, this number is projected to exceed 70 million, or nearly 20 percent of the population, with people 85 and older being the fastest growing segment (Federal Interagency Forum, 2008). Social service programs that rely heavily on volunteers have begun to recognize the enormous potential in the large pool of untapped older adults, which Freedman (1994, p. i) has called this country's "only increasing natural resource" (Newman and others, 1997, p. 149). Rowe and Kahn (1998) suggest that engagement in productive activities and strong social ties are positively correlated with successful aging. Yet, people aged 55 and older spend the majority of

their leisure time watching TV and spend only two percent or less of their time caring for and helping others, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, American Time Use Survey (Federal Interagency Forum, 2008). Determining how to find a sense of purpose in life after retirement is a major challenge in the United States (Larkin, Sadler, and Mahler, 2005). Furthermore, the ability to be generative—to pass on care and commitment from one generation to the next—has also been linked to well-being in old age (Erikson, Erikson, and Kivnick, 1986; McAdams and de St. Aubin, 1998; Graves and Larkin, 2006). It follows, then, that as we see longer lifespan expectancy and higher quality health care, more, and more active, older adults will be seeking employment, educational, and volunteer opportunities to maintain strong social ties and enhance the quality of life in their later years (Bloom, Canning, and Fink, 2009).

The poverty rate for older minorities and women is higher than for the rest of the population in the United States. More than 8.5 million elders need some kind of assistance to remain living in the community (Federal Interagency Forum, 2000). Feelings of loneliness and depression, particularly among those who are geographically separated from their families, or who have limited English speaking abilities, are common. With 77 million “baby boomers” now facing retirement, communities need to create structures that enable senior adults to continue as contributing and productive members of society. Furthermore, as the caretakers of tomorrow, young people need to understand that aging is a process that begins at birth, not at age 65 (Friedman, 1999). Yet, in both families and communities, expectations of one another and obligations across generations are shifting (Reich, 1998–1999). Families today often find themselves in a negotiation crunch, trying to decide who has the right to be needy and who is responsible to meet those needs. Changing patterns of marriage and divorce are creating new family structures (e.g., kin care, step-kin care) that can result in unclear caregiver roles and responsibilities. Families then need support from extended family members and the community in which they live to provide care to both the young and the old in lieu of institutionalization (Sandwich Generation Caregivers, 2007).

With more than 70 percent of mothers now in the workforce in the United States (Federal Interagency Forum, 2008), the need for quality child care and after-school care is critical (Larkin, 1998–1999). Because of the cost and limited availability of quality programs, many families rely on relatives or have latchkey children, who arrive home after school to a house empty of adults. Without adult supervision, latchkey children are at greater risk of truancy, substance abuse, and poor academic performance (Morton-Young, 1995). Demanding jobs and long commutes also have a major impact on the amount and quality of time children spend with

family members. A Kaiser Family Foundation study (Roberts and Foehr, 2004) found that American children spend an average of five hours and 29 minutes per day unsupervised, using some type of media, rather than social interaction, to entertain themselves. According to Kagan and Cohen (1997), 80 percent of children spend up to 50 hours per week in poor or mediocre child care settings. In addition, 35–40 percent of the settings that care for infants and toddlers are so poor that they can actually jeopardize children's health and safety. Families need quality programs that will not only provide children with a safe place to grow up, but that will also support their optimal development during critical years.

Larkin and Newman (2001) have reported on a national study of older adults working in child care as volunteers or Foster Grandparent aides. Observations, interviews, and a rating scale were used to identify the unique contributions of older adults who had not been formally trained as early childhood educators. Findings showed that the nurturing presence of the older adults brought a "familial" dimension to these settings, which complemented what younger, professionally trained teachers provide in the classroom. Although their behaviors were not always consistent with professional standards for early childhood educators, they made a significant and unique contribution that enriched all participants. In another example, the Senior Kapuna in the Preschool Program (SKIPP) project in Hawai'i documented older adults in six preschool settings who were paired with disruptive children needing special attention in the classroom (HIN, 2003). The evaluation of the program showed that the senior kapuna had a calming effect on children's behavior, which the teachers appreciated. At the same time, the seniors enjoyed being with the children and partnering with the teachers. Both studies support the idea that the presence of older adults in the lives of young children is "not just nice but necessary" (Generations United slogan). The added attention and familial quality of the older adults' nurturing is especially important for young children who spend long hours in child care programs outside the home.

Historically, families have taken responsibility for supporting their members over the life course. Although this still holds true, many families today are under enormous stress as they try to meet the needs of both younger and older generations. Particularly vulnerable are families in which children have special needs and those in which the caregivers are older relatives. According to the National Family Caregivers Association (2007), 1.4 million children (ages 8–18) provide care for an adult relative, and 30 percent of all family caregivers are over the age of 65. The challenges faced in kinship care are many, including physical and emotional problems experienced by children whose parents are ill, incarcerated, or are substance abusers, as well as difficulty obtaining benefits and services

because caregivers lack legal custody (Smith and Beltran, 2003; Henkin and Butts, 2002; Wallace, 2001).

The challenge for American families to provide elder care is as great as that for child care. Research indicates that most adults will actually spend more time caring for parents than for children (Roszak, 1998). With 13 percent of the workforce providing care for family members, and 60 percent of caregivers being women, American businesses can lose as much as \$34 billion (NFCA, 2007). In fact, PBS recently released a documentary film on how the growing demands of child and elder care for the “sandwich generation” are affecting the workplace (particularly for women), and presents steps Congress is taking to help these families (Sandwich Generation Caregivers, 2007). Employers are beginning to recognize their responsibilities in supporting elder care, in addition to child care, now that so many working women provide assistance for their parents or other aging relatives.

In Japan, the mobility of families moving from rural to urban settings has had an impact on cultural norms for caregiving. The family structure has changed from a large, multigenerational household to a nuclear family configuration, with a growing number of the elderly living independently or alone. Young working families tend to live in urban areas of Japan, in many cases leaving the grandparents behind in their rural homes. The geographic mobility caused by economic forces has resulted in a loss of contact between elders and children, placing the child care burden on young parents and altering the role of the grandparents. As the elder generation is now living longer, often with extended health care needs, the cost of their long-term care has to be assumed by the younger family members, on top of their child care responsibilities (Newman and Larkin, 2007). Intergenerational programs are being created throughout Japan to serve the needs of young families together with the needs of the aging adult population. To combat social isolation, for example, in Tokyo, Obachanchi (Grandmother’s House) is a neighborhood place where young mothers (most of whose peers are still working) can socialize while older adults play with their babies and enjoy sharing cultural traditions. Here, the older adults find joy in being able to socialize with younger generations and feel that their wisdom and experience can be passed on to others (Watanabe, 2007).

Like Japan, Singapore has become an aging society (Thang, 2007). Both countries face the dilemma of an unprecedented low fertility rate, caused by the increasing number of unmarried people and the trend among younger couples to maintain dual incomes rather than start a family. Lower income women may have no choice but to work when spouses, parents, or in-laws view this as the only way to maintain their quality of life given the

high cost of living in Singapore. Cultural norms support the idea of caring for the elderly within the family and community, despite a decline in multigenerational coresidence. In addition, grandparents see themselves as the most appropriate caregivers for their grandchildren, because they naturally love them, and can assume the responsibility of transmitting desired values to the younger generation. Many families in Singapore have maids, and this allows grandparents to assume a nurturing role without taxing their own physical stamina. The premise that grandparents play a vital intergenerational role within the family remains, and they are not regarded as abandoning their family commitments in expressing a desire to pursue their own leisure and autonomy. Thang (2007) recommends that grandparents be encouraged to participate in joint activities in child care centers so that they can maintain close emotional ties with the children without having to assume the burden of full time caregiving.

As we promote the involvement of older adults in preschool classrooms, we do not want to see women automatically relegated to the jobs of preparing snacks and sweeping floors. Neither would we want to see older men assigned to the woodworking area simply because it is assumed they will be skilled at using tools. Larkin and Newman (2001) learned that many of the older adult women in this study gravitated to these housekeeping responsibilities because they felt confident in their abilities to be helpful to the teachers by taking care of these things. Thus, it is important to recognize that older women may enjoy being able to express their nurturing instincts through providing nutritious foods and maintaining a tidy environment, although teachers should not expect older volunteers to spend all their time in this housekeeping role. Some volunteers seem to appreciate having a domain where they can function completely autonomously, so it is also important to learn if this is a factor in how older adults feel that they can make a positive contribution (Graves and Larkin, 2006). Older adults were observed to be reluctant to set limits on children's behavior or intervene in their disputes. Certainly, when children's safety was at stake, they got involved, but typically they preferred not to deal with children's outbursts. Furthermore, the teachers explicitly stated that they preferred the older adults defer to their leadership in managing the children's behaviors in school.

Big Brothers Big Sisters of the Sun Coast, Inc. (BBBS), a one-to-one mentoring program in Sarasota, FL, participated in another research study to investigate why retired older adults might want to volunteer their time to help at-risk youth (Larkin, Sadler, and Mahler, 2005). The study revealed that many older adults who were somewhat bored with leisure activities also did not want to assume major time-consuming responsibilities for mentoring young people. Successful recruitment resulted from a personal

request (rather than a broad ad campaign) and the promise of a limited time commitment (one hour per week). Once involved, they discovered many unanticipated benefits such as

- Replaying successful roles and offering their hard-earned expertise as a role model
- Recapitulating satisfying experiences by telling stories and remembering events from their own youth
- Righting previous mistakes, such as not spending enough time with their own youngsters while they were growing up
- Renewing positive emotions (love, care, curiosity, satisfaction) through laughter, touch, activity, and talk
- Reinforced meaning to life through being appreciated and recognized as a valuable person

As Margaret Mead (1972) said, “It is extraordinarily difficult to love children in the abstract, to devote oneself exclusively to the next generation. . . . It is only through precise, attentive knowledge of particular children that we become—as we must—informed advocates for the needs of all children and passionate defenders of the right of the unconceived to be well born” (Mead, 1972, p. 300). Although she was speaking about her experience of being a grandmother for the first time, her point about the critical importance of bonding with a particular child in order to understand and defend the next generation is applicable to the experience of these mentors. The older adults in the BBBS study wanted to make a contribution to society, and they did it by making a visible difference in one child’s life, because they felt emotionally connected and gratified (Larkin, Sadler, and Mahler, 2005). They missed having close contact with their own grandchildren, but were rewarded by the relationships they developed with children in need of a mentor in the community.

Well-planned intergenerational programs can benefit all age groups, families, and communities in any culture. The extra attention, nurturing, and personal guidance children and youth receive from older adult mentors can improve overall well-being, academic achievement, school attendance, resiliency, and positive attitudes toward the elderly (Boström, 2003; Taylor and others, 1999). For older adults, the opportunity to share their skills, knowledge, and experience with future generations, and to stay connected to their communities, can have a positive impact on life satisfaction, social engagement, and overall health (Kuehne, 1999; Larkin, Sadler, and Mahler, 2005). Families involved in intergenerational programs often experience a decrease in caregiver stress and reduced social isolation when they are able to expand their social networks and receive support services

(Power and Maluccio, 1998–1999). Communities become stronger and more cohesive when diverse groups work together for the common good (Pennix, 2003). Through collaborative partnerships, new resources become available to enhance the quality of life for all ages.

### **Planning Successful Intergenerational Programs**

Although intergenerational programs differ significantly in terms of target populations, goals, and depth of engagement, they do share common elements that can be used as guidelines in developing new initiatives. Larkin and Henkin (unpublished paper for the Rosalyn Carter Institute, 2003) have identified the following as components of any successful program:

- Meaningful roles and activities for all participants to give and receive care
- The intentional development of positive, interdependent relationships between individuals of different ages
- Recognition that both young people and older adults are valued community resources and assets and have something to offer one another
- Infrastructure for the recruitment, training, and support of volunteers and staff

Intergenerational programs are created to address a particular social problem, such as after-school child care, English language learning for refugees and immigrants, neighborhood safety, cross-cultural awareness, or respite care. Often, they involve collaborative partnerships between organizations that independently serve one age group. Social service agencies, educational systems, health care providers, and community groups are all structured and funded differently, which necessitates combining expertise and resources for intergenerational programming. Very few organizations in the United States are created with an intergenerational mission and supported by a sustained source of income, as our social and economic infrastructure is set up to serve segregated age groups in various settings, such as schools, nursing homes, housing subdivisions, recreation areas, and even retail stores. Consequently, institutions effectively isolate different age groups as they cater to those specific needs and desires.

Intergenerational programs are a strategy for crossing these institutional boundaries to bring families and communities together. Challenges abound in terms of reconciling differences in transportation needs, program schedules, staff expertise, available resources, and the organizational



cultures. Table 5.1 proposes a framework for understanding the current landscape in terms of organizational structure, program mission, and funding sources. Programs can be placed in the grid where the type of service and the organizational structure meet. Some programs may cross boundaries because they are partnerships between two different types of institutions. The problem with organizations being separately funded becomes highlighted when it is difficult to place a particular program in any one cell, which demonstrates the challenges in budgeting program partnerships.

As an alternative to working in partnership, some organizations have independently made their entire mission intergenerational in nature and provided staff development opportunities to augment their age-specific expertise. Programs initiated by these kinds of organizations are easier to sustain, because they are more apt to be embraced at all levels of the organization. Their challenge becomes demonstrating the success of the intergenerational mission in order to sustain funding and recruitment.

High standards of professionalism are needed in intergenerational programs so that vulnerable populations are protected and nurtured in the best possible environment and the goals are met to everyone's satisfaction. Although there is no formal credential, the question of what expertise is needed by an intergenerational specialist was taken up by Larkin and Rosebrook (2002; 2003) in their proposed *Standards and Guidelines for Intergenerational Practice* ([www.sarasota.usf.edu/COE/llarkin/guidelines](http://www.sarasota.usf.edu/COE/llarkin/guidelines)).

**Table 5.1** Typology of intergenerational programs

	501(c)3 Site	Sponsored Program	For-profit Institution	Gov't. Agency	Grant Supported	Unfunded Project
<i>Child/Elder Care</i>						
<i>Education and Learning</i>						
<i>Community Development</i>						
<i>Health and Legal Support</i>						
<i>Social Services</i>						
<i>Arts and Recreation</i>						

*Notes:*

1. A **501(c)3** site is an independent not-for-profit organization, governed by a Board of Directors, that offers the intergenerational program.
2. A **Sponsored** program is one operating under the auspices of another umbrella organization such as a university, a hospital, or a corporation.
3. A **For-profit** institution operates the program to generate income.
4. A **Government** agency is funded by local, state, or federal monies.
5. A **Grant** project is externally funded for a specified period of time.
6. An **Unfunded** project is typically of limited duration to meet a shared need.

htm). In addition to evaluating the practice of intergenerational specialists so that programs can demonstrate consistent care and professionalism in their services to families, documentation provides “measurable outcomes” that reassure funders and policy makers who invest in intergenerational initiatives.

Although there is no clearly defined understanding of best practices, Larkin and Kaplan (2010) propose that intergenerational specialists should have the ability to

- Demonstrate readiness to allow the program participants to figure out the best ways to share their knowledge and insights, and to engage one another.
- Promote asking questions (formal and informal) that encourage an exploration of similarities and differences among participants.
- Help participants translate discovery about others into discovery about self.
- Use a sense of humor and playfulness to bring people together and experience a shared sense of well-being.

There is still limited demand for a workforce that has an intergenerational degree or certificate. Most educators and human service practitioners interested in developing intergenerational programs learn how to do so by attending workshops, reviewing manuals and videos of successful programs, or receiving technical assistance from consultants with expertise in specific types of intergenerational programming. Kaplan, Larkin, and Hatton-Yeo (2009) argue that, beyond a need for knowledge and skills, leaders of intergenerational programs require certain personal dispositions, such as a passion for making a difference and helping others to succeed.

### **The Importance of Evaluation in Intergenerational Practice**

Evaluation is critical to shaping the evolving identity of the intergenerational field and to understanding the growing effectiveness of intergenerational programming as a strategy for social change. Without empirical data to support claims of success, practitioners, funders, and policy makers face an uphill battle to convince others that this is the right approach. Evaluation requires thoughtful, systematic review of program outcomes, as well as of the professional expertise of “intergenerational specialists” who help to facilitate positive relationships among participants. Evaluation need not be formal, but in taking a researcher’s objective point of view, program outcomes and professional performance can be systematically

documented to demonstrate what is actually happening in order to assess how well goals are being met and what changes need to be implemented to improve the intergenerational experience. From this informed position, planners and policy makers can provide true leadership, rather than simply reacting to pressures arising from the growing social problems of an aging society.

Newman and Larkin (2007) recommend developing an evaluation strategy early in the program development and planning stage. The following basic questions can help begin the process of framing the evaluation plan:

- What outcomes (desired results) can the program realistically expect to achieve?
- What are the anticipated benefits for learning, social interaction, and overall well-being of the participants?
- How else might the program be making a difference (e.g., unanticipated benefits such as impact on the broader community)?
- What is the best time to gather information about whether the program is achieving its goals and objectives?
- How will we find out if the participants, their families, and community residents are satisfied with the intergenerational experience?
- How and by whom will the evaluation results be used?

There are various approaches to evaluation, ranging from having informal conversations with participants and staff to employing outside professional evaluators to develop formal measures and procedures for assessing how goals are being met. The traditional rationale for intergenerational initiatives has been grounded in human development theory. Goals are set based on younger participants' need for nurturance, positive role models, a secure value system, cultural recognition, and a sense of place in history, together with older adults' need to nurture others, have a sense of purpose, and to recognize their continuing worth. Most studies of intergenerational programs tend to focus on the interaction itself and on the psychosocial and educational benefits afforded the older and younger participants. The significance of intergenerational programming, however, often goes beyond benefits to the participants themselves to have consequences for the community at large (Kaplan, 2007).

Whether it is through raising awareness of local assets and resources for all ages, giving joint service to others in need, organizing around an issue of common concern, or providing input into community planning, some intergenerational approaches have been found to contribute to desirable changes in the community that affect everyone, such as increased safety,

healthier environments, and improved recreational facilities. The intergenerational lens helps individuals redefine their responsibilities as family and community members so that we can become an age-integrated society that supports everyone as we move through the life course. Intergenerational initiatives are proving to be an effective strategy for civic engagement to enact change at the community level. Demonstrating the effectiveness of these programs is challenging, because of the numerous variables that might be affecting change. Consequently, systematic data collection must take place at more than one level to capture the full picture of what is happening. Table 5.2 is a framework for how an evaluation process could be structured for a community-wide initiative. It was developed for an initiative in Sarasota, FL, but was never tested (Larkin, 2004, 181). The comprehensive plan would be implemented in stages, and it involves four streams of systematic documentation:

Different organizations and participants can identify their own categories and the indicators to track systematically as they add to the documentation process over a specified period of time. Evidence will include what happens at the program level, at the organization level, and at the government policy level. Once it is all collected, it should be organized chronologically to tell the story of how the intergenerational initiative has been making an impact on the whole community. Used in a formative way,

**Table 5.2** Evaluation of community-wide intergenerational initiatives

<i>Program Innovation</i>	<i>Organizational Change</i>	<i>Indicators of Best IG Practices</i>	<i>Community Outcomes</i>
<i>Count # of new IG partnerships</i>	<i>Modifications to leadership vision and responsibilities</i>	<i>Evidence of IG activities achieving goals (testimonials, sustained interest, etc.)</i>	<i>Evidence of changed attitudes (reduced age and/or cultural bias)</i>
<i>Track growth in # of participants</i>	<i>New roles created with responsibilities for IG engagement</i>	<i>Evidence of long-term IG relationships (mutual benefits)</i>	<i>Evidence of healthier public environments (greater usage, less crime, etc.)</i>
<i>Document meetings held (identify issues and decisions made)</i>	<i>New organizational mission that integrates IG perspective</i>	<i>Evidence of thriving collaborations (cross-training of staff, budgeted resources, etc.)</i>	<i>Evidence of civic engagement among all age groups</i>
<i>Photograph events held to celebrate programs</i>	<i>Budget projections that support IG program and staff development</i>	<i>Evidence of effective leadership (healthy programs)</i>	<i>Evidence of increased generational equity (e.g., in services and funding)</i>
<i>Collect public relations outputs (newspaper articles, announcements, etc.)</i>	<i>Increased outreach efforts include more age groups and audiences</i>	<i>Recognition of the value of IG interdependency in the community</i>	<i>Evidence of age-integrated policies</i>
<i>Collect annual reports of agencies (funding / staffing commitments)</i>			

the information gathered can inform planners and policy makers to make adjustments or changes that will improve the outcomes. If barriers to success can be identified and recognized along the way, they can be addressed in a timely manner. It is important not only to document these intergenerational initiatives, but also to disseminate the findings so that others can benefit from what is learned.

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# CHAPTER SIX

## PROGRAMS THAT AFFECT INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY

*Shannon E. Jarrott*

### **Introduction**

Worldwide, extremely low rates of medical, nursing, social work, and therapy students graduate planning to focus on a geriatric population (Fajemilehin, 2004; Schigelone and Ingersoll-Dayton, 2004). With older adults currently constituting 13 percent of the older American population, and expected to represent up to 20 percent in less than 50 years (He and others, 2005), and with rapid growth in aging populations globally, the need for geriatric health and human services workers will quickly outstrip their availability.

At the same time that intergenerational strategies present a logical, strengths-based approach to meeting community needs with community resources, age segregation (a lack of structural solidarity), and the resultant social distance, detract from normative solidarity. Although many practitioners expect nonfamilial intergenerational relationships to thrive organically when proximity is achieved, they are typically surprised by the amount of work required (Hayes, 2003), and intergenerational programs often flounder within two years of their introduction (Hamilton and others, 1999).

In the context of “a society for all ages” put forward by the United Nations, government officials, practitioners, educators, and researchers must plan and focus on specific programs to advance intergenerational solidarity. This chapter reports on attitudes towards persons from different generations and on factors affecting intergenerational solidarity; it provides an overview of theory- and evidence-based practices that support the success of nonfamilial intergenerational programs. Finally, it reviews a variety of intergenerational programs that contribute to community solidarity among all ages.



### **How Much Solidarity Among Generations?**

Bengtson's domains of familial intergenerational solidarity (Bengtson, Rosenthal, and Burton, 1990) serve as powerful indicators of solidarity between generations in the larger community. Advocates of "a society for all ages" uphold ideals of positive intergenerational sentiment (affectual solidarity), shared values (consensual solidarity), and an opportunity structure that favors intergenerational contact (structural solidarity) and reflects a commitment to civic roles and obligations (normative solidarity). Levels of intergenerational solidarity fall along a continuum for each dimension. Solidarity within a community fluctuates with historical and political events, demographics, and economic shifts.

One might presume that high levels of intergenerational solidarity within families would carry over to the larger community, but positive contact with out-group members in one's family does not necessarily generalize to other out-group members (Newman, Faux, and Larimer, 1997; Pettigrew, 1998). Harwood and colleagues (2005) described factors such as group salience, uniqueness, and quality of contact that affect whether one's contact with an out-group member generalizes to their attitudes towards other members of that out-group. For example, when a 14 year old describes her grandmother as "awesome, active, smart, funny, and tough" and then goes on to explain that her grandmother is "not like other old people," she is less likely to transfer the positive sentiment she has for her grandmother to other older persons. Indeed, Funderburk and colleagues (2006) associated frequent contact with unrelated older adults, but not family members, with more positive attitudes about aging in general. Consequently, we cannot rely on familial contact to achieve intergenerational community solidarity.

We may look to attitudinal and behavioral measures for indicators of intergenerational community solidarity; these are equivocal. Attitudes of youth towards elders are heterogeneous (Jarrott and others, 2007; Lichtenstein and others, 2005) and may be positively (Aday and others, 1996; Bales, Eklund, and Siffin, 2000) or negatively (Aday, McDuffie, and Sims, 1993; Middlecamp and Gross, 2002) affected by familial and nonfamilial intergenerational contact. For example, Fees and Bradshaw (2005) determined that children with more grandparent contact possessed greater uncertainty about whether the aging process would be generally positive or negative.

Early, limited research on elders' attitudes towards children suggests generally positive attitudes of older adults about children (Seefeldt and others, 1982). Furthermore, a large number of elderly respondents agreed that the issues of children should receive national attention. More recently,

research demonstrated multiple stereotypes older adults have about young people (Matheson, Collins, and Kuehne, 2000). Most stereotypes were positive, and these were rated as more typical than the negative stereotypes. The multiple perspectives young and old have about each other reflect diversity in both groups.

Researchers debate whether attitudes towards older adults generalize to ideas about one's own aging. Aday and colleagues' study (1996) discerned positive effects of intergenerational programming on children's attitudes towards older adults and their own aging. In contrast, children whose views of older adults improved over the course of an intergenerational intervention (Newman, Faux, and Larimer, 1997) maintained negative attitudes about their own aging. The interrelationships between intergenerational contact, attitudes towards older adults, and attitudes towards one's own aging are significant because negative self-stereotypes tend to adversely impact individuals' health (Levy, 1996; 2003) and even their longevity (Levy, Slade, and Kasl, 2002). Kidwell and Booth's (1977) finding that even older adults report the greatest social distance from members of their own age group indicates a limited capacity to experience old age as a positive period in life that is likely influenced by a range of cultural, relational, and developmental factors.

Intergenerational community solidarity should be reflected in a generations' support for programs and policies that benefit another age group. For example, public support for elder welfare programs (such as Social Security or other pension programs) is quite high (Cook and Barrett, 1992), which may indicate consensual solidarity. Silverstein and Parrott (1997) also reported support for Social Security across cohorts, but younger persons were less likely to view cutting elder programs as a violation of the public good. At the same time, Silverstein and Parrott determined that contact with grandparents moderated the more negative attitudes towards elder public care programs. That is, those with more grandparent contact tended to report greater support of elder programs.

Researchers reporting on voting habits of elders emphasized the considerable heterogeneity within the population of older voters (Turner, Shields, and Sharp, 2001). Thus, factors other than generation more keenly affect whether older adults vote in favor of youth and family programs and policies. To illustrate, advocacy groups such as the Wisconsin Intergenerational Advocacy Group reflect the commitment of some seniors to the issues of children and families. Conversely, other communities' voting patterns may reflect weaker support of child welfare programs. Given the high rates of voter participation among older adults, child and family advocates may find benefit in voter education programs targeting older adults.

## Evidence-Based Practices

While a range of “how to” IG manuals exist (Bressler, Henkin, and Adler, 2005; Epstein and Boisvert, 2005; Jarrott, 2007; Steinig, 2005), there is not one manual that fits all communities, needs, or intergenerational strategies. Intergenerational contact does not always have positive effects (Aday, McDuffie, and Sims, 1993; Seefeldt, 1987) so we must attend to not only the structure and availability of intergenerational contact, but also the quality of the contact setting (Knox, Gekoskie, and Johnson, 1986; Schwartz and Simmons, 2001), whether in a familial or nonfamilial setting. Allport’s (1954) contact theory provides essential conditions to support positive intergroup contact. Intergenerational scholars have used the contact theory to assess and inform interventions (Caspi, 1984; Meshel and McGlynn, 2004) across a range of intergenerational settings.

The following subsections outline the contact theory tenets and other evidence-based practices that apply widely to intergenerational programs.

### Contact Theory

#### Support of Administrators, Stakeholders, Tradition, or Law

Intergenerational programs often develop under the direction of one or two enthusiastic employees or volunteers (Deutchman, Bruno, and Jarrott, 2003). Without the support of supervisors or other stakeholders (e.g., parents or caregivers of program participants), or without a tradition of intergenerational programming, sustaining the programs often proves impossible. To engender administrative and institutional support, intergenerational partners can construct a shared intergenerational mission statement and a memorandum of understanding regarding their commitment to collaboration. Directors may incorporate intergenerational responsibilities into staff job descriptions, and resources may be coordinated to create an intergenerational coordinator position. The Neighbors Growing Together program at Virginia Tech incorporated these practices as they worked to institutionalize intergenerational practices (Jarrott, Gigliotti, and Smock, 2006). Consequently, intergenerational programming has become a tradition, and staff members readily collaborate to partner young and old with the full stakeholder support.

### Equal Group Status

Interpreting the condition of equal group status in an intergenerational context can prove tricky, particularly when discussing contact between

young children and frail elders. Rather than suggest that adults and children are equal in health and ability, I interpret this condition to mean each participant has something to contribute to and something to gain from the contact setting.

Many intergenerational programs are framed as one group serving the other, which inherently creates a status differential between the “givers” and the “receivers” of the service. Salari (2002) described the common case of infantilization at adult day programs with intergenerational programs involving young children. When the young and old participants are treated the same, the elders are denied the opportunity to contribute to the program in a way that matches their abilities, and they are less likely to benefit from contact.

Even in programs with an obvious direction of service, such as students performing Service-Learning (S-L) by providing home maintenance for elderly residents, equal group status can be achieved by encouraging youth and elders to see what they can gain from and give to each other. In the S-L example, students have the opportunity to learn about elders’ circumstances and experiences, and they develop skills related to the services they perform for or with the elder. The older adults learn about the aspirations and circumstances of today’s youth while sharing their experiences and advice.

### Interaction Characterized by Cooperation and Common Goals

Intergenerational programs involving cooperation, as opposed to competition, as youth and elders work towards a common goal is central to positive contact. While youth and elders may be united to address groups’ different needs (e.g., elders’ need for generativity and children’s developing language skills), they should be united in purpose (e.g., conducting life history interviews and studying the community’s development). Furthermore, programs should be able to identify one goal that both groups share, such as developing positive intergenerational relationships (Jarrott, Gigliotti, and Smock, 2006).

### Opportunities for Friendship

Pettigrew (1998), in his analysis of Allport’s (1954) contact theory, added one condition for positive intergroup contact—opportunities for friendship. The condition speaks to the import of frequent and regular contact (Caspi, 1984). Some “one-shot” intergenerational programs have demonstrated positive outcomes (e.g., a panel of visiting elders in a classroom; Couper, Sheehan, and Thomas, 1991); however, programs that repeatedly

bring together the same children and elders will better reduce ambiguities about the relationships, lessen social distance, and support intergenerational solidarity (Bales, Eklund, and Siffin, 2000).

### **Other Evidence-Based Practices**

#### Voluntary Nature of Contact

While contact between generations is the best way to support intergenerational solidarity, contact needs to be voluntary (Jarrott and Bruno, 2007). Some participants will need time to acclimate to the intergenerational setting if they have had limited contact with the other generation. Adults who decline invitations to join programming with one age group may welcome opportunities with a different age group (Seefeldt and others, 1982). For example, some adult day services participants who regularly refused to join intergenerational programming with the neighboring preschoolers welcomed the chance to join a language arts project with area seventh graders (Jarrott, Komelski, and Weintraub, 2007). Similarly, children may need to try out different roles in the contact setting before they find where they feel most comfortable. If children or older adults refuse contact, their wishes should be respected as program staff collaborate to identify appropriate ways to involve them in the intergenerational setting.

#### Variety of Opportunities

Provision of varied IG opportunities supports high levels of voluntary IG contact and increases the range of needs that can be addressed. Drawing on continuity theory (Atchley, 1982) and theory of personhood (Kitwood, 1997), practitioners can expect individuals to find greater interest and meaning in familiar roles and activities. At a time when the scope of familial and employment roles is typically narrowing (Carstensen, 1992), volunteer and recreation activities (Ice, 2002) tend to further constrict options available to elders. Older adults' interests and experiences only become more diverse with age and a commensurately wide range of opportunities with intergenerational options will more likely attract them and their young counterparts.

#### Cross-Training

Because professionals working with youth and older adults typically have expertise limited to one generation or the other, cross-training is recommended for intergenerational practitioners (Jarrott, Gigliotti, and Smock, 2006; Travis, Stremmel, and Duprey, 1993). Such training typically

addresses developmental characteristics of the two (or more) age groups, the purpose, and anticipated benefits and challenges of intergenerational programs, and evidence-based practices for connecting the generations. Levels of training can range from single session workshops to semester long courses and specialists certificates (Rosebrook and Bruno, 2005). Some practitioners even recommend cross-training sessions for the young and old participants prior to initiating intergenerational contact (Bressler and others, 2005). Research demonstrated that receipt of training contributed to more positive attitudinal change about IG contact among shared site intergenerational care staff (Jarrott and others, 2004).

### **Nonfamilial Intergenerational Programs that Support Intergenerational Community Solidarity**

A survey of education and human services research publications, trade journals, newsletters, and websites reveals a plethora of diverse intergenerational programs that can build intergenerational solidarity. The following highlight examples of such programs.

#### Residential Program

Hope Meadows is a unique residential community at a former U.S. military base that provides low-cost housing to foster care families and low-income elders who contribute to the community by volunteering a minimum of six hours per week. Elder volunteers' tasks can include tutoring, playground supervision, and guarding school crossings. Eheart and Hopping (2001) reported developmental benefits for the foster children and increased sense of purpose among the older adult volunteers. Porgozola and Krout (2001) described a different type of intergenerational residential setting in which a retirement community was built on the campus of Ithaca College. Residents were able to attend college courses, and university students collaborated with residents for a range of service, educational, and social projects.

#### Home Visits

In an effort to foster civic engagement, schools and a number of university courses require students to perform Service-Learning. Some opportunities include visits with community seniors during which students may perform light maintenance that elders cannot complete on their own. Students learn about the range of abilities of seniors, they learn about the social histories of the adults, and they learn about themselves (Brown and Roodin, 2001;

Knapp and Stubblefield, 2000). The seniors benefit from the services and socialization, and they learn about the lives of today's youth. Elderly participants described contributions they made to the Service-Learning context, including sharing stories of "olden days," encouragement to overcome challenges in life, and friendship (Underwood and Dorfman, 2006). Even family members benefit; those interviewed by Bullock and Osborne (1999) reported they worried less about their aging relatives who were visited regularly by Service-Learners.

Parallel to youth visiting the homes of seniors to provide services, programs such as Family Friends (<http://www.philafamilyfriends.org/>) connect older volunteers with families caring for a disabled child. Seniors visit the family home on a regular basis to interact with the child. Parents receive some respite, and the child's social ties broaden by forming a close relationship with another person.

### *Telephone Reassurance Programs*

In the past, telephone reassurance programs such as "Grandma, please!" have supported latchkey children needing advice, help, or simply someone to talk to about their day at school. Trained volunteers received calls from children and made referrals to the supervisor if they determined that the child needed urgent help.

### Care Settings

Care settings are a common site for intergenerational programs. Addressing the increasing need for formal care support at both ends of the lifespan, the children's component may consist of child care or wraparound school care, and the elder care program may consist of adult day services, assisted living, or nursing home care. Innovative programs may link generations in residential communities or connect one group in a care setting with intergenerational participants from another program. Children and seniors may visit each other's programs from across town, down the street, or in the same building.

Shared site intergenerational programs are uniquely positioned to connect the generations because they provide ongoing services concurrently to children and seniors; that is, both children and seniors are in attendance at programs in a single building or adjacent buildings at the same time (readers are directed to Generations United's *Under one roof* for a useful resource on shared site intergenerational programs; Steinig, 2005). Care programs are the most common shared site setting (Goyer and Zuses, 1998). Shared and nonshared site programs have demonstrated capacity

to support children's (e.g., Marx and others, 2004) and elders' well-being (Hayes, 2003; Jarrott and Bruno 2003; 2007), improve community capacity, and enhance attitudes staff hold about intergenerational contact (Jarrott and others, 2004), contribute to caregiver benefits (Gigliotti and others, 2005), and provide cost-effective care (Chamberlain, Fetterman, and Maher, 1994; Jarrott and Schroeder, 2008). In an early study by Hegeman (1985), nursing home directors reported that colocating a child care program at their facility attracted staff and improved the nursing homes' image in the broader community. Such programs have the potential to provide cost-effective care without duplication of services. Elder care programs that provide on-site child care may find such programs enhance retention and reduce absenteeism of staff, a major problem in the long-term care field.

Another setting that supports intergenerational programming involves older adults as employees or volunteers at children's care programs. Larkin and Newman (2001) reported that senior employees provided a family-like quality to the program and that they allowed the lead teachers to accomplish other tasks and provide more one-on-one care. Older care workers modelled for the children, supported practice of social skills, and, for some children, eased the transition from home to school. An early study by Dellmann-Jenkins and colleagues (Dellman-Jenkins, Lambert, and Fruit, 1991) reported enhanced pro-social behaviors among children attending a university-based child care program with older adult volunteers. More recently, long-term positive impact on empathy and pro-social behavior among 9 year olds was associated with the children's attendance of an intergenerational child care center before they entered school (Femia, Zarit, Blaire, Jarrott, and Bruno, 2007).

### Educational Settings

Although the structure of the education system typically segregates generations, it is also a common source of intergenerational programs. Schools may target intergenerational solidarity with aging curriculum (Lichtenstein and others, 2005), Service-Learning, or older adult volunteers. Older adults have been used as mentors to youth at risk of drug use and dropping out of school (Taylor and others, 1999) and as living historians addressing students' curriculum (e.g., Bales, Eklund, and Siffin, 2000; Meshel and McGlynn, 2004). Bales and colleagues (2000) observed an increase in the number of positive words and a decrease in the number of negative words students used to describe traits of visiting elder historians. Fourth graders involved in an outdoor curricular experience with older volunteers demonstrated significantly enhanced school behaviors compared to those without



elder partners (Cummings, Williams, and Ellis, 2002). Experience Corps represents a large-scale initiative in the United States that places teams of trained senior volunteers in an elementary school at which the volunteers provide 15 or more hours of service per week. Most volunteers are low-income women who receive a stipend for their contributions. Research demonstrated increased physical activity for the volunteers (Tan and others, 2006) and significant academic improvements among child participants (Meier and Invernizzi, 2001).

### Community Service Settings

Recreation settings provide opportunities for sharing resources that can connect generations and save money. For example, senior centers may colocate with wraparound care programs. These may be shared resource programs, in which the children's program occupies the space in the morning and late afternoon, while the seniors use it during the day, or it may involve periodic or regular activities involving senior center participants and youth. For example, older children might visit the center to teach the seniors how to use computers, elders might teach children how to play chess, or both groups could work together on service projects.

Diverse intergenerational programs abound. A Native American Indian community center in Arizona ([www.nsaie.org/knowledge.htm](http://www.nsaie.org/knowledge.htm)) recently introduced a program designed for elders to pass down tribal language and traditions to children. Nonfamilial intergenerational camps have been piloted in the United States (<http://www.generationscrossing.com/>). The Betty J. Queen Center in Louisa, Virginia, is a shared site intergenerational program that houses a senior center, youth center, child care, adult day care, and an *Arc of the Piedmont* center that supports day programming for young adults with mental disabilities. Programs share space and equipment resources (e.g., kitchen, basketball court, and meeting areas) as well as companionship.

The SHINE (Students Helping in the Naturalization of Elders) and Intergenerational Bridges programs are noted for their work in connecting young and old immigrants with U.S. citizens to work on the naturalization process. SHINE connects college students with elderly immigrants while Intergenerational Bridges pairs older adults with young immigrants (<http://www.interagesmd.org/intergenerationalbridges.html>). Such programs go beyond intergenerational solidarity to promote national solidarity. As populations in the United States and other countries become increasingly diverse ethnically and racially, the support of immigrants by citizens will enhance norms of civic obligation (Skilton-Sylvester and Garcia, 1998).

## Sustaining Capacity for Intergenerational Solidarity

Beyond building intergenerational solidarity, we must attend to its sustainability. Indicators of sustainability described by Mancini and Marek (2004) include (1) leadership competence, (2) effective collaboration, (3) understanding of the community, (4) demonstration of program results, (5) strategic funding, (6) staff involvement, and (7) program responsibility. Beyond these markers, intergenerational advocates share the responsibility to disseminate their experiences in order to shape future practice and policy. Intergenerational strategies evolve to address the ever-changing circumstances of societies. We enhance the probability of success by combining our experiences and ideas with those of others who have explored how to foster positive intergroup contact, build community, and connect generations to achieve a greater good.

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# CHAPTER SEVEN

## INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY

### PROGRAMS AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

*Mariano Sánchez, Juan Sáez, and Sacramento Pinazo*

In 2005, the European Commission (EC) published its “green paper” *Confronting Demographic Change: A New Solidarity Between the Generations*, which stated:

Demographic changes are creating a new society, and these changes are set to speed up from 2010 onwards: ever fewer young people and young adults, ever more older workers, pensioners and very elderly people. Our societies will have to invent new ways of liberating the potential of young people and older citizens. Dealing with these changes will require the contribution of all those involved: new forms of solidarity must be developed between the generations, based on mutual support and the transfer of skills and experience. (European Commission, 2005, p. 23)

This chapter focuses on the very last call mentioned in this excerpt—the need to develop new forms of solidarity among generations. We explore how an intergenerational framework for programs and policies may be a good source for new and richer forms of solidarity.

We know well the demographic lesson: our social landscape, and particularly that of aging, has experienced profound changes in the last century, and aging has become one of the main trends in contemporary societies. The populations of so-called developed countries are doomed to age more rapidly. And the consequences of this long and wide aging process, especially the major implications, are being announced everywhere. What should be done? International organizations and institutions, like the European Commission and the United Nations, are trying to be responsive to the aging challenge. The issue of intergenerational solidarity has been raised in this context.



Without dismissing demographic arguments, however, there are other significant and generally unnoticed reasons to pay attention to today's practice of intergenerational solidarity: social fragmentation, lack of connections between individuals and groups, loss of social capital, and the like. Even if we did not have to face up to the demographic challenge of aging, we still would need to work out ways to get back to basics, that is, regain and restrengthen the sense of belonging that has always been behind any successful human community. As relational beings, we need nurturing and bonding, whether intergenerational or not; our being in the world is a *shared being, a being together*. Our lives are relational, and relationships are an essential part of who we are.

### **Intergenerational Solidarity: A Relational Approach**

In chapter two, Bengtson and Oyama define intergenerational solidarity as “social cohesion between generations” and explain that the concept of generation has several meanings. We do not intend to discuss their definition, but to adopt a complementary approach. In our view, intergenerational solidarity is only a particular type of intergenerational relationship. Following Donati, we underscore the relational nature of generations: “Generations involve social relationships, even more, they are social relationships and they need to be understood through the timing of relationships” (Donati, 1999, p. 32; translation provided by M. Sánchez).

Donati further emphasizes one particular relationship at the core of the generation concept: “A generation is the set of people who share a particular relationship, the one linking their position within the family-parental lineage (i.e., son, father, grandfather, etc.) and their position in the social sphere according to their ‘social age’ (i.e., according to age groups such as youth, adults, elderly, and so on)” (Donati, 1999, p. 37; translation provided by M. Sánchez).

We, on the contrary, adopt a wider perspective because there are criteria other than family lineage and social age connected to the concept of generation. Some authors indicate that both familial and nonfamilial approaches to the study of generations should be connected through a wider framework: “The concept of generation can be defined with regard to society or to family—two levels which are usually analyzed separately but need to be treated in a unified framework” (Kohli, 2005, p. 518).

Why is our approach wider? Because it prioritizes the relational character not only of generations, but also of intergenerational solidarity; and it does so without first highlighting one specific type of relationship as the typical one in the practice of intergenerational solidarity. Whether it is social cohesion, mutual service, sharing resources, or just providing

companionship (i.e., “being there” with an individual or group from another generation), intergenerational solidarity has to do mainly and above all with relationships—not with individuals.

With regard to generations, our perspective does not deny that the concept is multifaceted. For instance, Donati (1999) suggests four typical and different ways to conceptualize *generation*:

1. Generation in demographical terms: a group of people born within a given interval of years
2. Generation as age group: a cohort of individuals considered a social group
3. Generation as a historical unit: an age group able to lead social and cultural movements
4. Generation in socioanthropological terms: people sharing the same position in terms of lineage

Whenever we tackle generations within aging studies, however, we tend to oversimplify the potential of the concept by reducing it to either a matter of (individual) age or to a question of (individual) lineage. Depending on the concept of generation adopted, the meaning of *intergenerational* changes, but its relational nature persists:

The age-composition of the population is the background of all ways to analyse intergenerational relations, both conceptually and empirically. Generations are conceived of as one or more cohorts who are united by certain experiences, by a specific approach to tasks and by a more or less strict sense of common identity. How many cohorts a generation may include can vary. In any case, the notion of a generation implies a difference to at least one other generation. The most general expression of this is the juxtaposition between the old and the young. At the same time, generations belong to the same overall community, society, or, technically speaking, social system, thus they are bound to each other by more or less formalised and institutionalised *social relations*. (Lüscher, 2000, p. 11; emphasis added).

Our typical interpretation of the term *intergenerational* tends to concentrate on *generation* as its core component: “Intergenerational relationships has been used to refer to relationships *between* (and in some cases among) members of different generations; while multigenerational relationships has been used to refer to two or more generations considered together as a static system. The term ‘multigenerational relationships’ does not appear to refer to the relationships *between* or among those members of the generations under consideration” (Brownell and Resnick, 2005, p. 73).

The relational approach (whether Donati's or ours), however, is more promising. In using the term *intergenerational* we propose to highlight the prefix *inter* instead of the noun *generation*: "I suggest that it is useful to take the institutionalisation of the *relations* between generations as the point of departure for conceptual and empirical, and also policy-oriented, work on the topic" (Lüscher, 2000, p. 11). In our view, this choice of notions is not a simplistic choice but an epistemological dilemma. Giving preference to the noun (generation) means cultivating an approach that first needs to establish identities (who are the members of the generations?) and then is able to cope with dynamic processes (to whom do they relate?). The way of thinking based on an *intergenerational* approach puts an emphasis on relationships, because it is through our relationships that we get to know, however challenging and fuzzy it may be, our identity, who we are. This approach implies a change of "lens": when we observe an *intergenerational* interaction, what we should be seeing first is the relationship dimension. In addition, it admits that individuals somehow continuously reshape their instable and multiple identities.

Therefore, it is the relationship (*inter*), not the subject (*generation*), that really matters here. Individuals participate in intergenerational relationships; however, they are not the *nucleus* in these relationships; the real essence is *between* individuals, but not when each one of them is separately considered. Here, a change of paradigm is needed. Social policies are too frequently individual centered, group centered, community centered, society centered; that is, they concentrate on identities (whether at individual, group, community, or society level) or on categories (who does what?). Regarding *the intergenerational* (instead of an adjective, it should be treated as a noun), it is the *inter* that matters (what is happening between generations?). More than simply "being," what really matters is "being with" and "being together." Instead of fixed identities ("generations are . . .," "intergenerational practices and programs are . . .") we should concentrate on contingent and changing relationships ("generations are being . . .," "intergenerational practices and programs are being . . .").

### **Barriers to a Relational View of Intergenerational Solidarity**

Henceforth we will be presenting some interrelated obstacles that constitute real barriers to the promotion of a relational approach to intergenerational solidarity, and therefore to intergenerational practices and programs as networks of relationships or relational realms.

### Fragmentary Visions of Aging

First, aging is not an isolated phenomenon, disconnected from other social trends. A *siloed* approach to aging—just one of the processes in our lives, not a special one—risks putting too much emphasis on old age as a residual and fragmented period in life. Consequently, elderly people are perceived, above all, as aging individuals without a relational content. “Hegemonic gerontology” has contributed, to some extent, to this fragmentation and isolation of its very subject, namely, aged individuals and the aging process. However, any effort to foster solidarity, strengthen the social fabric, overcome generational fragmentation, combat isolation, and promote relational trust needs a social rationale more than a gerontological one. To some extent, critical gerontology and lifespan approaches have been able to recast the study of aging in social terms: aging is just one of many social processes whose understanding may only be achieved through an analysis of several interconnected social issues (social order, political structures, cultural symbols, economic trends, and so on) throughout the life cycle.

The more fragmentary our visions of aging processes are, the less able we are to capture their social and relational nature. This fragmentation is typical of a Western culture that has tended to situate the “me” at the very center of all ontological, anthropological, and political explanations of human beings, instead of highlighting their relational nature. The social keyword is not “me,” but “us.”

### Compartmentalization Predicament

In an effort to understand and explain various aspects of aging and its implications, a wide range of theories have been developed. However, the lack of fertile articulation between approaches and concepts prevents us from producing a more thorough understanding of aging and its different dynamics. Yes, everyone seems to acknowledge that aging is a multidimensional process, but we still tend to situate our research on aging within specific fields of knowledge, the so-called disciplines. “Disciplining old age is ultimately impossible, however productive and expansive the attempts to do so have been over the last century” (Katz, 1996, p. 134). Therefore, disciplines like medicine, psychology, biology, sociology, anthropology, demography, pedagogy, and so on, study aging from their specific platforms and adopt their particular methodologies and approaches, preventing us from producing a unified, relational, and powerful base knowledge around aging. Multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches do not deny the central position of disciplines; they simply suggest different ways to work beyond them, but also with them.

A vivid example of this disjointed approach is the sheer lack of semantic consistency in the use of terms like intergenerational and multigenerational, depending on the discipline at stake. This can be concluded after reading the following couple of excerpts:

1. Although both intergenerational studies and family studies consider cross-generation interaction, family scholars utilize a broader definition of intergenerational relationships than the one widely accepted in the field of intergenerational studies. Specifically, family studies includes parent-child relationships and other kin relationships, among those relationships that are viewed as intergenerational, while intergenerational studies focuses on non-kin relationships and family relationships that skip a generation. Intergenerational simply means ‘between generations’ and thus the inclusion of studies on parent-child interaction is considered important here. (Hanks and Ponzetti, 2004, pp. 8–9)
2. Mabry, Schmeckle, and Bengston (2001) state ‘Much research in aging focuses on the relationships and interactions among people of different ages or in different age groups. Intergenerational relationships are *between* family members in a lineage—parents and children, grandparents and grandchildren—interacting at the microsocial level’ (p. 555). (Brownell and Resnick, 2005, p. 71)

Transdisciplinary work should be nurtured so that we are able to *undiscipline* aging. Disciplines are usually linked more strongly to an exercise of control over a certain set of knowledge than to one of free production of knowledge. We believe that undisciplining aging will be a way to highlight the relational nature of intergenerational processes.

### A “Me” Culture Is Deeply Ingrained

One of the main features of contemporary accumulation of knowledge and research around social issues seems to be the ingraining of a “me” culture: I (me) need to know the others, to identify them, and to act (intervene) upon them. It is a sort of egocentric anthropology.

What are the consequences of this ingraining regarding the geography of aging studies? First, aging is mostly approached in its biological and individualistic dimensions: individual bodies and minds seem to ease the identification process.<sup>1</sup> Actually, it took us decades to realize that we can not talk about older persons as if they were a sort of universal category; instead, we must try to address them as a heterogeneous group of very diverse people; not all older persons share the same identity-related

attributes. Second, once we find out what older persons are like, we typically move on to concentrating on the impact that aging has on societies and social structures. Hence, a set of problems associated with aging is listed; therefore, aging, and consequently older persons, are increasingly perceived as problematic. A whole range of prejudices and aprioristic assessments are settled. Finally, once we define and identify older persons (who are they and what are they like?), we concentrate on solving *the problem*: what should we do with older persons to solve problems connected to aging and improve their lives? Needs, understood as deficits, and the satisfaction of those needs are still considered the doorway to aging policies. How is it that we, later on, complain because of the negative stereotypes produced around older persons? Aren't we contributing to that stereotyping through our own approach to older persons as a problem-linked object for researchers, programmer and policy makers?

We believe that it is a mistake to use a problem-based approach to try to better understand the identity of older persons. This biased approach might be corrected through the implementation of a relations-centered view of older persons: What makes up the core of the relationships in which these persons participate? How does the presence of older persons mold relationships in general, and intergenerational relationships in particular? And, what is most important, how are older persons shaped by relationships in which they are involved?

### Professional Misconception

Professions focused on aging and older persons have also contributed to the justification of a deterministic approach. Instead of acknowledging their lack of knowledge about the issue, professional fields concentrate on the production of truths, which justify a professional intervention. We think, on the contrary, that what we will someday know about older people will be still less than what we will ignore.

However, professions and professionals need to produce specific analyses on needs and continue doing so. For instance, psychologists concentrate on behavioral and mental needs, geriatricians look at health needs, social workers are concerned with social integration needs, and so on. The definition of these needs is often neither made by nor with older persons themselves. Despite this, professional bodies of theories and traditions are too strong to be prevented from pushing forward processes of needs identification and production. Might some of these needs have just been incited by overly conscientious professional work?

Our point of view distances us from the aforementioned professionalism. Instead of a rationale based on confirming professional beliefs and

ideology (“At this stage we do know a lot about older people; therefore, whenever we meet them this previous knowledge tends to be confirmed”), we should adopt a “discovering” position (“Given that we always know a little about these older persons, an effort to continuously understand who they are is needed”). It is within the network of relationships that we can better learn what defines a human being. A “culture of relationships” instead of a “culture of subjects or individuals” should be promoted in order to really understand intergenerational processes.

### **Intergenerational Programs from a Relational Perspective**

Not all intergenerational practices take the shape of intergenerational programs. However, all intergenerational practices and programs are, to some extent, an attempt to identify the community to which practitioners belong and within which they develop as individuals. Intergenerational practices are opportunities to experience and be aware of the essential need to recover and maintain a sense of belonging to a certain community and, consequently, to foster intergenerational solidarity. It is the existence of a *between* within intergenerational practices that makes sense of them.

Therefore, intergenerational programs should be approached as a means to building a culture of relationships, one able to substitute for the current individualistic culture. “The idea is to emphasize a culture involving encounters, underlining what happens between people, and how it happens at a given time in a given place, in order to overcome methods focusing on isolated individuals categorised according to abstract criteria” (Sáez, Pinazo and Sánchez, 2007, p. 186).

What does it mean to approach intergenerational programs from a relational perspective? It means considering them, above all, as relational spheres, means for people to meet and relate. Sometimes we tend to underline the fact that these programs consist of an organized set of activities realized by individuals from different generations. However, activities are only an instrument: what matters in these programs is the development of mutually beneficial relationships through processes such as cooperation, interaction, and exchange. Approaching intergenerational programs from a relational perspective means that relationships happening within their framework become an end in themselves; beyond outputs and outcomes, what people involved in intergenerational programs gain is the experience of *being with* others, and *feeling connected* to others. “Programs are about more than service. They should help participants establish personal bonds and feelings of affection, support, trust, and companionship” (Bressler, Henkin, and Adler, 2005, p. 20), all of which counteract the individualistic and instrumental approach currently so extended in human agency.

## Towards Meta-Generational Social Policies

Let's take into consideration the aforementioned relational approach to intergenerational issues in order to formulate features of appropriate social policies for the improvement of intergenerational solidarity.

First, there is the relational concept of *life cycle*. One of its key elements is the concept of existence as a continuum, which means that all life stages are interrelated. What does this have to do with our relational approach? Interrelation of life stages implies that no human being should be perceived as a sum of parts, whether losses, problems, or even assets. Every individual has a continued existence represented by his or her *life project*.


A life cycle approach to intergenerational solidarity implies that the intergenerational continuum cannot be reduced to interactions between two given generations. On the contrary, all generations are interwoven in the existential cycle of individuals, groups, communities, and societies. Intergenerational programs and policies should become instruments to sustain the logic of the existential cycle—the *life cycle*—to counteract the process of generational differentiation and separation undertaken through multiple social transformations. Each generation is built on previous generations and is influenced by expectations of what future generations will be like. A good intergenerational policy that tries to overcome age-group niches cannot then contribute to the creation of either generational niches or intergenerational silos.

Third, we refer to *place of life* as the sociocultural site where intergenerationality occurs. In this regard, both typical spaces for social links (such as family households, schools, community centers, and so on) and innovative places (intergenerational shared sites, cohousing communities, multigenerational houses, and the like) should be considered by intergenerational developers and policy makers.

The life cycle, life project, and life place, as depicted in figure 7.1, constitute the three axes of our suggested approach to intergenerational social policies.

The *being-together* rationale pervades each development of *intergenerational* policies (the ones regarding a liveable *life place*, the ones supporting a *life cycle* and the ones guaranteeing a dignified *life project*). Consequently, *intergenerationality* should not only be a facet of social policies, but all social policies should be *intergenerationally rooted*. Hence the proposal to concentrate on developing *meta-generational policies*—those that work at a supragenerational level, that is, taking into account individual generations, but looking, above all, to the relationships between all generations and not just to each generation on its own.





**Figure 7.1** Labor policies

Source: Mariano Sánchez, Juan Sáez, and Sacramento Pinazo.

### Policy Recommendations

The final section of this chapter, in line with what has been presented, suggests some criteria to be considered by policy makers in trying to launch intergenerational social policies that foster intergenerational solidarity.

#### Recommendation #1: Accept the Contingent Nature of Intergenerational Relationships

First, an obvious, but often forgotten, axiom: Every policy intended to foster intergenerational solidarity risks not only failing, but also reducing solidarity. Whatever the actions (*trials*) undertaken, errors (unintended results) will arise:

It is in the policy arena rather than in the attitudes of younger people and in demography that we find the main threat to intergenerational solidarity. Describing pensions as a burden and encouraging a popular view that older people themselves are a burden may weaken the willingness of younger people to provide support for older ones. If the level of pension that today's younger people can expect in the future is reduced they may question whether it is worthwhile being part of the social contract. At a societal level, the process of revising the social contract may create the conditions for intergenerational conflict (Walker, 2001, p. 6).

Generations can be fixed through conceptual criteria, but relationships are contingent and, consequently, impossible to discipline. Therefore, do not expect to find automatic cause and effect between what we, as policy makers, wish to happen and what finally occurs regarding intergenerational processes.

#### Recommendation #2: Older Persons Alone Should Not Be at the Center of Intergenerational Policies

Examples of policy actions recently recommended to strengthen solidarity between generations can be found in the Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing (MIPAA):

- (a) Promote understanding of ageing through public education as an issue of concern to the entire society;
- (b) Consider reviewing existing policies to ensure that they foster solidarity between generations and thus promoting social cohesion;
- (c) Develop initiatives aimed at promoting mutual, productive exchange between the generations, focusing on older persons as a societal resource;
- (d) Maximize opportunities for maintaining and improving intergenerational relations in local communities, inter alia, by

facilitating meetings for all age groups and avoiding generational segregation;

- (e) Consider the need to address the specific situation of the generation of people who have to care, simultaneously, for their parents, their own children and their grandchildren;
- (f) Promote and strengthen solidarity among generations and mutual support as a key element for social development;
- (g) Initiate research on the advantages and disadvantages of different living arrangements for older persons, including familial co-residence and independent living in different cultures and settings. (United Nations, 2002, pp. 17–18)

As long as older persons alone remain at the core of the United Nations aging policies, it will be difficult to make the world understand that the real issue at stake is intergenerational solidarity. Infancy policies, youth policies, adult policies, and older person's policies should demonstrate more mutual rapprochement and *cross-fertilization*.

#### Recommendation #3: Increase Opportunities Not Only for Intergenerational Doing, But Also for Being Together, for Being With

Beyond activities, projects, and programs, intergenerational spaces should also be promoted. Intergenerational solidarity needs an appropriate place—one which invites us to meet people from different generations, but without making it an obligation; one where different generations cross and therefore may establish some kind of contact. In this regard, the promotion of intergenerational housing and shared sites seems to be an interesting and promising avenue (Jarrott and Wintraub, 2007). Sometimes intergenerational solidarity may be triggered through an opportunity to observe, in the right place, people from different generations, prior to interacting with them.


#### Recommendation #4: Prioritize the Promotion of Intergenerational Practices

Bernard (2006, pp. 6–7), in an effort to stimulate further debate about the (developing) intergenerational field, argues that “research (and indeed evaluation) underlies, and is fundamental to, facilitating and understanding the linkages between intergenerational practice, policy and theory. [...] [Research] is what holds the ‘jigsaw’ together.” This scholar represents the intergenerational field “jigsaw” as presented in figure 7.2.


We believe that, in order to strengthen the intergenerational field, practice, and not research, should come first. Therefore our “jigsaw” is somewhat different from the one above (see figure 7.3).

Why is this so? All human beings are intergenerational to the extent that we all depend on interaction with a previous generation in order to survive and develop. Intergenerational practices and experiences are at the root of human issues. We are all somehow *intergenerationally wise*. Therefore, policies should call attention to the fact that intergenerational practices have always existed and, therefore, each person’s intergenerational experience may become the raw material upon which to build a more intergenerational social fabric.

Consequently, policies should provide as many opportunities as possible to practice intergenerational relationships, to *being with others*. Theory and



**Figure 7.2** Intergenerational field components. Original



**Figure 7.3** Intergenerational field components. Revised

*Source:* Authors inspired by Bernard (2006).

research may sustain (i.e., orient) practice; theory, research, and practice may constitute the basis upon which policies are thought out. However, people need opportunities to practice the *inter*. The more continuous, diverse, and sustainable these opportunities are, the better.

#### Recommendation #5: Bridge Intergenerational Solidarity

In the same way that we talk about bridging social capital, we should introduce the need to bridge intergenerational solidarity. With this proposal we refer to the urgent commitment to link intergenerational family bonds with intergenerational relationships outside the family. The fact that familial intergenerational solidarity may be somehow of a different nature than non-familial intergenerational solidarity does not prevent us from suggesting that exploring ways of bridging this divide will be very positive. To what extent might strong intergenerational family solidarity either inhibit or foster intergenerational practices outside the family system? Might intergenerational solidarity become a type of social relationship bridging the boundaries of social divides such as gender, ethnicity, social class, sex, and age? Trying to approach policy-making efforts in a manner that increases familial and nonfamilial intergenerational solidarity would be a worthy effort.

In summary, we present below a revised and adapted list of recommended strategies (Sáez, Pinazo, and Sánchez, 2007, pp. 201–203) to be considered by policy makers trying to provide opportunities aimed at building a society for all ages:

- All policies defined as intergenerational, and whose objectives are above and beyond a specific age group, should be based not on subjects or individuals, but on relationships.
- The above means that all subject-based policies (older persons' policies, youth policies, children's policies, and the like) categorize and define subjects within limited scopes, thus disabling them for fully participating in social relations that foster cohesion and solidarity in societies. No long lasting progress can be made with such policies.
- Policies created from positions of power fail to foster their implementation and specific application: there is an insurmountable divide between what these policies say (promise) and what they can do (achievements). A bottom-up participatory relational approach should be implemented instead.
- A relational culture needs to use the language of relationships. Both policy makers and professionals need to be fluent in the use of such a language.

- The design of an intergenerational policy requires perceiving intergenerationality as a continuum in which the past, the present, and the future constantly meet and in which personal relations, as with all constructive relations, become the basis for solidarity between groups and communities of all ages.
- All intergenerational policies should be formulated, on the one hand, based on the potential of open and unconditional encounters between different generations and, on the other, on the strength of the active lifelong aging concept.
- An intergenerational policy aimed at overcoming silos and working against any kind of segmentation has to build new languages and strategies with which to reinforce its proposals. Concepts such as *place of life*, *life cycle* and *life project*, which refer to vital and real situations and contingencies, are examples of that language.
- Intergenerational policies, by providing opportunities for meaningful personal relations, can be a good antidote against isolation, atomization, abandonment, or passiveness. Recent studies link an improved quality of life to the stable, lifelong relations experienced by individuals.
- Intergenerational policies must be based on the necessary and mutual interdependence of generations within their communities. Only communities can create suitable environments in which solidarity between generations may grow and from which we may reach authentic societies for all generations.
- From a relational perspective, intergenerational programs and practices are excellent resources for experiencing community and promoting solidarity, as well as for improving lifestyles and fostering the natural condition of humanity.

### **Emergent International Issues Regarding Intergenerational Solidarity**

In March 1995 the United Nations Secretary General presented the conceptual framework for *a society for all ages*. Four dimensions emerged: (1) the situation of older persons, (2) lifelong individual development, (3) multigenerational relationships, and (4) the relationship between development and the aging of populations. Regarding “multigenerational relationships,” the conceptual framework said:

Communities can facilitate multi-generational relationships, both within neighborhoods and between special interest groups. Though undergoing change, the neighborhood community is usually age-integrated, making

interactions between its younger and older members a matter of daily routine. Communities of special interest, such as organizations of elders or youth, can establish new relationships in addressing community concerns such as safety, environmental protection, cultural enrichment, income-generation and others. Communities can also facilitate communications between younger and older generations, particularly in the exchange of new and old technologies and new and traditional lifestyles. (United Nations, 1995, p. 7)

It seems clear that, at that stage, “elders” and “youth” were considered to be potential actors in the endeavor of progressing towards a (multigenerational) society for all ages.

Seven years later, in 2002, the Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing changed the language: intergenerationality opened its way as the key concept in the struggle for the ideal, that is, a society for all ages, to become a reality. In 1995, multigenerational relationships, as a concept, underlined the fact that we are all interdependent. In 2002, intergenerational relationships, as the new keyword, emphasized that we all have to practice solidarity. The progress seemed evident.

Now that the first review and appraisal of the MIPAA has finished, we may learn how intergenerational issues are taking shape (United Nations, 2007):

- Generally speaking, it seems that intergenerational solidarity is gaining attention in international policy agendas on aging.
- Intergenerational solidarity, mostly from a family perspective, has become a core item within the issue of increasing care for older persons.
- Intergenerational contracts, the strengthening of social protection schemes, and the revision of policies relating to pensions and benefits for older persons emerge, as well as issues at stake among policy makers.
- Intergenerational solidarity within families and within communities, as two different dimensions of intergenerational solidarity, are still perceived as mostly disconnected.
- Volunteer programs increasingly include intergenerational contacts and the provision of daily care to older persons.
- Intergenerational programs, more a result of local community arrangements than specific public policies, “allow efficient use of community resources and help to eliminate negative consequences of isolated living” (p. 10).
- Intergenerational shared housing is an innovative program allowing for complementary possibilities of intergenerational exchange.

Beyond acknowledging that “promoting an intergenerational dimension in policymaking enhances social cohesion and links between generations” (United Nations, 2007, p. 10) the progress witnessed is still slow. There are many unnoticed initiatives, worldwide, improving intergenerational solidarity in effective, but yet invisible, ways. We most likely need to approach this issue using a different and complementary lens and, in this regard, this chapter suggests the convenience of a more relational approach.

### Note

1. This strategy is alive and well. At a recent European International Conference on aging, which took place in 2008, the program devoted one of the workshop sessions to answering the question “Who is considered an older person?” This question is a good example of ongoing concern around the setting of identities. From our perspective, and to eliminate the individualistic and instrumental biases of this question, it should have been drafted as follows: “In which kind of relationships are involved people considered older persons and how these relationships do shape that consideration?” or “What are the characteristics of those relationships in which people considered older become involved?”

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PART 3  
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

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CHAPTER EIGHT  
DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION  
AND INTERGENERATIONAL  
TRANSFERS IN PERU

*María Amparo Cruz-Saco*

This chapter explores intergenerational transfers in the context of rapid demographic change in Peru. The case study was chosen to illustrate how transfer payments from remittances, public payments, and pensions are presently not enough to support the growing income needs of the people, and particularly of older persons. Peruvian society possesses a strong tradition of solidarity within the extended family, and this basic social unit is resilient to sharp economic and sociopolitical shocks. For that reason, small children and older persons who need special care and income support are often assisted by family members. This chapter shows that international out-migration is accelerating the aging of the population because younger people are leaving the country in large numbers. Aging is also a natural outcome of the drastic decline in fertility rates, particularly in urban areas, and increased longevity. One would hope that remittances from abroad would help support relatives back at home. Evidence, however, seems to indicate that the percent of the population that accesses international transfer payments is still small. Another option for income security in old age would be access to pensions. However, as will be seen, neither public nor private pensions are paid to a majority of persons over 65, who represent more than six percent of the population.

The main finding of this case study is that both the young and the elderly are, to a large extent, financially on their own. As Peru continues to build its social protection system, policy makers and civil society will need to strengthen intergenerational transfers to provide required quality education and health care, as well as income security, to the bottom and top portions of the population.

### The Demographic Transition

The demographic transition in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is caused by a combination of lower child mortality, higher life expectancy at birth, widespread use of contraceptive methods, and out-migration. While the fall in fertility rates varies among and within countries (according to geographic region, socioeconomic class, and ethnicity), the average fertility rate has decreased from 5.9 in 1950–1955 to 2.4 in 2005–2010 (ECLAC 2005, p. 19). One of the outcomes of lower fertility rates is the drop in the total dependency ratio,<sup>1</sup> which has been decreasing from its peak of 88.5 percent in 1965 to 56.2 percent in 2005. It continues to fall and will level off at 49.6 percent in 2025 (ECLAC 2005, p. 26). The proportion of children aged 0–15 has been falling, from 40 percent in 1950 to 32 percent 50 years later, and it will continue to fall to 18 percent in 2050. This process shows a major change from an expansive population pyramid to a slimmer geometric figure reflecting a narrower base that will continue to shrink with a simultaneous widening of the top. Then, the rapid aging of the region will cause a reversal in the total dependency rate by 2025–2030 (up to 52 percent in 2040 and 56 percent in 2050). At that point, the rate of growth of the older population will be higher than the reduction of the younger population, the dependency rate will increase, and the potential for the so-called “demographic dividend” will end.

In the last century, LAC has been a net exporter of migrants to the rest of the world, notably to the United States. The latter is the most important destination for most Mexican, Caribbean, and Central American migrants. International out-migration from South America is more diverse and seeks destinations in other South American countries, Europe, and the United States. The estimated regional migration rate as reported by ECLAC 2005 for 1990–2020 is presented in table 8.1. Negative numbers show the net out-migration just described.

Table 8.1 includes figures for El Salvador and Peru, two countries that consistently registered high rates of out-migration. Seminario and Alva

**Table 8.1** LAC: Estimated migration rates (per 1,000) by quinquennium, 1990–2020

	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020
LAC	–1.5	–1.4	–1.4	–1.3	–0.9	–0.7
El Salvador	–2.1	–1.3	–1.2	–1.1	–1.0	0
Peru	–1.7	–4.0	–2.6	–2.2	–1.4	–0.6

Source: ECLAC 2005, p. 24

(2007) have noted that these recorded migration rates, for El Salvador and Peru, may largely underestimate the exodus of individuals. For example, according to ECLAC estimates, the total regional out-migration would have been approximately 730,000 people in 2006 ( $-1.3$  per 1,000 \* 560 million Latin American and Caribbean people). But a detailed study in El Salvador carried out by Cruz, Chávez, et al. (2007, p. 12) indicates that in 2007 the rate of out-migration in El Salvador was of the order of 360,000 persons a year—figure in 2006 was probably around the same. For Peru, the annualized figure was approximately 300,000 in 2006 (see INEI, 2006). It can quickly be seen that if these two countries were experiencing a combined out-migration of 660,000, the regional estimate was going to be much larger than 730,000. More recent population census in El Salvador and Peru found that the total population was less than predicted by previous census, thus showing the need to revise their methodologies in the calculation of the rates of crude birth, crude mortality, and migration.

The end of the fall in the dependency ratio in Peru will take place in 2025–2030, which is similar to the LAC trend (United Nations Population Fund, 2007). It should be noted that Peru's dependency ratio is analogous to the dependency ratio for the developing world (WB, 2006). In the period 2005–2025, the labor force in the entire developing world will continue to grow, although at a slower pace, and dependency ratios will fall. In the industrialized world, however, the labor force will shrink, or is already shrinking, while dependency ratios are increasing.

In the Andean countries,<sup>2</sup> dependency ratios are also falling. The fall in this variable is considered by some as a unique window of opportunity for countries to prepare for the aging of their populations (ECLAC, 2005). They can benefit from high economic growth and larger labor forces, combined with lower current commitments, to fund their dependents in the future. Chile is about to end this phase, while the rest of the countries in this group will continue to enjoy this opportunity until 2025–2030. Bolivia's ratio will continue to decrease until 2045, which shows that its population is younger, and aging is delayed. For Peru, its dependency ratio and labor force trends are almost identical to the Latin American trend: a steady increase in the size of its labor force and a fall in the dependency ratio until 2025–2030.

### **Intergenerational Transfers**

Transfers are unilateral cash payments to persons that can be either private (within the family or granted by not-for-profit nongovernmental organizations) or public. They allow the divergence of earnings and consumption

so that transfer recipients, including small children and older persons, can be consumers. Within the family, payments are usually interage transfers. They are delivered in heterogeneous ways from financial and time transfers, to transfers paid when people are alive or after their death (to their beneficiaries), and cash transfers that take place at a specific time, received during early childhood, youth, or old age. Transfers can be from older to younger persons (downward flows) or from young adults to older persons—for example, to parents, grandparents, and older relatives (upward flows). Examples of the first type include child rearing (to children of married, separated, or divorced parents or caregivers), gifts and bequests, and paying for education and health care, while examples of the second type include supporting older parents and coresidence. The motivation for transfers is also varied, including altruism among well-integrated and harmonious families, exchanges or reciprocity that are driven by self-interest, and indirect reciprocities that go from parents or grandparents to younger children in the form of bequests and gifts. Transfers of larger amounts of assets, including bequests, support an intergenerational chain of wealth transmission that often reinforces structures of economic and financial concentration.

Remittances from migrants to their families at home are another modality of intergenerational transfers that play an important role in securing the well-being of families left behind, including young children and older people. A steady flow of remittances can boost financial intermediation through the expansion of markets for banks and the creation of new instruments that have the potential of promoting economic growth. This is an added side effect of these transfer payments.

In the public sector, transfer payments go from taxpayers, who are typically in the 20–64 age group, to younger and older persons (according to the proportions of nonworking people, children, and older persons). Government expenditures in public education, health care, recreation, social assistance, and so on, and the payment of social security benefits (old age, disability, and survivors' pensions; family allowances; basic, non-contributory pensions; and poverty reduction programs) are funded with general revenues and social security contributions. The analysis of public spending in the provision of public (and semipublic) goods, disaggregated by age groups, becomes increasingly more difficult due to the large size of records that would be needed. Developed countries may have systems in place to conduct this type of disaggregated analysis, but in the rest of the world, the development of this capacity will be required. In the case of social security contributions to unfunded systems (pay-as-you-go) and special poverty reduction programs (e.g., conditional cash transfers), it is relatively straightforward to determine the upward and downward flow of transfers.

Private foundations, official and multilateral agencies, and nongovernmental and community-based organizations may provide cash or non-financial transfers to specific vulnerable groups. Modalities can include grants, food allowances, social services, educational and vocational training, technical assistance, and health care, which are net transfers to targeted beneficiaries.

The complex dimensions and changing nature of intergenerational transfers imply that it is difficult to provide a strict definition or typology. And this is happening within a context of demographic transformations that are affecting how families and governments confront the impact of changing patterns in the age distribution of communities and the emergence of new needs and challenges. In addition, the influence of new institutions in the provision of coverage for short- and long-term social contingencies is another dimension in which these new trends are unfolding. The relevance of both family and public transfers is manifested in multiple forms, for example, in national debates regarding the future of social security and in the anticipation of the implications of accelerated aging on labor markets and the future well-being of older people. The following quotation from Arrondel and Masson (2006, p. 1037) illustrates this point:

The central message of this literature is that key policy issues, such as the future of social security and the debate between pay-as-you-go retirement schemes and private pension funds, cannot be analyzed only by comparing the relative efficiency of the State and the market in securing old-age needs: *family* intergenerational relations and specific motives for transfers do also matter when assessing the effects of government transfer policies.

It has been hypothesized that public transfer programs in industrialized countries enable the current and future elderly “to live well at the unfair expense of today’s youth and tomorrow’s newborns” (Lee, 2003). This is precisely the type of argument that often leads to tensions among generations, because young people do not feel that it is right to “bail out” older people in their need for long term care and financial security. It is not clear, however, that everywhere in the industrialized world older people are net winners in the intergenerational assignment of transfer payments and benefits. For example, in the United States, the social security system pays relatively more benefits to widows, orphans, people with long- and short-term disabilities, and people receiving unemployment benefits, welfare, and other forms of social assistance, than it does pensions to retirees. Lee (2000) also argues that public and private transfers combined go upward in industrialized countries, but still downward in the developing world. For many countries in LAC, including Peru, this observation seems to



hold true: most transfers go downward due to several reasons, such as the impoverishment of older persons in view of the collapse of social security systems in the 1980s, long episodes of hyperinflation and stagnation that eroded the wealth of older generations, and incipient capital markets. A senior ranking official once said to me in an interview that when resources are scarce, difficult decisions need to be made. The idea was basically that a developing country has to build its human capital for the future of the nation. In Peru, as in many other Latin American countries, such as Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, the government has promoted a series of poverty reducing efforts, such as conditional cash transfers and programs to insert youth in the labor market. These programs have clear intergenerational components, mostly of the “downward” flow type.

### **Migration and Remittances**

The other side of migration is remittances. In recent years, there has been an enormous push to measure their size.<sup>3</sup> Some have talked about “remittances-led” development. The common idea is that countries can leverage remittances to promote economic growth, given that in many countries these flows are larger than official development assistance and even foreign investment. But the stability of remittances depends on a diversity of factors, from secure jobs to market conditions and the migrants’ predisposition to continue to send money home. With the successful insertion of millions of migrants in labor markets abroad, remittances to the developing world have surged from \$31.2 billion in 1990 to \$167 billion in 2005, (WB, 2006, p. 88), and \$370 billion in 2007 (UNDP, 2009). One-third of the remittances inflows are explained by India (\$35 billion), China (\$33 billion), Mexico (\$27 billion), and the Philippines (\$16 billion). For LAC, the estimates were \$5.8 billion in 1990, \$42.4 billion in 2005, and \$63 billion in 2007—there has been a leveling of remittances most likely due to the financial crisis of 2008.

Remittances increase net foreign assets, and thus, they are important to central banks, which try to put their hands around them and have good estimates of the inflows. In 2009, Peru’s central bank estimated remittances at around \$2.8 billion, with a 10 percent decrease from 2008 due to the global crisis (BCRP, 2010). Other sources estimate that the flow can be as high as between \$3 and \$4 billion. It is difficult to have a good estimate due to the number of unrecorded flows. A study by the InterAmerican Bank, quoted by Peru21.pe (<http://peru21.pe/imprensa/noticia/remesapromedio-peru-us166/2009-03-17/241358>, visited on June 07, 2010), said that ten percent of the adult population in Peru receives approximately \$166 per payment, that they receive on average nine payments a year, and

that most payments are made to residents in Lima, Huancayo, and Piura. This information is different than UNDP (2009) data, which shows that Peruvian migrants send \$3,294 (in 2007), which would average more than \$1,992 for each recipient. Basically, information on how much money comes in and on its allocation is still difficult to know.

These concerns aside, for the most part remittances are used for consumption and often help alleviate the incidence of poverty (IADB-MIF, 2007). There is, however, evidence that the poorest of the poor do not leave and, thus, members of this group cannot benefit from transfer payments from relatives abroad.<sup>4</sup> It is difficult to calculate the average amount of money that migrants sent back home. UNDP (2009) calculations indicate that, on average, in 2007, a migrant from Guyana sent \$55,000, from Jamaica, \$26,000, and from Peru, \$3,300,000. While the dollar value of per capita remittances is an artificial amount (remittances are targeted to families or friends of migrants; international comparisons of the purchasing power of one dollar is tricky) it provides an idea about the leveraging power of remittances vis-à-vis population size. The per capita remittance rate<sup>5</sup> is high in Jamaica, at \$790, and in El Salvador and Honduras, at around \$550, less in the Dominican Republic (\$350) and Mexico (\$255), and lower still in Peru (\$76) and Chile (\$25). These figures give the general sense that in some countries, with larger diasporas abroad who send more money home, the power of “remittances-led” economic growth may be higher than in others. Similarly, the incidence of support to young and older persons from access to these monies may also be higher in these societies. It is difficult, however, to conclude that most of the region is equally affected by this type of financial boost for relatives and friends, which may include young and older persons. We simply do not know enough.

Despite this general conclusion, there is evidence that remittances may positively affect the health and mortality of communities by changing the resources and investment patterns of specific individuals, families, and communities. For example, a study on migration and health changes in 25 communities located in central Mexico showed that infant mortality increased at first when migration rates intensified. Thereafter, when remittances to communities and migration became institutionalized over time, mortality fell (Kanaiaupuni and Donato, 1999). For a sample of 11 LAC countries, Fajnzylber and López (2007) estimated that their joint remittances increased their share in GDP, from 0.7 percent in 1991–1995 to 2.3 percent in 2001–2005, leading to an increase of 0.27 percent in the per capita GDP growth. According to these authors, remittances play an increasingly important role, although their direct impact on economic growth has been small in the immediate past.

Household surveys provide information on access to remittances by profile of household. These surveys include questions about remittances that can help measure their impact. In the Philippines, in 1991, of more than 11 million families surveyed, 17 percent reported having received some sort of income from abroad, which represented 8 percent of the country's household income. In the same year, more than 665,000 workers left the country, mostly as contract workers (Rodríguez, 1996). In Peru, Cox, Ezer, and Jiménez (1996) found that 25 percent of Peruvian households received income from abroad, representing 22 percent of their income. Fajnzylber and López (2007, p. 22), however, have a different estimate. They estimate that only 3 percent of Peruvian households benefited from remittances.<sup>6</sup> They also showed that fewer than 6 percent of the households that receive remittances belong to the lowest quintile, and a large concentration of remittances in the relatively better-off segment of society.

Using Peruvian household surveys from 2004 to 2006 (INEI-ENAHO, 2007), I calculated the percent of individuals with access to remittances (foreign transfers) and domestic transfers.<sup>7</sup> Table 8.2 shows these calculations. My estimates seem to be more consistent with Fajnzylber and López (2007) than with Cox, Ezer, and Jiménez (1996) in that less than 5 percent of the total population has access to remittances.<sup>8</sup> In contrast, approximately one-fifth of the population reports having received domestic transfers. The smallness of my estimate may reflect a variety of factors, such as the reluctance of individuals to report actual access or confusion in the reporting of transfers. The important lesson here is that we need additional research to get a better grasp at who is accessing remittances, how much they receive, how the remittances are spent, and what type of intergenerational transfers are taking place.

### Pensions

In Peru, the National Pension Office (ONP), which was created in 1992 after a major reform of the social security system, administers a pay-as-

**Table 8.2** Percent of individuals with access to transfers, 2004–2005

Year	<i>Access of persons to transfers</i>	
	<i>Domestic:</i>	<i>Remittances:</i>
2004	36.4%	4.0%
2005	23.5%	3.2%
2006	22.8%	4.8%

*Source:* ENAHO 2004–2006, and author's calculations

you-go unfunded system (SNP) of defined benefits. This system affiliates approximately one million workers, but only 576,000 contribute regularly, which is 4.5 percent of the labor force. It pays approximately half a million pensions. The ONP administers a fund of \$3 billion that helps generate a portion of the revenue needed to pay the benefits. But more than two-thirds of the pensions are funded out of the government's general stream of revenues. Some of these pensions, therefore, are considered intergenerational transfers.

The private pension system<sup>9</sup> (SPP) is administered by four pension fund managers (AFP); it affiliates 4.5 million individuals (by April 2010), of which only 1.8 million contribute regularly (by third quarter 2009), and pays only a fraction of the SNP pensions, more than 70,000 (the system is 17 years old).<sup>10</sup> The rate of affiliation has decreased from 13 percent in 1998–1999 to 6.5 percent in 2003–2006 (BCRP, 2007). Presently, the SPP covers approximately 10 to 11 percent of the labor force (contributors/labor force), that is, affiliates who are current in their contributions. In the SPP, contributions are defined and each affiliate contributes to his/her own retirement fund. Thus, there is zero intergenerational transfer in the SPP, with the exception of the minimum pension,<sup>11</sup> which is paid with a government transfer.

Both the SNP and the SPP cover less than one-fifth of the labor force, mainly the salaried and urban workers who work in modern, formal establishments. The majority of the affiliates to the SPP (80 percent) are less than 44 years old and two-thirds are male. The SNP covers workers with relatively lower salaries who expect a pension that would be higher than one obtained at the SPP; workers with higher salaries have affiliated in the SPP.

Approximately one-third of the population over 65 received a pension from either the SNP or the SPP in the decade between 1995 and 2005.<sup>12</sup> This proportion may have increased slightly since 2006. In essence, this means that two-thirds of the older persons in Peru have not earned a pension from any contributory system and are supported by their extended families. This situation has not changed in any significant way in the last five years.

It can be seen that the aging of the population begins to increase more markedly after 2004, which is consistent with estimates that the population older than 65 will represent 8.8 percent in 2010, 10.9 percent in 2020, 14.5 percent in 2030, and 24.4 percent in 2050. Since affiliation to pension programs is facing structural barriers to expansion, the proportion of the elderly without a pension from a contributory system will increase. Assume that the number of pensions in the SNP will remain constant at 1.5 percent of the population (a rather optimistic assumption given the decrease in

affiliation), while the percent of pensions paid by the SPP increases to 0.50 percent, 1 percent, and 2 percent, respectively, in 2010, 2020, and 2030. The percent of people older than 65 without a pension will increase from an average of 67 percent in 2003–2005 to 77 percent in 2010–2030. Note that the number of people over 65 will double in this time period. A projection of the percent of the population older than 65 who will not receive a pension in the period 2005–2030 shows two important trends. First, a sharp increase in the size of this age group, and second, a drastic increase in the percent of older persons without a pension.<sup>13</sup>

### **Health Care for Insured Older Persons**

EsSalud is the social security program funded through tripartite contributions from employers, employees, and the government that provides health care to insured workers, their families, and pensioners. Through a national system of health care posts, clinics, and hospitals, EsSalud delivers primary, secondary, and tertiary care. Approximately 6.5 million people, including active workers, their eligible family relatives, and pensioners have access to EsSalud (less than one quarter of the total population).<sup>14</sup>

PADOMI, an office of EsSalud, is the residential health care program that benefits 30,000 disabled and frail pensioners (over the age of 65) in Metropolitan Lima and its districts. They represent 1.8 percent of the population over 65. The program was created initially for persons over the age of 80 who were disabled, but in the last few years, it has expanded its coverage to include persons older than 65. They are visited monthly by one physician and twice a month by a certified nurse (in some cases more frequently, depending on the condition of the patient). Prescribed medicines must be picked up from the central office by a relative or friend and are distributed at no cost. If the older person experiences an emergency, PADOMI has an emergency unit that can provide assistance at home or transport the patient to an EsSalud hospital.

One of the goals of PADOMI is to educate families and caregivers about the health condition of the patient and to incorporate them into the health team. A small percentage of the patients do not have relatives, and their care is delivered by friends, neighbors, or another older person whose health is as precarious as the registered patient. Occasionally, PADOMI staff has identified situations of abusive behavior against their patients or cases of abandonment. For the most part, however, the experience is one of collaboration among caregivers and relatives. PADOMI does not discriminate by gender, socioeconomic class, or ethnicity. The staff is aware that, due to high congestion of health facilities, it is often difficult to secure a hospital bed for a patient who needs emergency care. PADOMI's staff

includes 500 employees, of which 130 are physicians, with only five of them trained in the field of geriatrics. The program owns four transportation units and three ambulances for all of Metropolitan Lima and its districts. The wait period after an emergency call can be anywhere from 24 to 72 hours, depending on other emergencies and the availability of staff.

EsSalud has also organized a system of Centers for Older Persons that have been designed to enhance the quality of life of older persons (those over 60 and pensioners) in physical spaces and environments that are conducive to intergenerational dialogues through the development of cultural, social, and productive activities, recreation, and so on. They are located in several districts of Metropolitan Lima and in many provinces. These centers are housed in a variety of spaces, offices, and sometimes small houses. When the physical space is large, they have a kitchen with food service (cafeteria), a small health club, hair cutting services, a legal counselor, and a basic health care unit; the house may have a small shop or a classroom for training and educational workshops in simple productive activities (knitting, ceramics, etc.); the house may also organize cultural and social activities.

### **The Peruvian National Plan for Older Persons**

As part of the Peruvian government's efforts to implement the agreements of the Madrid International Plan of Action on Aging (National Plan for Older Persons), the Office of Older Persons (Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo Social, the Ministry of Women and Social Development) has implemented a National Network for Older Persons. One of the goals of the national network is the establishment of a series of local networks for the promotion of their self-care. These networks are collaborations of civil society (e.g., the Sociedad de Beneficiencia de Lima), international organizations (UNFPA), and local municipalities that will coordinate with other government-led strategies such as the Centers for Older Persons administered by EsSalud.

Visits to Programs for Older Persons in five important municipalities in Lima<sup>15</sup> showed the following: these programs have successfully engaged older persons who reside in the district and who are excited about the various activities that enable them to acquire new skills and training; the participants spend quality time with other neighbors and feel a sense of reassurance regarding their right to age with dignity and in welcoming environments. Programs are relatively new and have small budgets. Beneficiaries and administrators, however, are seeking funds in a creative manner because they believe that their programs add enormous value to communities. Interaction of residents with staff members is beginning to increase public awareness about the living conditions of older people,

and of their needs and opportunities. Districts varied in the activities and workshops that they have designed, in the number of beneficiaries, and in the co-payment needed for the sustainability of the initiatives. All districts offer programs in physical and health education, development skills for income-generating activities, and classes on how to use computers and the Internet. All are committed to finding better spaces for the Home of the Older Person and, if possible, enough room and beds to house individuals who are homeless. Staff members in all districts emphasize the need to promote increased awareness of the rights of older people and how communities can be better prepared to promote their active engagement.

### Conclusions

Lower fertility rates are dropping the dependency rate and creating an opportunity for a “demographic dividend” that ends around 2025–2030. At that point, longer life expectancies reverse the trend and the dependency rate increases. During the period of the “demographic dividend,” proactive policies to create a stronger transfer system that helps pay for future benefits or to fund current transfers to persons in need could increase. This is due to the fact that the number of active workers will reach a peak, thus creating a parallel peak in the level of income. This process has the potential of increasing savings which is needed to implement programs that prepare society for a larger proportion of persons over 65.

The demographic changes and the lack of income security of older persons affect the perception of financial solvency of the economically active population aged 15–64. This generation perceives a reduction in its disposable income due to transfer payments to their own children, their older parents, and mandatory contributions to either of the two pension systems (an additional incentive not to affiliate). The existing privately funded pension scheme, without intergenerational transfers, can provide income security for older people who contribute. But unresolved structural barriers to the expansion of coverage limit its effectiveness.

By 2025, 77 percent of persons over 65 will not have a pension. They will need to be supported by their families. The government should consider options to address the income insecurity of a large segment of older people. Policy makers, however, are giving priority to the reduction of chronic malnutrition among children aged 0–5 and the reduction of rural poverty (emphasizing the mother-child relationship), also an essential social goal that will help attain the Millennium Development Goals.

The social security system provides health coverage to 18 percent of the total population, including one-third of older persons who earn a public pension. Only 1.8 percent of older people benefit from the special residential

health care program for the disabled. A National Plan for Older People has been implemented, which includes the establishment of local networks of support. While still small and new, these networks can promote the rights of older people and prepare communities for their rapid aging.

Remittances may be a source of income flow that can help support young and old, reduce the incidence of poverty, and promote economic growth. Despite the rapid growth of remittances, it seems that they benefit a small proportion of the population. But a significant flow of remittances may not be registered. More research is needed to find out how remittances are used and who is benefiting from the flows.

### Notes

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1. The ratio between those of working age and those of non-working age. Typically calculated as the population of those aged 0–14 plus the population over 65, divided by the population aged 15–65.
2. Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.
3. See Acosta 2007; Altamirano 2006; BCRP 2007, 2010; Choy 2005; Cox 1996; Fajnzylber and López, 2007; Kanaiaupuni and Donato 1999; IADB-MIF 2007; Rapoport and Docquier 2006; Rodríguez 1996; UNDP 2009, and WB 2006.
4. The distribution of remittances by quintiles in eleven countries of LAC showed that in some cases they are distributed in a slightly more regressive way than income. For example, Fajnzylber and López (2007, p. 9) show that the poorest 60 percent of the population (first three quintiles) receive only a quarter of total remittances, while the top quintile receives on average 54 percent of those flows. In Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Paraguay remittances are distributed more equally, but in the other seven countries of the sample, the first three quintiles receive only 16 percent of total remittances, compared to 26 percent of total income.
5. This is total remittances divided by total population.
6. Instead, they concluded that Haiti is the country with the highest access, with 25 percent of the households reporting that they received remittances in 2001;



- between 10 and 25 percent of households in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras; between 5 and 10 percent in Mexico and Guatemala; and between 3 and 5 percent in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay.
7. These include child alimonies, various types of pensions—old age, disabilities, and survivors’—cash payments, gifts, and other grants.
  8. A typical household in the 2006 ENAHO has 4.2 members: 1 member aged 0–14, 2.7 members aged 15–65, and 0.5 member over 65.
  9. For in-depth analysis of the 1992 reform and its implications see Cruz-Saco (1998), Cruz-Saco and Ivachina (1999), and Morón and Carranza (2003).
  10. For an in-depth analysis of the genesis of the SPP see Cruz-Saco (1998); for an assessment of its evolution and cost, Cruz-Saco and Ivachina (1999), Morón and Carranza (2003). This data is from the Superintendencia de AFPs (2010).
  11. The minimum pension is \$100/month for both SNP and SPP.
  12. INEI, ONP (2007), SAFF, and author’s calculations.
  13. INEI, ONP (2007), SAFF, and author’s calculations.
  14. The other three quarter include a small proportion of persons that use private health care and the vast majority that is covered by the ministry of health through a national program that attempts to secure access to the entire population.
  15. Based on interviews to program officers in Ate-Vitarte, Jesús María, Miraflores, San Isidro, and Santiago de Surco in the months of September and October 2007.

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# CHAPTER NINE

## LABOR MARKETS AND SOCIAL INCLUSION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

PERSPECTIVES FOR INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY

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The labor market is considered one of the fundamental building blocks of social inclusion, not only as a provider of immediate income, but also as a source of family and community cohesion, learning, and self-esteem. Excluded populations, by definition, have more limited access to financial capital and social networks, and therefore rely on their human capital as a ticket out of exclusion.

Human capital is both earned and innate over the life of an individual. It accumulates over time from the combination of education, learned skills, innate abilities, drive, and work habits. The labor market and education are two of the most important sources of human capital development. While many factors interact in creating social exclusion, labor market exclusion—the inability to generate a livable family income, the devaluing or lack of recognition for one’s daily work, discrimination, lack of basic legal protections on the job—prompt a chain of social and economic effects that deepen and solidify social exclusion. These effects include marginalization to living in poor areas, social stigma associated with poor-quality jobs, unsafe working conditions, and an early end to education, all of which create lifelong impacts. Improvements in human capital through education, training, and better-quality jobs can conversely contribute significantly to greater inclusion through higher income, greater social integration, and stronger cultural awareness and identity.

Labor markets and human capital development occupy both sides of the exclusion/inclusion dichotomy. They can be both a principal source of exclusion and a principal resource for inclusion. In terms of intergenerational

solidarity, the two labor market cohorts of youth and mature adults face distinct challenges regarding labor market exclusion, in addition to their shared challenges. For youth, study after study has revealed the importance of the earliest years of employment in building a positive orientation to work. High unemployment and underemployment in the earliest years often has lifelong effects. The aging population in Latin America and the Caribbean has difficulty formally “exiting” from the labor market, as weak social safety nets often leave them dependent on family (through remittances) and on low productivity, informal work. For both cohorts, the lack of lifelong education and training systems leads, for many, to “entrapment” in low productivity employment with few prospects for exit via human capital enhancement.

This chapter explores the role of labor markets and human capital development in the dynamics of social inclusion and exclusion in Latin America and the Caribbean, with a perspective on intergenerational solidarity. It looks particularly at the most recent decade of the late 1990s up to the late 2000s. It analyzes how labor markets play a central role as both a principal cause of exclusion and as a vehicle for promoting greater inclusion, particularly for women in the Latin American and Caribbean region. This paradox of labor markets as both friend and foe in combating social exclusion will be explored throughout the chapter. The chapter uses a definition of the principal excluded groups used widely for the Latin American and Caribbean region (IDB, 2007): afro-descendants, indigenous peoples, poor women, persons with disabilities, and persons living with HIV/AIDS.<sup>1</sup> Labor market data on these populations is limited and far from uniform across the region. At the outset, it is important to point out that excluded populations taken together can often represent the majority of the labor force in key Latin American countries (e.g., Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru) and certainly constitute the majority of the informal sector, which has shown the principal employment growth in the last decade.

The first section looks conceptually at how labor markets and human capital development act as agents of inclusion and exclusion simultaneously. It then turns to the major labor market trends of Latin America and the Caribbean, matching trends with their likely impact on deepening exclusion in the region. Finally, the concluding section discusses how labor market programs and policies in the region may be better oriented to play a more positive role in promoting inclusion.

### **Understanding Inclusion and Exclusion in Labor Markets**

Social exclusion can be seen as a dynamic, multidimensional process by which individuals, by nature of their race, ethnicity, gender, or other

defining characteristic, are denied access to opportunities and quality services necessary to live productive lives outside of poverty. Quality work at decent wages affords individuals not only the financial means to potentially break out of their exclusion, but also social and political access to the networks, services, and benefits to promote inclusion in a more integrative fashion, via family unity, community, and civic participation. Inclusion and exclusion through work is not a straightforward process. The same job can have inclusive and exclusive elements. A job in a local plant may offer dependable wages, but have no social security and benefits, thus assisting family income in the short term, but risking a different form of exclusion in later years. Families may have members in different states of labor exclusion and inclusion—some with steady, formal sector work, and others with subsistence employment and working children.

Literature on the subject identifies three principal ways that labor markets can foment social exclusion (Weller, 2002). First, through lack of access to jobs of any kind (Type 1, e.g., unemployment or severe underemployment); subsistence employment (Type 2); and lack of access to quality jobs (Type 3). Table 9.1 lists these types of labor market exclusion and how they are manifested in the labor market, as well as some of the features that reach beyond the labor market. It is important to see how an initial form of labor market exclusion—for example, unemployment or subsistence employment in the informal sector—can be linked to other aspects of social exclusion, such as segregation into poor neighborhoods, lack of

**Table 9.1** Principal forms of labor market exclusion

<i>Type of Labor Market Exclusion</i>	<i>Chief Labor Market Characteristic</i>	<i>Exclusion Features</i>
Type 1 Lack of access to jobs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Open unemployment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discrimination</li> <li>• Family/community</li> <li>• Social isolation</li> </ul>
Type 2 Access to only subsistence work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Very low wage employment</li> <li>• High percentage of informality</li> <li>• Precarious, unstable</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Poverty and associated social exclusion</li> <li>• Long working hours</li> <li>• Lack of benefits</li> <li>• Unhealthy working conditions</li> <li>• Physical or spatial segregation in poor neighborhoods</li> </ul>
Type 3 Lack of access to quality jobs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Underemployment</li> <li>• Poor-quality, low productivity work</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of access to social networks for advancement</li> <li>• Employment trap with little chance of improvement</li> <li>• Lack of access to productivity-enhancing training</li> </ul>

access to information on other job opportunities, and long working hours that inhibit family development and schooling. Experiencing any of these types of labor market exclusion can lead to family decisions (e.g., child labor, an early end to education, longer work hours, and migration) that deepen and exacerbate exclusion beyond the specific working individual.

Until recently, open unemployment (Type 1) was rare in Latin America and the Caribbean, and exclusion manifested more in underemployment and low-paying jobs. Duryea, Jaramillo, and Páges (2003) found sharp increases in unemployment in the Andean region and the Southern Cone, particularly in the late 1990s, with more moderate increases, and sometimes declines, in unemployment in the Mexican—Central American region. Open unemployment is still rare in the lower income Latin American and Caribbean countries (e.g., Central America) where the principal labor market adaptations are underemployment and out-migration.

The growth of the informal sector in Latin America and the Caribbean is perhaps the most striking trend affecting and accelerating exclusion of Types 2 and 3. While one must take care not to define all informal sector employment as subsistence or poor-quality work, it clearly has an exclusionary dimension in that workers are outside legal protection; have no formal recognition and job status; have few, if any, benefits; and may be subject to hazardous working conditions. In some cases, informal sector employment can be seen as the least severe of the exclusionary outcomes (e.g., low-paid work vs. no work, Type 2 or 3, rather than Type 1) because formal sector employment growth has been stagnant, particularly at lower skill levels. Informal work sites are not regulated for hazardous conditions, do not offer rights for union organization, and provide limited access to information on markets, finances, technology, and training. These three types of labor market exclusion should be kept in mind while reviewing key economic and labor market trends in the region in the most recent decade.

### **Recent Latin American-Caribbean Labor Market Trends: Exacerbating Exclusion**

The more recent trends in labor markets in Latin America and the Caribbean beginning in the early nineties have been described as “gloomy.”<sup>2</sup> If one is to generalize, work in Latin America and the Caribbean became proportionately more precarious (e.g., less security, more periodic, more unemployment), less remunerated (e.g., wage stagnation or decline), more informal (Klein and Tokman, 2000), and of poorer quality. Informality was particularly prevalent for women and those over 45, who, once losing their formal sector jobs, were highly unlikely to return to another formal

one. While there are no precise measures of labor market exclusion, we can look at trends in unemployment, informal sector employment, labor force participation, and benefit coverage as proxies for trends in exclusion/inclusion. As noted previously, in only a minority of countries can this data be disaggregated by race, ethnicity, and other characteristics. Table 9.2 lists some of the major labor market trends in the region and provides a delineation of the exclusive and inclusive aspects of these trends.

Of the principal recent labor market trends, a few stand out in terms of exclusion and intergenerational links.

### Rising Unemployment

Most countries in the region experienced a steady rise in open unemployment<sup>3</sup> beginning in the 1990s, with rates varying recently from 4 percent in Mexico to 15 percent in Colombia (Páges, Pierre, and Scarpetta, 2009). Mexico and Central America continue to have higher rates of underemployment and out-migration, rather than open unemployment. While regional

**Table 9.2** Key labor market inclusion/exclusion trends in LAC

<i>Labor Market Trend</i>	<i>Inclusion Aspects</i>	<i>Exclusion Aspects</i>
1. Weak Labor Market Demand		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased unemployment</li> <li>• Increased informality</li> <li>• Declining job quality</li> </ul>
2. Upward Qualification Bias	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Upgrading of key occupations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Low demand for jobs requiring low schooling levels</li> <li>• Increase in wage gap</li> </ul>
3. Growing Female Labor Force Participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increase in female employment, including formal sector</li> <li>• Reduced male/female wage gap</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased informality</li> <li>• Persistent salary discrimination</li> <li>• Occupational segregation</li> <li>• Concentration in lower-quality jobs</li> </ul>
4. Labor Market Flexibilization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Diversity of contracting incentives supports expanded workforce</li> <li>• Voluntary self-employment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Growth in precarious employment</li> <li>• Decreasing percentage of workforce covered by benefits</li> </ul>
5. Dual Wage Trends		
a. Wage increases in high end occupations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Wage conditions improve for certain groups</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Gaps between high and low income wages increase</li> </ul>
b. Stagnant/declining wages for low-end occupations		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>b. Increasing working poor, declining living conditions, longer work hours</li> </ul>

*Source:* Adapted from CEPAL, 2001, and Weller, 2001.



rates are still below the average of OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries (9 percent), many countries are coming close to OECD rates without the benefits of social and unemployment insurance. Youth, women, and urban workers experience higher than average unemployment, yet the relative importance of youth, female, and urban unemployment as a determinant of high unemployment rates declined. Youth, though, are retreating from the labor market despite continued high unemployment rates. The most recent trends indicate youth are participating less and working less in most countries of the region, many staying in school longer as the labor market offers fewer short-term opportunities (Páges, Pierre, and Scarpetta, 2009). This is affecting social security contributions, as many Latin American systems heavily weight contributions from young workers toward final benefit levels.

### Increasing Participation and Poor Employment Growth

One of the salient characteristics of the recent Latin American labor market is what has been termed a “massive” expansion in labor supply that could not be absorbed by the slow growing labor market. Average participation rates in Latin America (66 percent) now mirror the OECD countries (70 percent).<sup>4</sup> In only three countries (Brazil, Chile, and Colombia) was the rise in unemployment combined with a decrease in employment rates. There are many factors behind increasing labor force participation. There is clear evidence that secondary workers (those other than the primary family wage earners) were “pulled” into the labor market by the need to supplement family income. In addition to the “push” or demand factor, female workers in particular were attracted to employment possibilities in the market. The most notable and positive trend for labor market inclusion is the rapidly rising participation of women in the labor force.

### Low-Wage, Low-Quality Jobs

Latin American and Caribbean economies have been unable to keep pace with enough new jobs at sufficient quality to meet the demands of increasing numbers of job seekers. Stefano Scarpetta argues that while the Latin America economies had relatively strong growth despite key crises (e.g., Mexico and Argentina), the “employment content” of this growth was low.<sup>5</sup> The lack of good-quality, formal sector jobs underscores a dominant trend in the region over the decade—the near exclusivity of employment growth in the informal sector. While there is a lively debate on how negative the economic and productivity implications of the rise in informal sector employment is, its negative implications for labor

market exclusion are more straightforward. Even more important to marginalization than informality is whether jobs are at “poverty wages.” The incidence of “bad jobs,” defined as poverty wages of \$1 per hour,<sup>6</sup> increased over the decade of the 1990s in Mexico, Central America, and the Andean regions. . Poor-quality employment is affecting even more than those thought least vulnerable, and now impacting men and workers with secondary education.

### Declines in Jobs with Benefits

Beginning in the 1990s, Latin America and the Caribbean saw an expansion of labor market regulations to permit more “flexible” contracts as well as informal employment. Latin America and the Caribbean also faced changes in part-time employment, although these changes were less dominant than in OECD countries. As noted in table 9.2, the new flexibility in labor contracts likely eased and supported the important increases in labor market participation rates and can be seen as having inclusive elements, particularly if it brought in workers who might otherwise have been marginalized outside of the formal sector. The increases in job instability and

**Table 9.3** Percentage of Latin American workers with benefits

<i>Country</i>	<i>Salaried Workers with Benefits</i>	<i>All Workers with Benefits</i>	<i>Data Year</i>
Argentina	62.7	46.4	1998
Bolivia	34.5	25.2	1990
Bolivia	17.4	13.5	1999
Brazil	52.5	45.4	1992
Brazil	54.0	45.0	1999
Chile	77.1	65.9	1990
Chile	75.8	63.6	1998
Colombia	60.1	44.7	1996
Colombia	61.3	43.6	1999
Costa Rica	70.6	56.7	1993
Costa Rica	66.3	53.6	1998
Dominican Republic	28.1	14.8	1998
Mexico	49.8	37.0	1992
Mexico	43.2	31.5	1998
Nicaragua	33.6	24.0	1993
Nicaragua	18.5	13.1	1998
Peru	37.8	24.5	1991
Peru	32.6	13.1	2000

*Source:* Cox Edwards, Alejandra. *Legislación Laboral: Algunos principios fundamentales, evidencia empírica y políticas en América Latina*. Paper presented at the *II Regional Technical Seminar on Labor Markets—Lima, Peru—July 2002*.

lower benefit coverage, conversely, tend toward greater exclusion in many countries. Table 9.3 demonstrates that in only half of the countries surveyed did a majority of salaried, formal sector workers have benefits. Trends in Andean countries are particularly striking; only 38 percent of salaried workers have benefits, a mere 13 percent of the Peruvian entire workforce.

### Migration

While almost every country in the world both sends and receives migrants, Latin America and the Caribbean have some of the highest rates of net out-migration. On average, 1 out of every 1,000 leave their nation of origin, compared to half that rate in North Africa (-0.5) and one-tenth that rate (-1) in South Asia (IOM, 2005). While it is true that the overwhelming destination for Latin America's migrants is the United States, the less well-known trend is the increasing diversity of migration to other developed countries (e.g., countries of Southern Europe and Japan) and to countries within the region. Migration for work has important implications for family functioning and intergenerational dependence, with young children increasingly left in the care of grandparents, and grandparents dependent on the resources and remittances from migration in the absence of social protections and insurance.

Remittances from Latin American and Caribbeans working abroad—nearly \$60 billion annually—now exceed foreign investment as the largest capital inflow to Latin America and the Caribbean, accounting for nearly 30 percent of Nicaragua's GDP and more than 2 percent of the region's GDP overall (IDB-MIF, 2009). While remittances provide a lifeline for many poor families, local employment can be depressed by the distortions introduced by dollar inflows (e.g., increased reservation wages). Once vibrant rural communities now lay quiet due to the absence of the principal working age population. Grandparents, long beyond their parenting years, are being called back to parenting without sufficient resources. Basic social and political rights are rarely accorded to migrants abroad, who suffer from exclusion and direct discrimination.

### Excluded Populations and the Labor Market

Much less is known about how specific labor market groups—afro-descendants, persons with disabilities—in Latin America and the Caribbean fared with these negative labor market trends in the region during the last decade or so. Did excluded populations suffer disproportionately from the negative trends of low wages and low-quality work? Clearly excluded

populations demonstrate higher rates of poverty and higher rates of extreme poverty. Data by race and ethnicity in key countries demonstrate high concentrations of low wage jobs among racial and ethnic populations. There is evidence that shows that there is concentration of low income among indigenous populations in countries such as Peru, Guatemala, and Bolivia, and among populations of afro-descendent populations in Brazil.

A key factor in the poorer labor market outcomes for excluded populations, for either young or old persons, is the likelihood of suffering discrimination. Labor market discrimination applies not just to discrimination in hiring decisions, but also while on the job (e.g., promotions and transfers), in wages, and through occupational segregation. Discrimination typically cut deepest where the social divides of any given country fall: in Brazil, blacks were perceived to be the most discriminated against, indigenous peoples in Guatemala, and the poor (or low-income class) in El Salvador (Behrman, Gaviria, and Székely, 2003).

### **Promoting Inclusion in Latin America and the Caribbean through Labor Market Policies and Programs**

Labor market policies and programs in Latin America and the Caribbean have not often been designed, analyzed, or evaluated in terms of promoting the greater inclusion of socially-excluded populations, or of promoting or addressing intergenerational solidarity. To broadly generalize, targeting in labor market programs in the region, if undertaken, was typically based on income (e.g., programs for the poor) or gender. More commonly, programs and services were provided universally to all workers (e.g., state-financed job training, labor intermediation, or placement services), with lower income workers more likely to take advantage of public financing. There are clear exceptions to this general trend in the region, particularly in regards to training disadvantaged youth and women.

Promoting greater labor market inclusion through programs and policies, however, does not always imply that programs must be designed to target specific populations, for example, indigenous peoples or persons with disabilities. Depending on the nature of exclusion and the size and nature of the excluded populations, more universal labor market programs can be tailored or supported with additional services to insure that excluded populations more fully participate and take advantage of universal programs. Youth is a key exception here, as the key labor market skills and knowledge to be imparted are not technical skills, but job readiness and workplace skills that are particular to the needs of first entrants. Taking into account existing Latin American and OECD experience in labor market programs, there are a number of key ways that Latin American and Caribbean labor

market policies and programs could be better used to advance the labor market performance of excluded populations. Improving the labor market performance of these populations serves national economic objectives, as these are segments of the population most likely to be trapped in subsistence or low-wage labor. Any such initiatives need to be in the context of a much broader framework of a national inclusion process so that labor market advances are linked to a broader range of constitutional, institutional, and programmatic changes (IDB, 2007, Chapters 13 and 14).

### Improving Data Collection and Labor Market Analysis

The first step in more inclusive labor market policies and programs is to know better the racial, ethnic, and other characteristics of the labor force, and how and whether those attributes affect labor market outcomes. While the broadly defined excluded groups are similar across Latin American countries, the nature and form of discrimination is likely to vary significantly by country and national experience. Disaggregation of labor market data is as important for labor market programs as for broader national policies, and more consistent age disaggregation would facilitate a better understanding of intergenerational dynamics. Within the region, there has been increasing attention on the collection of national census data on race and ethnicity, spurred by two important regionwide conferences: *Todos Contamos I* (Cartagena, Colombia, 2000) and *Todos Contamos II* (Lima, Peru, 2002).

### Building on the Youth Training Example

Following the example of *Chile Joven*, a training and labor market insertion program for disadvantaged youth, spawned a series of youth training programs throughout Latin America designed to address the poor labor market performance and prospects for low-income, high risk youth who were outside the labor market. The lessons from these programs have important applications for a wide range of labor market training programs. The key feature of this type of program is the use of traineeships, or *pasantías*, to provide low-income youth with actual job experience. The training provided is oriented toward the development of basic work skills and habits (e.g., responsibility and promptness) rather than vocational skills for a specific job (e.g., basic carpentry). Particularly for disadvantaged youth, job skills are not the most important barrier to an entry level position; it is the lack of a social network and work record to get the youth in the door. Training programs provide an incentive for employers to “take a risk” on a disadvantaged youth, while providing supervision and classroom-based

basic job orientation. Studies have clearly demonstrated that with limited or delayed early work experience, labor market problems persist well into adulthood. The combination of short-term traineeships and work skills training was combined with another key feature—competitive bidding by intermediary firms to do the training and business placements. These firms became brokers soliciting traineeships for disadvantaged youth, who would have a hard time getting their foot in the door, and assured the hiring firm that there would be oversight and training of each of the youth trainees. Participating youth had to be low-income and demonstrate disadvantage, defined differently in different national programs.<sup>7</sup> While specific actions were not incorporated for indigenous, afro-descendent youth, special efforts were made to attract and recruit young females, with measureable effect in reducing gender gaps. Evaluations of the *Chile Joven* project demonstrated an increase in both labor market insertion rates and income for the disadvantaged youth over the control group, who did not participate in the program. An interesting and positive outcome was the high rate of youth who returned to education after the training.

While youth training models incorporate training in firms (*pasantías*) plus work orientation, adult training models should concentrate on in-firm training. Mexico's *Bécate* program is the largest program of this type in the region. Classroom-based training models, in particular, have been less successful for adults. Latin America has not developed interventions specifically targeted to older workers (45 and older), although this has become increasingly an issue as older workers, once they have been laid off from formal sector employment, have limited success at being rehired in an ever-shrinking formal sector.

### Anti-Discrimination Laws, Quotas, and Labor Protections

Many countries in the region have broad civil protections against discrimination and more specific legislation related to the labor market (IDB, 2007). Three serious problems, however, are lack of government enforcement, lack of a civil legal tradition defending individuals, and large, informal sectors which are outside the protection of labor codes. Labor ministries in Latin America and the Caribbean are traditionally poorly funded with limited expertise and resources to enforce civil and work-related rights. This situation affects both guarantees against discrimination and protections on the job, including enforcement of working hours and minimum wages, prohibitions against child and forced labor, and occupational health and safety laws (e.g., leading to an increase in Types 2 and 3 of labor exclusion). National antidiscrimination policies in the region need to be strengthened through more vigorous attention to enforcement, citizen education, legal

services for the poor, and the broadening of antidiscrimination protections to include informal employment.

Latin American and Caribbean experience with quotas to redress past and present discrimination is much more limited. Brazil has led the region in advancing education quotas for afro-descendents and indigenous populations and is one of the few countries in the region with quotas in the hiring of government workers. Hiring quotas are rarely used in the Latin American or Caribbean private sectors. While the subject has become highly politicized in the United States, in light of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the case of the University of Michigan, quotas should to be examined and advanced in Latin America and the Caribbean as part of the box of tools considered by developing countries. The developing country context is one in which civil protections are much more limited and excluded populations suffer even greater disadvantage in terms of earnings, unsafe workplaces, and subsistence employment. Quotas need to be seen not as negative penalties for those with advantages, but as part of a mix of tools to promote positive advancement of populations suffering generations of disadvantage.

### Improving Education and Workforce Skills within a System of Lifelong Learning

The labor market cannot leapfrog over the severe disadvantage faced by excluded populations when they enter the labor market with proportionately less years of education and lower-quality schooling. This initial disadvantage accumulates as workers with low skills receive little investment in skills development and are rarely able to return to education later. To advance labor market inclusion, skills development must advance in a more continuous exchange between education, training, and work (e.g., learning on the job). The region continues to suffer from outmoded, state-based training institutes, which are out of step with private sector demand (Brazil is an exception). A more effective training system must be served by a stronger educational foundation. Primary education is nearly universal in most of the region, but the greatest inequity arises in the quality of primary and secondary education provided to the poor and the proportionately greater subsidy provided to university-level education that benefits the elite. Even increasing the educational attainments of excluded populations, however, is not sufficient to improve their labor market performance. Duryea and Páges (2001) argue that increasing education will not be sufficient to boost productivity without a broader range of productivity-related improvements in areas such as in infrastructure and credit.

### Labor Intermediation Systems

While much of the focus on labor market programs has been on providing better training for skills development, labor intermediation—systems to link workers to jobs and to training—are an underutilized instrument in the region for advancing the labor market performance of excluded populations. Labor intermediation services serve both workers and employers by promoting a better and more efficient match of worker to job. They were initially developed as national employment services in many OECD and developing countries, but as purely public services they demonstrated a relatively poor connection to employers and were typically poorly funded. Recent reforms in both the OECD and Latin American countries are leading to a range of new models of intermediation services that expand the range and type of services offered and more directly involve private and nonprofit providers.<sup>8</sup> Providing labor intermediation services on a universal basis to whomever walks in does not undermine the ability to serve more excluded populations. To open doors for excluded populations, national labor intermediation services or networks need to be able to serve a wide range of income categories and employers, otherwise they will end up serving only the poorest with the lowest wage, lowest skilled openings. What labor intermediation services can do is adapt universal services to the needs of excluded populations, or provide specialized assistance that make the service more accessible and user friendly to excluded groups. This includes, for example, staff that speak indigenous languages, mobile units that bring the service to hard-to-reach communities, and training in working with disadvantaged populations.

#### Extending Rights, Services, and Community Development to Migrant Populations

Labor market exclusion is perpetuated both in developed and developing countries alike, when the not-so-hidden migrant labor force—and those left behind—must act outside traditional social safety nets or are ill considered in local development strategies. Part of the advancement of labor market inclusion must come both in regularizing or providing basic rights to those working abroad and in incorporating migration as a reality in local development strategies.

#### Pensions and Unemployment Insurance

An additional consideration for Latin America and the Caribbean is the creation of broader and more comprehensive systems of social insurance and, where appropriate, unemployment insurance<sup>9</sup> to protect incomes and



smooth out negative economic cycles all too common in the region. The IDB's 2003 report on the Economic and Social Progress in Latin America makes an extensive case for such a policy change. This policy evolution will require more creativity in applying systems of social insurance to the informal sector, as early experience with Mexico's *Seguro Popular* (insurance for the poor), a health insurance program for informal workers, highlights the unintended effects of increasing informality through the provision of benefits.

### Final Remarks

Promoting labor market inclusion in the current economic and labor market context of Latin America and the Caribbean presents a range of challenges. Advances must be managed in the context of a series of negative labor market trends in the region impeding inclusion. These trends include large increases in the informal sector, limited to no formal sector job growth, greater job instability, and stagnant, low wages. Challenges for raising the profile of excluded populations abound: the invisibility of these populations in statistics and national political life; the high concentrations of extreme poverty and multiple sources of exclusion; and limited regional consensus in reorienting and reshaping labor market policies and programs toward greater inclusion. Youth and older adults face this exclusion on a more pronounced basis.

Nonetheless, the important advances of women in the labor market and education in Latin America and the Caribbean in the last decade serve as a reminder, albeit a highly incomplete one, of how labor markets can serve as an entry point and engine for inclusion carried out in the context of broader social and political changes, even in difficult times. Duryea, Edwards, and Ureta characterized the changes for women in the labor force in the 1990s as "remarkable." (Duryea, Edwards, and Ureta, 2001). The gender engine was fueled by "push and pull" factors of economic necessity, investments in education, societal and cultural changes, and political mobilization and still has a long road to travel. Labor market inclusion cannot function in isolation. In the case of gender, labor market advances came in concert with a wider set of political and social changes that are opening up opportunities and slowly undoing age-old biases and stereotypes. In the case of both older workers and youth, not only do stereotypes regarding their capabilities need to be overcome, but the labor market must also become more flexible to work schedules and contracting. Throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, national governments cite low productivity and poor-quality jobs as the key labor market challenges. Youth and, particularly, older workers are rarely seen as the target of these national concerns, and even less so in relation to

each other. These relational changes (Sánchez, Sáez, and Pinazo in this volume) form part of the larger social context for work—home responsibilities, education, parents working abroad, and community services—in which an intergenerational perspective offers a window on the future. Policy changes and reforms to promote labor market inclusion, such as those highlighted in this chapter, must also be conceived of within a larger pro-inclusion and intergenerational policy framework (IDB, 2007)—a framework that fully takes into consideration the role of labor markets as both a friend and foe of inclusion.

### Notes

1. Migrant populations and the elderly may also be considered an additional excluded group, in many ways, from formal labor markets and legal systems. Aspects of both groups are touched on in this paper.
2. Comments of Stefano Scarpetta, Labor Advisor, World Bank at the IDB Annual Meeting in Milan, Italy, 23 March 2003.
3. Unemployment rates are for workers aged 15–64 who actively looked for work in the reference week of the survey.
4. OECD data from OECD (2001) as quoted in Duryea, Jaramillo and Pagés.
5. Stefano Scarpetta, “What Went on in Latin American Labor Markets.” Presentation at the IDB Annual Meeting, Milan, Italy, 23 March 2003.
6. Based on PPP, purchasing power parities.
7. In some cases these were secondary school dropouts, in other cases the youth had finished secondary school but were unemployed for a determined period.
8. For a fuller discussion of the international models for labor intermediation services, see Mazza, 2003.
9. See Mazza, Unemployment Insurance: Case Studies and Lessons for Latin America and the Caribbean Inter-American Development Bank, Working Paper Series, 411, October 1999.

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# CHAPTER TEN

## IS CARING FOR ELDERS AN ACT OF ALTRUISM?

*Moneer Alam*

### **Introduction**

The ongoing public debate in India and many other developing countries on the income security of a rapidly growing aging population has unearthed the perceived risk of weakening ties between young and old and a shift in long-term filial commitments between them. There have also been questions about the basis of intergenerational linkages. Do linkages rest on exchange considerations, implying mutuality in gains drawn from each other, or is there a sense of altruism that maintains them and motivates the young to care for the elders? If the former, that is, exchange-based, relationship is true, it brings to light many questions for countries like India, in which old-age poverty is rampant, and many older people own nothing tangible to offer in exchange for favors from their younger siblings and children. This problem may lead to further complications in countries where public transfers to older persons are either nonexistent or weak. India, particularly, is a country where filial piety remains critical in the absence of well-designed and widespread social security coverage.

In view of the growing debate around changing family roles and intergenerational relationships (Kohara and Ohtake, online; Logan and Spitz, 1995; Rossi and Rossi, 1990; Brody, Johnsen, and others, 1983), this chapter investigates altruism among youngsters toward their parents or elderly family members—especially at critical times, such as during ailments. The data for this exercise was drawn from a household survey conducted in the second half of 2002 as part of a larger study in urban Delhi (Alam, 2004; Alam 2006).<sup>1</sup> The survey, which covered over 1,000 households from all the nine administrative districts of Delhi, included a younger

respondent in addition to one or more coresiding elders of the same household. Questions asked of the younger respondents, in the 15 to 59 age group, addressed three major issues, namely:

- Motivational factors in caring for the aged
- Altruism in providing care
- Non-elderly views on self-aging, especially health and income security aspects

Older adults, aged 60 and above, were asked questions regarding their health—type of ailments, functional capacities, incidence of hospitalization over the last 12 months, nature of hospital accessed (i.e., nonpayment public hospital or private facility), and source of payment toward hospitalization charges. While this survey was conducted with many other issues of aging under consideration, the discussion to follow focuses largely on the above mentioned questions.

This chapter provides empirical evidence on altruism and exchange-based relationships using data from a sample in Delhi, and discusses altruistic behavior among siblings, children, and care providers in the sample by looking at two aspects: first, the nature of the responses given by younger family members (mostly sons and grandsons) on elder care, and second, how the offered responses were translated into action at the time of the ailments and necessary hospitalization of the older relative. Policy implications are highlighted at the end. Two caveats of the study must be borne in mind while interpreting the results. First, given the size and diversity of India, a study based on 1,000 households may, at best, be viewed as exploratory. This is true despite the fact that a stratified sample was used to carry out the study with explicit attempts to make the sample diverse and representative of a mix of income groups including slum dwellers, high-income households, public sector employees, and others (i.e., middle- and low-income families). The second caveat relates to the fact that the study fails to include the rural population, which accounts for over three-quarters of the older population in the country.

### **Altruism vs. Exchange-Based Relationships: A Brief Description**

How selfish so ever man be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature which interest him in the fortune of others, and their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it.

Adam Smith, cited in Piliavin and Chang (1990, p. 27)

Several studies and theoretical advancements in most areas of the social sciences have agreed with the notion of conformity between altruistically motivated behavior and the rational choice (Piliavin and Chang, 1990). Many economists, and especially those dealing with intra-household and intra-family distribution of resources, have used this concept. We therefore decided to rely on some of these studies in our own brief application of this concept.

Economists have utilized a number of perspectives to explain why individuals may enjoy supporting parents or close family members (Ermisch, 2003; Pezzin and Schone, 1997; Hayashi, 1995). One explanation, for example, focuses on the altruistic (or benevolent) behavior that commonly ensures an intra-family bonding or bonding among descendents and relatives (Becker, 1974, 1991).<sup>2</sup> Another hypothesis, mostly known as the hypothesis of “generational stake,” argues in favor of support to be directed mainly from the older family members to the younger generations (Bengtson and Schrader, 1982). This hypothesis allows bi-directional flow, such that younger generations help their older relatives, including aging parents. The analysis presented in this chapter however rests entirely on the concept of altruism because of two important considerations: (i) a sizeable fraction of the elders in India may not be able to offer any exchange to their care providers—children, relatives or any other—because of severe old age poverty and lack of transferable resources, and (ii) being a country with no or a very limited social security provisioning to the aged, filial piety and altruism is considered as critical for survival of the old. An exchange relationship may therefore not be a workable proposition for the destitute, widows or similar other vulnerable elderly groups. Tests for altruistically guided resource flows, however, remain mired by various contradictions and inconclusive empirical findings.<sup>3</sup>

It has been hypothesized that others things being equal, adult children with widowed or infirm parents helped more than those whose parents were not suffering from these conditions. Contradicting this viewpoint, Spitze and Logan (1989) have noted that women’s early life investment in caregiving and kin-keeping activities is a strategy to create obligation in men and children for later assistance and help in old age. Another competing hypothesis in the context of intergenerational flow, as was noted at the outset, relates to the “exchange relationship.” This hypothesis considers these flows more as a reciprocal process. It also suggests that the exchange may be immediate and circumstantial or may occur over the lifespan (Cox, 1987; Cox and Rank, 1992). Which of the two—altruism or the exchange-based relationship—is closer to reality is, however, not very clear from the literature.

Given some of these contradictions, and also because of the growing hiccups in intergenerational linkages, we tried to analyze the empathy and altruism implied in responses made by the caregiving younger respondents in our Delhi survey. We undertook this exercise by assessing the health care support provided by younger children to their fully dependent and ailing parents. If support is found to be greater in cases in which the ailing person is financially dependent and unsecured, this may be presumed to be altruism or benevolence—a situation closer to what has been argued by Hogan, Eggebeen, and Clogg (1993) as altruistic exchange.<sup>4</sup>

## Data and Motivational Factors in Caregiving

### The Sample

The study involved a stratified survey of 1,019 households in the nine administrative districts of Delhi (see Alam 2006, Ch. 3), including a total of 4,525 younger persons in the 15 to 59 age group and 1,385 older persons aged 60 and above. The stratification was designed on the basis of the Census of India, 2001, Series 8, Delhi (paper 2 of 2001) and included a mix of respondents from four major socioeconomic categories: slum dwellers (14.8 percent), high-income households (4.4 percent), households employed in civilian public sector establishments (4.0 percent), and the middle- or lower-middle-income households not covered under the three preceding categories (76.8 percent). Sample size and a few selected socioeconomic characteristics of the sample population are presented in table 10.1. A few notable points that emerge from this table include the fact that the age variations among the 15 to 59 population is much higher than those of the 60 and over population; the share of respondents characterized as “others” is disproportionately large, illustrating the high incidence of middle- and lower-middle-income households in Delhi; high levels of illiteracy, in particular among lower-income slum dwellers; and low economic participation of older respondents. It is not surprising that a much larger proportion of older persons in low-income households are economically active, which is a sign of coping tactics.

Two basic questions were asked of younger participants:<sup>5</sup>

1. Is caring for the aged an economic burden?
2. Why should the younger children/grand children, siblings or other family members be responsible for caring for the aged? Is it because caring for the old:
  - Is a social obligation for them?
  - Is their religious and moral responsibility?
  - Is in return for the care they received during childhood or while a non-earning dependent?

**Table 10.1** Sample Size and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Respondents (in Percent)

<i>Age Groups</i>	<i>Socioeconomic Groups</i>				<i>Sample Size (No.)</i>
	<i>HIG</i>	<i>Slums</i>	<i>Government</i>	<i>Others</i>	
Young (15–59)					
Male	4.0	14.6	4.4	77.0	1642
Female	4.3	15.4	3.7	76.7	1498
Total	4.4	14.8	4.0	76.8	3140
Old (60+)					
Male	5.3	16.0	3.6	75.0	617
Female	4.6	15.2	3.8	76.4	768
Total	0.6	1.9	0.4	9.2	1385
<i>Literacy, Marital Status, and Work Participation</i>					
Young (15–59)	HIG	Slums	Government	Others	Row Total
Currently Married	69.2	66.2	66.9	66.1	66.2
Illiterate	0.0	48.3	9.4	7.9	13.7
Economically Active	44.6	49.8	46.5	45.1	45.8
Old (60+)					
Currently Married	64.7	61.6	45.1	59.6	59.6
Illiterate	1.5	83.8	45.1	43.9	48.1
Economically Active	19.1	34.3	11.8	11.1	15.2

*Source:* IEG/CIDA Survey, 2002. For more details, see Alam (2006).

A separate question was also included to ascertain if the responding care provider would be willing to offer support without involving others. An overwhelming majority (92 percent) of the respondents denied that caring for the aged is a burden (Alam, 2006). It may also be noticed, however, that about 8 percent of the respondents felt that caring for the aged is becoming a burden with time. Furthermore, more males held this view than females (table 10.2 (a)).

Though representing a small number of respondents, this answer dispels the notion that the family system in a tradition-bound country like India is impregnable and will remain so in the future. One may perceive a change based on these results. Tables 10.2 (b) and 10.2 (c), which present respondents who agree with this question by socioeconomic categories and educational level, support this observation.


An interesting observation arises from the distribution of respondents by age. Figure 10.2 indicates that the younger of the young (i.e., teens and those relatively young, i.e., 18 to 30 years) are more favorably inclined to elder care and treat it as a moral responsibility. In contrast, many of the older caregivers, especially those in their mid-thirties through fifties, believe that older people constitute an economic burden and endorse the



**Table 10.2 (a)** Is Caring For the Aged a Burden? (by Gender)

Is caring for the aged a burden?	Male		Female		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Yes	55	9.7	25	5.6	80	7.9
No	511	90.3	424	94.4	934	92.1
			Chi-square = 5.94		p-value = 0.015	

Source: As in table 10.1.

**Figure 10.1** Elderly care: Is it a burden or responsibility?

view that the elderly should provide support in domestic activities and child care.

### Caring for the Aged: Motivational Factors and Determinants

In most cases, a combination of social, moral, and religious factors motivate transfers from young to old. Among the three, the most potent motivational factor appears to be religion, combined with a sense of strong moral values. While social responsibilities are also significant for about three-fourths of the respondents, a sense of religion or religious conviction appears to work more decisively. In other words, socioreligious institutions and leaders of different faiths may play a significant role in helping to inculcate altruistic values and sentiments toward older people.

Caring for older parents or relatives in return for their past contributions drew relatively fewer responses. Only about a quarter of respondents agreed that this is an important factor in caregiving by the young (Figure 10.3). Instead, almost 90 percent considered that motivations were moral

**Table 10.2 (b)** Is caring for the Elderly a Burden? (by Socioeconomic Strata)


Is caring for the aged a burden?	HIG		Slums		Government		Others		Total N	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Yes	4	8.7	17	10.6	3	7.3	56	7.3	80	7.9
No	42	91.3	144	89.4	38	92.7	711	92.7	935	92.1
Col. Total	46	100.0	161	100.0	41	100.0	767	100.0	1015	100.0

Source: As in table 10.1.

**Table 10.2 (c)** Is Caring For the Elderly a Burden? (by Literacy Level)

Is caring the aged a burden?	Illiterate and literate without formal schooling		Schooling up to 8th standard		Higher Secondary (up to 12th standard)		Graduates and above		Total N
				Matriculates					
Yes	12.3		8.0		8.2		9.7		7.9
No	87.7		92.0		91.8		90.3		92.1
Col. Total	12.0		18.5		18.0		18.3		100.0
Chi-square = 23.3					p-value = 0.000				

Source: As in table 10.1.



	HIG	Slm	Govt.	Mix.	Total
■ Soc. Resp.	82.6	59.6	80.5	77.1	74.7
■ Relig./Moral	91.3	77.6	61.0	93.7	89.8
□ As Return	26.1	21.7	22.0	26.7	25.7


**Figure 10.2** Elderly care as sociomoral and religious responsibility: Distribution of younger persons by socioeconomic strata (in percent).

Source: As in table 10.1.

Source: Calculated on the basis of the data presented in Table 10.2(a)


and religious and 75 percent expressed that it was a social responsibility. It should be noted, however, that 10 percent of the respondents did not believe in most of these values.

A cross-classification of the three motivational factors by socioeconomic strata is provided in figure 10.4 and in its appended table. It can be seen that



**Figure 10.3** Motivational factors in caring the old (in percent).

Source: As in table 10.1.



	HIG	Slm	Govt.	Mix.	Total
■ Soc. Resp.	82.6	59.6	80.5	77.1	74.7
■ Relig./Moral	91.3	77.6	61.0	93.7	89.8
□ As Return	26.1	21.7	22.0	26.7	25.7

**Figure 10.4** Elderly care as sociomoral and religious responsibility: Distribution of younger persons by socioeconomic strata (in percent).

Source: As in table 10.1.

the moral criterion works better with those who are better-off, including those from higher- and middle-income strata. Social pressure and a sense of social responsibility, however, play catalyst roles for low-income households.

To reconfirm some of these findings and also to identify the roles of a few socioeconomic factors helping to generate pro-aged sentiments, we conducted a set of multivariate logit exercises with explained variables changing from “elder care a burden” to “elder care a sociomoral/religious responsibility.” The specifications used for this analysis are given in appendix t 10.1. Four logit regressions were estimated, each with a view to making an assessment about a set of likely socioeconomic factors contributing toward the pro-elderly feelings shown by the young. Results are presented in table 10.3, panels 3(a) to 3(d). In all four estimations (see the box explaining variables), we notice that

acquired sociomoral values are a likely outcome of several complex socioeconomic factors, including age, income, gender, religion, migration status, and educational level. A sense of family responsibility and conviction in serving older family members unconditionally (without involving others in the family) is yet another critical factor that turns out to contribute immensely in building up a pro-aged environment and respect in young-old relationship.

While the four equations, presented in panels 3(a) to 3(d), do not represent a uniform pattern and differ in terms of variables or their significance, two variables turn out to be statistically significant in every equation. These are the housekeeping/grandparenting ( $d\_HK\&BS$ ) and sex ( $d\_sex$ ) dummies. It may be noticed that women in all four equations are likely to be more willing to take responsibility for their older relatives than men. Furthermore, most caregivers would expect their elders to contribute in routine household activities including child care or grandparenting. These results, however, raise two significant questions. The first is, for how long could these activities be considered as significant contributions of the old to the younger family members? Growing emergence of commercial institutions like crèche and day care centers may take over some of these conventionally played roles by the old. The second question relates to the elders who are senescent or frail due to bad health and therefore may not be able to provide help with child care or other daily activities.

Acquired values also help in predisposing the younger family members toward the aged. We notice that the WCA dummy (willingness to care for the aged alone) remains highly significant in most equations with a negative sign. A similar relationship holds for education as well. We notice from table 10.3 that younger household members with a higher educational level are likely to be more supportive and provide better help to the aged.

Income level is also an important determinant of the quality of intergenerational relationships. It appears from the results that migrant households may differ to some extent from those of nonmigrants [panel 3(d)]. However, this requires further analysis because the migrant dummy remained statistically insignificant in the rest of the equations.

We included other economic variables, such as work status, nature of employment, and per capita monthly consumption expenditure in the estimations; however, none had the expected impact. Consistently, women emerged as more benevolent and likely to remain altruistic in helping the aged. This implies that, over time, the preference for sons may decrease in countries like India where female children are still considered as parental liability.

**Table 10.3** Results of Logit Regression: Factors Influencing Respondents' Views towards the Old (Number of Observations: 1012)

<i>Explained Variable: Is caring for the elderly a burden?</i>				
<i>Panel: 3(a)</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>Z</i>	<i>P &gt;  z </i>
Constant	-2.626	0.667	-3.94	0.000
Age	0.041**	0.013	3.30	0.001
Education	-0.117@	0.067	-1.74	0.083
d_sex	0.718**	0.275	2.61	0.009
WHHM/THHM	-1.561*	0.624	-2.50	0.012
d_hk-bs	0.583*	0.270	2.16	0.031
d_WCA	-1.179**	0.356	-3.31	0.001
d_caste	-0.514@	0.268	-1.91	0.056
d_migration	0.589*	0.267	2.21	0.027
Panel: 3(b)      Explained Variable: Aged as moral-religious responsibility				
Constant	1.281	0.597	2.150	0.032
Age	-0.021@	0.011	-1.840	0.066
Education	0.244**	0.054	4.490	0.000
d_sex	-1.121**	0.254	-4.410	0.000
WHHM/THHM	0.601	0.483	1.240	0.214
d_hk_bs	1.276**	0.383	3.330	0.001
d_WCA	0.915*	0.360	2.540	0.011
Panel: 3(c)      Explained Variable: Aged as social responsibility				
Constant	2.196	0.539	4.070	0.000
Age	-0.009	0.010	-0.890	0.373
Education	0.177**	0.047	3.810	0.000
d_sex	-0.748**	0.181	-4.130	0.000
d_hk_bs	-2.213**	0.183	-12.100	0.000
WHHM/THHM	0.230	0.373	0.620	0.537
d_martsts	-0.379	0.216	-1.760	0.079
d_caste	0.362	0.186	1.950	0.051
d_WCA	-0.618	0.400	-1.550	0.122
Panel: 3(d)      Explained Variable: Care in return for childhood care				
Constant	0.045	0.463	0.10	0.922
Age	0.001	0.008	0.10	0.920
Education	-0.019	0.040	-0.49	0.624
d_sex	0.302@	0.155	1.95	0.051
WHHM/THHM	-1.038**	0.353	-2.94	0.003
d_hk-bs	-0.340@	0.193	-1.76	0.078
d_WCA	-1.057**	0.284	-3.72	0.000
d_migration	0.569**	0.156	3.65	0.000
D_religion	-0.353@	0.184	-1.92	0.055

### **Altruism in Elderly Care: Hospitalization of Older Dependents and Its Financing**

Altruistically, care of the elderly ought not to be linked with their financial status or asset holdings. These principles are, however, subject to violation by many in India and elsewhere. To ascertain some of these issues and their magnitude, we tried to work through the following question: Is nonaltruism taking over elder support in India? Or, in other words, do support providers expect something tangible in return for what they do? And if the answer is yes, does it happen routinely? In response to both these questions, we present the results of a simple exercise based on data presented in table 10.1. Methodologically, this exercise was conducted in two stages and relates to aging dependents hospitalized for treatment in the preceding 12 months.

#### Financial Security Index of the Aged

At the first stage of this exercise, a financial security index (FSI) of the sampled older persons was constructed to differentiate between those who are

1. completely dependent with no personal source of income—in other words unsecured; and
2. persons with self- or spouse-generated single or multiple income sources.

The following income sources were used to construct the index:<sup>6</sup>

1. Earnings through self or spouse's work
2. Employer's pension
3. Income from family business
4. Annuity or investment earnings
5. Income from real estate
6. Farm income

The range of this index varies from 0 to 6. The maximum value of 6 was assigned to persons drawing income from all six sources. Conversely, a minimum index value of 0 was given to persons without any income. Financially, such a person will be treated as completely unsecured and family dependent.

#### Distribution of Sample Aged by FSI Values

Table 10.4 distributes the sample elderly by their FSI values, cross-classified by sex and two broad age groups. One of the most significant points shown

**Table 10.4** FSI Distribution of Elders by Gender and Broad Age Groups (In Percent)

FSI Values	By Gender (%)			By Age Groups			
	Male	Female	Total	60+(%)	Total (No.)	70+ (%)	Total (No.)
0 (no income)	49.6	78.5	65.6	65.6	909	70.8	380
1 (one source of income)	45.3	19.8	31.2	31.2	432	26.4	142
2 (two sources)	4.9	1.7	3.1	3.1	43	2.6	14
3 (three sources)	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.1	1	0.2	1
4 (four sources)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	0
5 (five sources)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	0
6 (six sources)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	0
Column Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	1385	100.0	537

Source: As in table 10.1.

by this table is that two-thirds of the elderly were completely unsecured with grave risks of income vulnerability and family dependence. Another 31 percent have merely one source of income. Persons with two or more sources are negligible. We can also see that nobody in the sample has more than three income sources. The situation worsens for persons aged 70 and above (see last two columns of table 10.4).

The first half of table 10.4, which distributes FSI by gender, reveals a very strong gender dimension with women appearing to be far more financially vulnerable than men. We can see from this table that more than three-fourths of the elderly women do not have any independent source of income with which to eke out their livelihood. In the case of men, this proportion is much smaller. This suggests that women are likely to remain more critically dependent on others.

### Out-of-Pocket Expenditure on Medical Care

At the second stage of the exercise, we cross-tabulated the out-of-pocket financial support provided by siblings, children, and grandchildren for the treatment of older parents or relatives by their FSI rankings.<sup>7</sup> A reference period of 12 months prior to the date of the survey was used to collect the expenditure data. One of the objectives of this analysis was to make an assessment of filial support given to persons with low financial rankings. Lack of support to the financially insecure may be viewed as a contradiction of the sociomoralist stands.<sup>8</sup>

Table 10.5(a) cross-tabulates the health care supports for the aged by their FSI rankings. Out of a total of 1,385 sampled older persons,

669 (48.3 percent) received these supports during the reference period. About 16 percent of those medically treated did not receive any support from their families; a majority of them, of course, had their own income sources. The children or grandchildren supported the rest of them, a majority of whom had no personal income source (table 10.5[a]). The chi-square test, used to indicate the role of FSI rankings in familial decisions, confirms that children opt to support unsecured parents.<sup>9</sup> To some extent, this finding appears to coincide with the argument made by Eggebeen and Clogg (1993).

Results by gender are presented in table 10.5(b).

These results further substantiate our earlier findings that suggest inverse linkages between filial support and the FSI rankings of the ailing

**Table 10.5 (a)** Expenditure on Medical Care by Children and the FSI Rankings of the Old

<i>Sources of Medical Expenditure</i>	<i>Ranking of Aged by FSI</i>				<i>Row Total</i>
	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	
Self or Nonfamily Expenditure (%)	8.9	26.6	26.9	0	15.8
Expenditure by Family or Children (%)	91.1	73.4	73.1	100.0	84.2
Total N	405	237	26	1	669
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Chi2 (3) = 37.770 P-value = 0.003				

Source: As in table 10.1.

**Table 10.5 (b)** Gender-wise Cross-classification of Expenditure on Medical Care by FSI

<i>Sources of Medical Expenditure</i>	<i>Male FSI (60+)</i>				<i>Row Total (N)</i>
	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	
No Family Exp. %	27.3	65.5	7.3	0.0	55
Family Exp. %	50.0	44.0	5.6	0.4	234
Total %	45.7	48.1	5.9	0.3	289
	Chi2 (3) = 9.750 P-value = 0.021				
	<i>Female FSI (60+)</i>				<i>Row Total N</i>
	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	
No Family Exp. %	41.2	52.9	5.9	0	51
Family Exp. %	76.6	21.6	1.8	0	329
Total %	71.8	25.8	2.4	0	380
	Chi (2) = 27.620 P-value = 0.000				

Source: As in table 10.1.



elderly. Most of the elderly men and women are able to draw support from their siblings and children. The older women appear to be better placed in this regard. In addition, it can be seen that, even in cases of older persons with higher FSIs, children provide significant support.

### **Concluding Observations**

This analysis was largely designed to highlight the views of nonelderly persons between the ages of 15–59 on caring for the aged, especially in the current economic regime characterized by the growing influence of market institutions, decelerating growth of quality employment, and large-scale informalization of the labor market resulting in rising inequality and poor wages. Three specific issues were subjected to empirical scrutiny:

1. How long are the nonaged willing to support and look after their older relatives?
2. What motivational factors are at work in this direction?
3. Is there altruism in elder care?

Our results bring out the positive role played by socioreligious and moral factors in motivating people, especially younger siblings and children, to help the aged. A very large majority of the responding younger adults, for example, agreed that caring for the aged is their sociomoral responsibility. This sense of their confessed morality was further tested in our subsequent analysis by probing the cases of hospitalization required by their elderly family members, both men and women. We observed that younger siblings and children helped in accessing hospital care for their ailing elders, especially women, even if they had no tangible or intangible wealth to bequeath. This leads us to infer that a sense of altruism still exists between the young and the old, even in a cosmopolitan society like Delhi. Stretching this argument a little further, it implies that leaders of sociomoral institutions, particularly the religious leadership of different faiths, may have a role in fostering a sense of altruism in elder care. Educational institutions, especially at the elementary level, may do the same. We also discovered that females and relatively younger siblings and children possess a greater sense of altruism for the aged.

A small fraction of households, however, especially those in higher age brackets, consider parental care to be a financial burden. With growing income disparities and the shrinking role of government, the number of persons with similar responses is likely to grow with time. Public

pillared social security should be therefore a part of the reforms process in countries like India. In addition, measures to improve intergenerational bonding through education and religious means need to be given due attention.

### Notes

1. Being a city state and the capital of India, Delhi is over 94 percent urban.
2. Becker's model was originally related to the benevolence of parents. There is, however, no reason why this notion cannot be extended to other family members.
3. For a very comprehensive discussion of some of these issues, including data limitations and lack of conclusive support on different perspectives of altruism, see Eggebeen and Davey (1998).
4. Unfortunately, the data available to us do not provide a detailed history of contributions made earlier by the ailing parents to their care providers (mostly children and grandchildren). We therefore assumed that most of them must have fulfilled their parental/grandparental responsibilities in a normal sense.
5. These questions were mainly drawn against the backdrop of the growing economic liberalization in the country, the growing role of private capital, and the very high informalization of the labor market that is likely to result in more insecure and low-wage employment. The burden of old-age dependents on low-wage persons may eventually be a constraining experience—especially if there are also younger dependents. A question that arises is, will such difficulties make old-age care less altruistic? If yes, the aged with better economic means may draw better filial care and respect. The inheritance factor may also have a role in offering care to the aged.
6. We do not include destitute pension or support provided by NGOs in this exercise. Both these income sources are considered here as out of self or family ambits.
7. For doing this, we constructed an *altruism dummy* where the variable takes a value of 1 if the children and the grandchildren have supported the cost of hospitalization or nonambulatory medical treatment, and takes a value of 0 otherwise.
8. It may, however, be noted that many of those failing to meet the cost of parental treatment may themselves be financially weak.
9. A further analysis of this data reveals that over 42 percent of the total elderly—mostly from the mixed category—have used private medical facilities for their treatment. Apparently, therefore, the altruism shown by the younger adults in caring for the health of their parents has not been very much affected by cost considerations.

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**Appendix Table 10.1** Explained and explanatory variables: Logit exercises

<i>Explained variables:</i>	<i>Explanatory variables</i>
1. Elderly a burden: yes = 1, no = 0	d_HK & BS: House keeping and baby-sitting dummy. Those agreeing with HK/BS role of aged = 1, Otherwise 0
2. Elderly as social responsibility: Yes = 1, no = 0	d_WCA: Willing to care elderly alone: Yes = 1, No (other family members must also contribute) = 0
3. Elderly as moral-religious (M-R) responsibility: Yes = 1, no = 0	D_migration: Migrants = 1; Non-migrants = 0
4. Elder care in return of childhood care: yes = 1, no = 0	d_Sex: Sex dummy: Male = 1; Female = 0 D_religion: Hindu = 1; Others = 0 D_marital status: Currently married = 1, Otherwise 0 D_caste: Higher caste = 1, Others (SC/ST/OBC) = 0 Education: Educational level of respondents Age: Age of younger respondents (15—59 years) WHHDM/THHDM: Working household members as proportion of total household members

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# CHAPTER ELEVEN

## EXPLORATION OF INTERGENERATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

*Akpovire Oduaran*

### **Introduction**

Oral traditions in African history are replete with accounts of avid concern for and actual cultivation of communities built on the foundation of intergenerational solidarity. Africans, in general, believe firmly in the ethos of establishing healthy, inclusive societies in which the community shares very warmly in achievements and challenges as they come. Africans have, therefore, established, maintained, and cherished intergenerational relations fostered by the dependence of the young on the older generations at some point in the lifespan and the dependence of older persons on the young in a reciprocal manner.

Traditionally, it was common to find that, anywhere one went in the subcontinent, older persons contributed financially, physically, socially, emotionally, and spiritually to the upbringing of the younger generations. In precolonial days, the informal learning systems and curricula relied extensively on the machinery of intergenerational relationships, as knowledge was freely shared between the young and the old during moonlight stories at the village square. The cultivation of inclusive societies was the duty of everyone, young and old, grandchildren and grandparents alike, and social tensions and frictions were rare. African informal family- and community-based care systems were so treasured that Africans had little desire or need for the dominant structuring of formal public welfare systems.

Intergenerational relationships in sub-Saharan Africa, however, are currently being threatened and eroded by modernism, post-modernism, globalization, and numerous socioeconomic challenges. Intergenerational relationships and action in sub-Saharan Africa is being dwarfed in importance and visibility by urbanization and its effect of exclusivity in

family relations. The extended family and intergenerational ties that made Africans very proud in the past are being thrown overboard. The emergence of urbanization and industrialization has meant that young Africans seek economic solace in the big towns and cities, leaving the rural areas almost exclusively to the aged. Intergenerational ties are weakened daily by the increasing changes in African value systems as communities are opened up to cultural globalization.

While intergenerational ties are being weakened, sub-Saharan African communities and families are also being confronted by the new reality of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The middle generation is the most affected, which means that the older and younger generations are compelled to live together again as they join hands in coping with the problems imposed upon them by HIV and AIDS. Moreover, the development of the modern public welfare system in sub-Saharan Africa is coming along like an old tortoise that is not in any hurry to get anywhere. There is much that needs to be done in terms of strengthening the weakened intergenerational connections and overcoming whatever negative impacts their weakening may have already had on sub-Saharan Africa's children, youth, adults, and older persons.

This chapter contributes to the pool of knowledge being generated to provide a global basis for action aimed at strengthening economic and social ties for the promotion of intergenerational relationships. The key objective is to develop specific strategies to promote social inclusion and enhance solidarity between generations. This chapter advances, from an African perspective, some ideas to assist in global policy adaptation and change in order to maximize existing opportunities for the promotion of intergenerational relationships and to identify the implications of this discussion for policy adaptation and research. The chapter does this by way of briefly exploring the following:

- The evolution of intergenerational solidarity in sub-Saharan Africa
- Sample current patterns and trends
- Policy contexts with regard to intergenerational solidarity
- Best practices in intergenerational solidarity
- Emergent major challenges and
- The future

### **The Evolution of Intergenerational Solidarity in Sub-Saharan Africa**

The features of intergenerational solidarity in traditional communities in sub-Saharan Africa are very close to the basic features of reminiscence,

social cohesion, and the integration of different generations and cultures identified by Mercken (2003, pp. 81–94) in the Netherlands. In the case of traditional African communities, the reminiscence activities were often built into moonlight stories, drama, sketches, dances, and music. However, many of these patterns have been altered as communities have become more “Westernized.”

The alteration of intergenerational relationships over historical time and space compelled us to propose what we termed the “African contextual definition” (Oduaran, 2003, p. 3; and Oduaran and Oduaran, 2004, pp. 171–185), which includes the following:

- Involvement of all generations, irrespective of age, gender, race, location, and socioeconomic status
- Unification in the process of generating, promoting, and utilizing ideas, knowledge, skills, attitudes, and values in an interactive way and
- Application of the outcomes of such unification and interactions to the improvement of self and the community

Following this proposed definition, it was argued that intergenerational relationships in sub-Saharan Africa are largely and primarily informal and are clearly and squarely located in cultural reproduction (Oduaran and Oduaran, 2004, p. 174). In putting forward that argument, we relied on the idea of cultural reproduction as originally espoused and developed by the French sociologist and cultural theorist Pierre Bourdieu (Jenks, 1993, pp. 1–3), who originally used the concept of cultural reproduction to describe the manifest quality of daily life experiences when applied to a broad spectrum of interpretations. When that happens, it is possible for one to articulate the dynamic process that gives meaning, on the one hand, to the utter contingency of the stasis and determinacy of social structures and, on the other hand, the innovation and agency inherent in the practice of social action (Jenks, 1993, p. 1; and Oduaran and Oduaran, 2004, p. 174). Put in a much simpler form, Africans have a way of rallying around community members who find themselves in difficult situations, and this has always produced positive results in terms of restoring such people to a position of social stability. It was social action that frequently guaranteed intergenerational relationships in sub-Saharan Africa prior to its coming in contact with foreign influences.

Although it would have been preferable, in the interest of good scholarship, to explore the earliest historical evolution of intergenerational relationships in sub-Saharan Africa, the dearth of relevant written records did not allow us to do so. In addition, the construction of the evolution of



intergenerational relationships after sub-Saharan Africa came in contact with foreign cultures is limited by the fact that historical data on the subject has not been explored in strict scholarship and the literature is therefore almost nonexistent. Moreover, an attempt to trace the evolution and development of intergenerational relationships in the subcontinent could be further limited by its diverse nature, owing largely to Africa's numerous cultures and the consequences of the partition of African people along the lines of earlier European colonialism. The diversity of the subcontinent is so intricate that one cannot possibly isolate for discussion the myriad of "good" cases indicating intergenerational relationships in a few places and, on the basis of this, generalize for the entire region.

We argued (Oduaran and Oduaran, 2004, p. 175), however, that even in the light of the apparent discontinuities one might observe in African cultures, it is possible to identify among African peoples common ground and similarities that are vital for intergenerational discourse. For example, there are discontinuities that arise from different colonial heritages, from differing geographical effects and socioeconomic and political systems, and from upheavals in the modern states in sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, common ground and similarities arise, as African peoples speaking the same languages and sharing in the same culture quite often have the same ancestors. This is in spite of the fact that the peoples may be in different countries. For example, the Yorubas are found in both the Republics of Benin and Nigeria and some of them are found in Brazil and the Caribbean, just as the Setswana-speaking peoples are found in both the Republics of Botswana and South Africa. These peoples living in different countries openly cherish their love, unity, and common heritage. What this means is that one can generalize with some degree of correctness about their practices of intergenerational relationships.

Many Africans cherish the unity of purpose in actions taken by those who are alive, their ancestors, and those who are yet to be born into this world. The cohorts of those who are physically alive are generally arranged according to age groupings. However, at a macro level, and for the purpose of this discussion, they are grouped into the cohorts of the young, adults, and older persons.

In precolonial times, the young were loved, cared for, and nurtured in African culture. Very early in their lives, the young were introduced to African value systems and the general belief in industry. This was the idea behind the development of the apprenticeship system, in which the young were prepared for vocational, professional, and even spiritual development. While the young were tutored in this way, the middle generation (that is, their parents) took on the responsibility of emphasizing the values

behind arrangements that fostered intricate links between the young and the elderly. The understanding and support of the middle generation was coveted at all times. Any form of mistrust and disagreement between the middle and elderly generation was deemed as capable of jeopardizing the relationship between the grandchildren and their grandparents. That in itself drove home the message that the middle generation is of no less importance than the other generations in the promotion and maintenance of intergenerational solidarity.

As long as the strong traditional roots of intergenerational relationships lasted, the elderly played a dominant role. One can point out that the elderly were respected for the one major reason that they were presumably nearer to the ancestors, and that this was particularly true in the context in which ancestor worship was strongly upheld in African culture prior to the advent of other cultures (Oduaran and Oduaran, 2004, p. 177). The elderly were largely upheld in most African communities as the custodians of wisdom, the anchors of the spiritual and judicial systems, and as guides who handed down African traditional and cultural philosophies to future generations. Such cultural philosophies are known as *Ubuntu* (*which means, unity*) among the Zulus in South Africa (Hoffman, 2003, pp. 173–174) and *ekwogbe* (*the same meaning- unity*) among the Isoko and Urhobo people in the Delta State of Nigeria (Oduaran and Oduaran, 2004, p. 177). In both cases, human solidarity was socially and culturally constructed to embrace compassion, cooperation, communalism, respect, and dignity in social relationships and practices.

In precolonial times, intergenerational relationships were built around the focal point of cultivating and nurturing kinship relationships, which would in turn provide the strong base needed for the social equilibrium of the community. The arrangements were such that intergenerational relationships featured very clear, yet unwritten, charters of actions and activities for the different social groupings in many African communities (Oduaran and Oduaran, 2004, p. 178).

As indicated above, intergenerational relationships in precolonial times relied extensively on the use of moonlight stories, ancestor worship, and art forms (Oduaran and Oduaran, 2004, p. 178), and then proverbs for greater impact (Oduaran and Oduaran, 2006, pp. 215–229, and Kaplan, 2002, pp. 39–40). The general outcomes of the systems and practices of intergenerational relationship were respect, love, good behavior, cooperation, understanding, and hard work, among others.

This was the case before the colonial system was imposed on the subcontinent by the West. Under the colonial system, Western institutions and ideas were imposed on the colonized Africans, with perhaps greater fervor after the 1884–1885 Berlin conference. With the coming of the colonial

system, African traditional ideas and values were slowly and eventually reduced in intensity and in many instances thrown overboard altogether. Individualism grew, and African grandchildren were tactically separated from their grandparents under the unproven pretense that the grandparents would “spoil” the grandchildren by “pampering” them excessively.

The colonial system also introduced welfare schemes, especially in the British-ruled colonies. One major consequence was that Africans began to get juvenile detention center, foster homes, and old people’s homes, largely in the urban areas.

With the coming of political independence in the late 1950s and into the 1960s, African political leaders who were “schooled” in Western values took the center stage and held on to the colonial institutions, systems, and values they “inherited.” The profound influence of external factors remained dominant in the urban areas, while the rural communities continued to hold on to the traditional intergenerational practices.

With increasing modernity, people began to drift away from the rich African traditions of intergenerational relationships. Yet the modern systems in many African countries could not sustain the Western institutions and systems. Particularly in Nigeria, the national budget began to feature huge cuts in social welfare allocations. With time, the modern social welfare institutions “inherited” from the colonial systems began to become less visible and patronized. Today, a tour of the Edo and Delta States of Nigeria reveal that the Western welfare institutions are almost nonexistent, and most children would prefer to support their aged parents in their homes.

The question that then arises from this development is whether sub-Saharan African countries can still safely return to the introduction of formal structures for intergenerational solidarity. Africans must have in place systems that should be clearly infused into the traditional patterns that are respected by African people. If this infusion is carefully planned and introduced, sub-Saharan African governments can tactfully offer social, economic, and political support that would promote solid intergenerational solidarity among African people.

### **Current Patterns and Trends**

Modernism and globalization have collectively altered the traditional patterns and trends in intergenerational relationships, especially in the modern urban areas. In contrast to urban areas, however, rural areas have continued to sustain the traditional roots.

In the urban areas, one can find increasing government involvement in directly supporting orphanages in the wake of the devastating effect

of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In Botswana, for example, the SOS village in Tlokweng has very effectively taken on responsibility for supporting and caring for children orphaned largely by HIV/AIDS, as well as other children who were abandoned at birth. But this is not to say that the traditional support systems have diminished in importance in terms of supporting these orphans. One could add that whenever welfare institutions supporting orphans exist, the dimension of intergenerational influence is largely lacking. For the paid workers managing the orphanages may not, and mostly do not, have any kinship ties with the children being cared for.

What is true of publicly supported orphanages may also be true of the private initiatives. For the modern intergenerational approach to caregiving and receiving is not profound in many sub-Saharan African countries. As in publicly supported institutions, the privately supported ones do not recognize how useful or valuable the gradual introduction of intergenerational relationships could be to their programs.

Yet the mounting consequences of what Mphande (2004, p. 148) calls disruptive socioeconomic and political changes in the capitalist world, together with the attendant renewed interest it has generated in the notion of "family," seem to suggest the need to revisit African social networks, which were at the basis of the purpose of life for many of African people. The point being made here is that Africans cannot afford to allow the age of materialism, together with its consequence of a disconnect between parents and children, to make less valuable the links that had prevailed between the young and the elderly. As a matter of fact, there is no choice in these days of the ravaging effects of HIV/AIDS.

The ravaging effects the HIV/AIDS pandemic, as well as civil strife, have had on sub-Saharan Africa manifest in the emergence of some initiatives and strategies that have not been studied with a view to determining the efficacy of whatever intergenerational relationship components and objectives they possibly could have generated. What is known is that now there is an interesting variant of caregiving and receiving in which the eldest child in an orphaned family provides the scarce economic and social support systems that are badly needed. Lydia Nyesigomwe (2006, pp. 55–63) has reported clearly about this trend in Uganda. There are also instances in Botswana in which orphaned children living with their grandparents make inputs to the welfare of the family. But, here again, research is either lacking or very thin in terms of illuminating the effectiveness or otherwise of these new initiatives and strategies. What is most plausible to do at this point is to briefly explore whatever policy contexts presently exist in the subcontinent and then proceed to comment on these contexts.

## Policy Contexts

Baroness Sally Greengross (2003) once predicted that

Across the globe, by 2050, one in every five people will be aged over 60 with a life expectancy of 76 years. There will be as many older people as children under age 14 and, in many countries, older people will outnumber the young.

This age shift will be particularly dramatized in developing countries, where over 70% of older people now live and where there are often no systems of social security and immense shortages of affordable or available health care. (2003, p. 11)

What Greengross (2003) had anticipated for 2050 is indeed already developing much faster than expected in sub-Saharan Africa. Many factors account for this manifestation, but we can easily identify the incidence of the HIV/AIDS pandemic as one factor that has further accelerated aging. More than anything else, the HIV/AIDS pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa has significantly affected the changing demographics and brought into the fore, more than ever before, the copious failure and inabilities of many sub-Saharan African governments to articulate clear social policies that feature intergenerational solidarity and programming for most of the countries.

In many sub-Saharan African countries, the HIV/AIDS pandemic is almost wiping out the middle generation (Oduaran, 2006, pp. 41–51). This in itself means that grandparents quite often have to fill in the yawning gap left by the “largely disappearing” middle generation. When the elderly generation reverts to playing the role of parent, providing medical, economic, and social care for their dying children on the one part and the teeming population of orphans on the subcontinent on the other, it should dawn on everyone that age-segregated policies, programs, and services would be far too obsolete and unrealistic in the avid determination to deal with these new challenges. Much more than that, it should dawn on Africans that whatever scattered fixated generational policies, programs, and research they had relied upon for these many years would no longer meet African needs and mitigate existing challenges.

The reality of the existing situation has revealed that Africans can no longer afford to have in sub-Saharan Africa overgeneralized social policies that tend to create serious and deep divisions among the young, middle, and older generations. It is no longer novel to say that the HIV/AIDS pandemic has exacerbated the vulnerabilities that African older and younger generations have been contending with over the years.

One reality sub-Saharan African political leaders cannot run away from is that the hitherto traditionally strong links and solidarity, which had existed amongst people but which had been weakened by urbanization and modernism, are crying out for rediscovery, cultivation, and development. Once African leaders become committed to that vision, it may be much easier to expect that they would initiate, in their different nations and contexts, intergenerational solidarity social policies that are informed largely by African traditions that are rooted in the following:

1. Interdependence rather than independence
2. Strong beliefs in respect for and trust in elders
3. Sustained and shared love among grandparents, grandchildren, and the middle generation
4. Community generation and sharing of knowledge, skills, attitudes, values, and interests
5. Multidisciplinary approaches to building relationships among the young, middle-aged, and older generations
6. Multisectoral reflections of economic, social, cultural, and spiritual needs of all generations
7. Concerns for, and coalition building among, persons with disabilities or special needs and the young, middle-aged, and older generations

But one must add that not all Western values and structures will work in sub-Saharan Africa. These may include the following:

1. The Western intergenerational notion of a day care center exclusively for older persons (Greengross, 2003, p. 12) may not work in sub-Saharan Africa. This is because in many African communities it is still the responsibility of children and grandchildren to house and care for elderly parents.
2. The idea of an institutional framework like Help Age International working exclusively for the benefit of older people in developing countries may not be too popular in many communities, as African cultures recommend and expect older people and younger people to work hand in hand and together share ideas, aspirations, challenges, and concerns, and to celebrate successes in all endeavors.

So then, what one must identify in African contexts is what could be regarded as best practices from an African point of view.

### **Best Practices in Intergenerational Solidarity or Relationships**

Although the most significant achievements in intergenerational relationships were mostly recorded in informal institutions, as has already been pointed out, formal institutions are beginning to emerge that tend to respond to the realities of modern living. The number of “best practices,” as they are known in the West, is very few indeed, and research is needed to identify more of them in sub-Saharan Africa.

Even at that, we can identify in Uganda a viable nongovernmental program known as Action for Children (AFC) and led by Lydia Nyesigomwe (2006, pp. 55–63). AFC was founded in 1998 “to rescue children from immediate danger and to advocate for their rights” (Nyesigomwe, 2006, p. 56). Somewhere along the line, the program began to provide psychosocial support, skills training and education, health services, and nutrition to orphaned children in Uganda. And as HIV/AIDS began to ravage Uganda, AFC came up with a special three-year project known as the Grand Parents Support (hereinafter, GAS) project following the needs assessment survey it had carried out in 1993. This pilot project is funded largely by the Bernard Van Leer Foundation (BULF).

Nyesigomwe (2006, p. 58) has reported that the GAS project was designed to strengthen the capacity of grandparents in providing care to orphans and vulnerable children under the age of 8. The project is thus aimed at improving the overall welfare of families taking care of children orphaned by HIV/AIDS. The core of the strategy outlined in GAS is family preservation and empowerment. The AFC project may be laying emphasis on the economic empowerment of grandparents caring for their orphaned grandchildren. But at the same time, it is possible that there are social interactions and exchanges with these frail-looking grandparents who are saddled with a task they had “dumped” several years ago that could be intricate. Africans need research to explore this and other kinds of projects that are scattered all over sub-Saharan Africa with a view to understanding how they effectively empower grandparents and their grandchildren.

Phillip Cook and William White (2006, pp. 65–77) have reported a similar best practice in South Africa. That project, called the Circles of Care, aims at implementing research strategies by building on the inherent resilience or coping capacity of children, their elders, families, and communities. In doing so, the Circles of Care project relies extensively on the strength of traditional African cultural values, beliefs, and practices in its strategies aimed at reversing the negative impacts of HIV/AIDS.

These two sample cases of best practices reported so far in the available literature indicate that Africa is behind in modifying what was already

in existence in its cultures in the dogged attempt to deal with present challenges. Extensive research is needed to identify more success stories and examine how they can be adopted for use in the subcontinent, while paying much attention to African varying contexts. The strategy being proposed here must take into consideration some of the major challenges facing countries in the subcontinent.

### **Emergent Major Challenges**

One hardly needs a soothsayer to tell Africans what their major challenges are in terms of developing intergenerational relationships. These challenges have been well articulated elsewhere (Oduaran, 2003; Oduaran and Oduaran, 2004; and Oduaran, 2006). However, for reasons of emphasis, one could draw attention to the issue of the near total lack of clear policies that adequately cover public provision of social services and resource allocation, social protection schemes, and well-implemented poverty reduction schemes with an intergenerational relationship focus for most countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Then one might add that HIV/AIDS, unemployment, poverty, political instabilities, civil wars, refugee crises, illiteracy, and near economic stagnation are among a host of other challenges that have actually “dwarfed” the improved use of intergenerational strategies in bringing about social stability in sub-Saharan Africa.

### **The Future**

Despair is out of the question as far as dealing with challenges that Africans face. For Africans to do better in building solid foundations for the takeoff of credible intergenerational programs and policies for sub-Saharan Africa, there is a dire need for extensive research on the subject in all the language blocs of sub-Saharan Africa. Such extensive research and needs assessment surveys may lead to the introduction of experimental projects across the continent. This could be followed by an Africa-wide conference that brings together experts on the subject so that African leaders can effectively identify, discuss, and document the dimensions of intergenerational relationships among African peoples. This way, one can generate the quality databases needed for charting the way forward. How well and quickly Africans can do so should depend largely on the readiness and commitment of African political leaders who are also saddled with the burdens of civil wars, refugee crises, HIV/AIDS, illiteracy, droughts, and sometimes flooding, among a myriad of other challenges. The hope rests in the African adage that says “Nothing ventured, nothing gained.”



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# CHAPTER TWELVE

## CONCLUSIONS

PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER

*María Amparo Cruz-Saco and Sergei Zelenev*

### **In Search of Intergenerational Cohesion**

Apart from in-depth analysis of the multifaceted nature of intergenerational (IG) solidarity, its ongoing evolution, and the interdisciplinary dimensions of human bonding, contributors in this volume illustrate several key messages that may be particularly valuable. The first and most obvious is the importance of consistent societal dialogue on all issues of IG significance. Although chances are remote of either IG conflict or open antagonism among generations, policy makers in many countries cannot ignore looming financial pressures and major concerns about the sustainability of national systems of social protection due to the aging of their populations along with decreasing fertility. To make this national dialogue effective, it should be as wide as possible and well informed, embracing representatives from government and non-governmental sectors, including service providers, business representatives, academia, and civil society. Given that all segments of society are interested in the effectiveness and positive results of this policy dialogue, every effort should be made to ensure that the voices of all social groups are heard and taken into consideration in policy decisions.

Another key message is that IG solidarity cannot and should not be seen simplistically: by its nature, it is always interactive. While the organization of social security using “pay-as-you-go” is a living example and the institutional embodiment of solidarity among generations, with younger workers paying payroll taxes to sustain public pensions of the current generation of seniors, one should not disregard the other side of the coin—the

ability and willingness of older generations to use their political power in a balanced way, taking care of the vital societal interests of younger generations (e.g., in terms of allocating money for education or some community development programs, of which younger generations may be major beneficiaries). Admittedly, the existence of national programs that underpin IG solidarity (such as Social Security and Medicare in the United States) facilitates the engagement of younger generations at the national level.

This aspect is particularly important given the heated debates among intellectuals in many countries about the role that “baby boomers”—those who were born between 1946 and 1964—are playing. The share of boomers (and older cohorts in general) in the distribution of national wealth has been quite significant, if not overwhelming. The impact of the 2008 global financial crisis on the pension funds and other assets of the boomers, who had retired or were preparing to retire, was largely detrimental although there was some improvement recently. This situation should not be overlooked since parental relationships can have a strong impact on the upward social mobility of children. British politician David Willetts<sup>1</sup> states that the current generation of boomers has concentrated wealth, has adopted a hegemonic position over British culture, and has failed to attend to the needs of the future, breaking, in effect, the IG contract. His observations regarding the parents-children nexus and professional opportunities illustrate a point that the middle classes are tightening their grip on opportunities available for the next generation, particularly upward mobility, sealing off some professions from the poor: “The competition for jobs is like English tennis, a competitive game but largely one the middle classes play against each other.”<sup>2</sup> Similar conclusions are expressed by George Magnus, who also draws attention to the plight of the children of the “baby boomers,” for whom personal debt and a far more financially challenging environment, compared to their parents’, has become a fact of life. In demographic terms, the significance of large debt is that “it can act to defer marriage, family formation and parenthood, as well as negating the impact of education.”<sup>3</sup>

A third message relates to the value of IG solidarity. Contributors, taking their cues from experience and examples from different countries, take a positive approach, proving that IG bonds can be exceptionally valuable for everyone in society. These bonds promote social cohesion and transmission of experience and multiple skills, facilitating socialization of children. They are also important for older and younger generations in emotional terms, enriching both.

IG solidarity could justifiably be considered the root of a healthy society, not only in today’s world but also, more importantly, in the world of

tomorrow. The demographic transition and unfolding increase in lifespan means that many adults will live longer lives, during which they can share knowledge and resources with younger generations. Greater longevity also implies that the number of years separating the young from the old is bound to expand. Strengthening solidarity among generations through equity and reciprocity becomes not only highly desirable, but also vitally important for social peace and cohesion.

It is all too easy to highlight and emphasize differences between younger and older generations—of course they exist, and this phenomenon was noted long ago. World literature is filled with descriptions of generational divides. One of the most interesting early examples is the classic novel *Fathers and Children* by the 19th century Russian writer Ivan Turgenev,<sup>4</sup> describing a new generation of young people in mid-century Russia known as radicals and “nihilists,” and showing cultural schisms and clashes of values between generations in their full complexity. “This confrontation of the old and young, of liberals and radicals, traditional civilization and the new, harsh positivism”<sup>5</sup> vividly demonstrated, among other things, the importance of IG communication and the great social dangers that emerge when it is lacking.

Presently, challenges of adjusting to an aging world are adding new dimensions. Rather than emphasizing the differences among generations, it is important to recognize synergies and growing interdependence. One obvious example is family caregiving, in which caring responsibilities quite often assume an IG dimension, with older persons caring for grandchildren and young adults providing nursing and long-term care for seniors. Solidarity between generations represents a lynchpin in all social protection schemes, whether formal or informal. The “IG justice” debate is particularly evident in many developed countries. This debate focuses on issues such as the sustainability of welfare states, eligibility conditions for public transfers, climate change, and debt service, among others, that are highly vital to youth and younger politicians.

A fourth message is that aging should be regarded as a lifelong process that requires age-adjusted policies and programs. Such programs should be geared at promoting social inclusion and participation, encouraging workplace flexibility and lifelong learning. Periods of transition, such as those occurring between childhood, youth, early adulthood, midlife, and later life, should be points of particular attention in policy formulation because the multitude of existing trade-offs could influence choices and decisions and eventually have a long-term impact. Meeting the challenges facing today’s young people, particularly regarding the ability to adapt to rapidly changing societies, are important in the long run, as they will have an impact on policy priorities for old-age groups in the future. Therefore,

“a life-course approach” to aging provides much better opportunities for forward-looking planning and encourages younger cohorts to make more rational choices in their career and life in general. The promotion of healthy lifestyles is one of the most obvious, sound choices that will have a positive impact on present and future workers.

The 2008 financial crisis occurred at a particularly difficult time, affecting vulnerable older persons dependent on their own resources. But it may have another consequence, as it may jeopardize or delay comprehensive financial reforms geared at adjusting society to the aging world. There are two layers here. For individuals, the issues are concentrated on the shortfall of retirement savings as well as a significant drop in equity and housing values. For society at large, a main concern is the provision of health care and other social services, the changing nature of work, and the investment allocated to education and skills formation over the life course. All of these items require predictable funding.

It is well recognized that in the context of aging societies it is vital for policy makers and society at large to tackle age discrimination at all levels, from the community to the nation state. Both young and old cohorts are crucial for sustainable communities, as well as for the development of more inclusive public spaces.<sup>6</sup> Deprived neighborhoods sometimes become a point of conflict between young people and adults, reflected, for example, in contests over the use of public space. The “IG divide,” including unequal involvement in community activity, local policy initiatives, and consultation, has been impinging on quality of life and contributing to social exclusion. In this light, IG programs around planned activities can be an effective community development approach that promotes cohesion.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, promoting IG solidarity contributes to building trust in society, and, in many ways, it fosters a sense of interdependence among people.

A fifth message refers to the empowerment of older persons as well as the positive image of aging advocated in the Madrid Plan. IG solidarity built into the MIPAA could be seen in different manifestations, from the IG pact between workers and retirees that forms the basis of many public “pay-as-you-go” pension systems to the family, in which most care for older persons is still provided all over the world. The members of the informal network of adult children, spouses, and other kin, as well as friends, in many societies are a vital source of personal care for older persons, giving their time freely to the people they love. Blending support from existing formal schemes of social protection and social service to informal arrangements that rest on family caregiving is important to maximize human and social capital invested in the care of older persons.

## Some Key Questions for Further Research and Policy Action

### *1. Evolution of the Family and Intergenerational Interactions*

Family has become a contentious category, and social trends affecting families have been used for political purposes in various communities and national settings. Changes in patterns of family formation as well as dissolution and diversification of households have led to more complex and “atypical” family and household structures. For some, a family is a social construct that does not necessarily imply a procreative unit in a heterosexual contractual relationship. For others, family is “a concept that centers on the physical coming-together of male and female and on the cluster of offspring that result from that relationship” (Almond, 2006, pp. 9–10). The diversity of family structures creates uncertainty in IG relations and expectations. It also affects life course roles and relationships such as grandparenting. There are disagreements regarding the characterization of family because definitions are shaped by differences in ideological and moral perspectives. But irrespective of definitional differences over the meaning of family, most agree that the family is the basic unit of society and that it deserves support from government and civil society.

The incidence of the two-generation nuclear family model has been declining, giving rise to the emergence of diverse family structures involving various forms of kin and nonkin relationships. This trend is promoted by many factors, such as the growing divorce rate, the increase in step-parenting and children raised either by their grandparents or by single parents, adoption, transnational families, and cohabitation of couples. In addition, the higher life expectancy of older persons is creating new spaces for multigenerational interactions and bonding in ways that were not experienced in the twentieth century.

There is evidence that there is strong IG correlation of earnings within families and among parents whose earnings fall in the bottom decile or quartile of the income distribution. This means that their children will have a high probability of having the same low earnings (Mazumder, 2005). To overcome this poverty trap, public policies need to be proactive and offer children and youth who live in poverty additional opportunities to enhance their education and to access positive environments for their personal and professional development.

Families have supported their members over their lifespan everywhere. But increasingly, nuclear families are more dependent on extended family members and the communities in which they live for the provision of care to both young and old. In a study that draws on empirical evidence from Europe, North America, and Australasia, Harper (2004) found that in these aging societies families play a crucial role in at least three ways: families are

mechanisms for IG support doing household chores, looking after small children, providing care for older or sick persons and assisting with everyday life activities; families are mechanisms for IG financial transfers; and families are mechanisms for IG solidarity, which encompasses emotional bonding. The same study reports that a process of verticalization of family structures is taking place, particularly in a few developed countries, which means that families are becoming four-generation families, but with increasingly fewer members.

At the micro level, there seem to be more exchanges among generations because the lifespan has increased. There are families with four generations, which translates into challenges and opportunities for all members.<sup>8</sup> Challenges arise when the issue of caregiving for aging parents needs to be considered; in contrast, opportunities are represented by the transmission of values and culture, as well as the help with child rearing and chores at home that grandparents offer. Greater divorce rates create horizontal expansions of the family network, particularly when parents remarry. As an outcome of international migration, an important segment of transnational families is developing, who, despite geographic distance, maintain their bond and sense of togetherness. At the macro level, the introduction of private health care insurance in some developing countries has limited access to informal workers. The lack of income security for older persons in most developing countries has also increased their vulnerability. The structural organization of the family may be particularly crucial for those in middle age, a phase in life when individuals are likely to play the multiple roles of parent, worker, breadwinner, and caregiver to older parents.

Examples of the way in which demographic and work-related changes are challenging traditional IG solidarity in communities and countries across the world can be seen in Africa, Japan, Latin America, and China. In many African communities, young adults migrate to survive the severe health issues affecting their living environments. In the African context, child-headed households are a huge problem because the HIV/AIDS epidemic has killed the middle generation. Some children and infants are also cared for by their grandparents. In Japan, the mobility of families has transformed the caregiving role that grandparents used to have because, in many cases, older persons have stayed behind in rural areas. IG programs are being created to support the needs of young families and the needs of the aging population. In many Latin American countries, governments have created conditional cash transfer programs in support of mothers and children, rather than in support of older persons. These examples show that even when financial constraints are pressing, governments are able to make difficult budget allocation decisions in support of specific vulnerable groups, if there is a political will to do so.

While there is no consensus on the definition of family, it is well recognized that there is a need to explore how IG solidarity could be strengthened through collective and public actions. A major question related to family policy, in the context of social protection and IG solidarity, concerns what the role of society will be, through its system of social protection and social services provision, in enhancing family relations and solidarity between generations at the family level. Other related questions include the policy implications of the potential for IG family conflict; the impact of generational family ties on the well-being of older persons; the amount of help and support that is actually exchanged between family generations; and the strength of the bonds of expectation and obligation between generations.<sup>9</sup>

## *2. The Impact of Current Socioeconomic Trends on Youth*

Youth have been affected by the impact of globalization. Greater uncertainty has impacted young people's ability to transition to adulthood, form partnerships, and become parents. Youth entering the labor market are less shielded by experience, and in contrast to senior employees, they have relatively lower economic security. Hence, they will be exposed to labor flexibility and precarious employment and will exhibit a higher rate of job mobility combined with short episodes of unemployment. In today's highly competitive global market, younger workers who are highly skilled have a greater chance of finding more stable and high-paying jobs.

Young people may sometimes prefer nonmarital cohabitation, postponing or forgoing children, remaining single, or adopting nontraditional lifestyles in order to meet educational challenges or find the types of jobs that can bring income security. In developing countries, teenage children, and often preteens, are pushed into low-paying jobs due to poverty. When children are forced to work at an early age, they often drop out of school and are unable to acquire the education they need to get out of poverty in their youth and adulthood. In addition to economic hardship, poor families often face related risks including delinquency, sexual exploitation, and lack of access to educational opportunities. Thus, the challenges that kinship care faces, including physical and emotional problems experienced by children, should be appropriately addressed.

IG community solidarity requires deliberate and carefully crafted programs to build strong, multiage communities. The latter link micro (familial relationships) to macro (welfare and social services) programs and this coordination requires careful management to ensure the connection of informal and formal care arrangements and IG activities. Families, communities, and other stakeholders, along with government structures,



should learn how to design and implement social programs (in education, health care, and community service) that use an IG strategy and contribute to solidarity among all ages. The IG vision needs to focus jointly on the needs of both younger and older generations in an attempt to attain generational equity without subordinating the needs of either of them.

Governments should implement programs for the protection of human capital over the life course, particularly given that many young people are more likely to lack social capital and access to resources and services, compared to other groups. The promotion of labor flexibility, lifelong learning, and healthy lifestyles, especially among young people, are vital in the transition to adulthood. One of the central actions in stimulating youth employment is the promotion of entrepreneurship. Young people often lack business experience and may not be aware of the peculiarities of legal and regulatory measures pertaining to starting a business venture. At the same time, they are often inclined to innovate and take risk. In this light, the assistance of national business leaders may be very valuable: on the one hand, some successful initiatives may be inspired by examples of existing successful business ventures, while, on the other hand, the veterans of these businesses could provide much help and expertise in refining plans, thus facilitating the learning and acquisition of business skills by younger entrepreneurs.

It is also imperative to strengthen families and communities and to eliminate the so-called IG transmission of poverty or the poverty trap through appropriate interventions. Some countries implement proactive policy measures in this regard. For instance, the government of Thailand adopted “The Family Policies and Long-Term Plans 1995–2005” to recognize the changing forms of families and child care in view of the weakening of family institutions. Laws and regulations were adopted to promote healthy multigenerational interactions and the well-being of families, further research on family issues, and the participation of stakeholders in family development. A major obstacle with this plan, however, is the gender dimension: the major challenge of how to reconcile work and family life is not addressed. Families need support from the government and society at large regarding provision of social services, including good child care; support for active participation of women in the decision making at various levels, along with promotion of fathers’ responsibilities in child rearing and child care (Kusakabe, 2006).

Youth participation—which is part of the process of the empowerment of young people—is one of the most important elements on the road towards better communication and understanding among generations.<sup>10</sup> When youth are left out of the very processes that shape their future, the resulting alienation is detrimental for all; on the contrary, greater

involvement of young people in the home, school, and community will benefit both their personal development and the society at large, including the IG cohesion.

### *3. Developmental Significance of Aging, Intergenerational Relationships and Rights of Older Persons*

As populations all over the world grow older, it is expected that the number of persons aged 60 or above will almost triple, from 0.74 billion in 2009 to more than 2 billion by 2050.<sup>11</sup> In the developing world, the population aged 60 and over is also projected to triple, from 473 million in 2009 to 1.6 billion in 2050, with the proportion of older persons increasing from 8 percent to about 20 percent in the same period.<sup>12</sup> Globally, the increase of the oldest of the old (80 years or over) will be largest, and most of them will live in the developing world; overall the population aged 80 and over is projected to increase fourfold, to reach 395 million in 2050. In developed countries, the proportion of older persons has already surpassed the number of children (aged 0 to 14 years), and by 2050, it is estimated that there will be two elderly persons for every child. The demographic changes—aging of the population amid falling fertility rates—are so transformative that the proportions of older persons and children in the world will be approximately the same by 2050, one-fifth.

Aging poses a truly global challenge in developed and developing countries that face the need to cope with its numerous consequences. The growing numbers of older persons need to have adequate income support as they age, opportunities to engage in decent employment should they wish to remain economically active, and access to appropriate health care services, including long-term care. The socioeconomic implications of demographic aging go beyond issues of social welfare to socioeconomic development in a broad sense, including issues of human rights, societal participation, and acknowledgement of the real value that older persons hold for society.

In developing countries, the majority of older persons live in rural areas, in multigenerational homes, with increasing income insecurity and with inadequate health care facilities for provision of short- and long-term care. Owing to changes in family structures, migratory patterns, and increasing urbanization, a growing number of older persons are being left without traditional family support, especially those in rural areas. Therefore, population aging presents challenges for the reallocation of resources in a context in which many developing countries face major socioeconomic concerns and severe resource constraints. In this respect, the situation differs from the developed world, which has been aging gradually and in which older persons have access to health care infrastructure and personnel, and can

enjoy independent living, long-term care facilities, and old-age income security. In contrast to the developing world, developed countries have been adjusting to aging and incorporating reforms in their welfare programs and pension systems for quite a long time to make them sustainable. The First World Assembly on Aging, held in Vienna in 1982, put the range of key issues pertinent to aging firmly on the international agenda, but its main focus was still on the specific needs of older persons and the socio-economic implications of aging in developed countries.

The Second World Assembly on Aging, which met in Madrid in 2002, adopted the Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing (MIPAA)—a bold strategy for a new century that is integral to the development agenda and is aimed at the empowerment of older persons and the full realization of their rights and potential. The Madrid Plan does not concentrate only on the *challenges* of an aging society, but also recognizes the *opportunities* of aging—the need to harness the productive potential of aging societies. An appeal for effective participation of older persons in the economic, political, and social spheres of their societies, along with the provision of opportunities for the individual development of people throughout their lives, permeates the Madrid Plan.<sup>13</sup> Intended implementation of policies and programs is based on the mainstreaming of aging concerns across all facets of development planning and policy making, along with strengthening national capacity to implement suitable aging-specific policies.

The MIPAA has put forth a framework that integrates initiatives that support aging with strategies that address major development challenges, such as the eradication of poverty. Its affirmative approach to aging seeks to eliminate negative, caricature-like stereotypes of older persons as primarily weak, nonproductive, and dependent; promotes the establishment of partnerships among civil society organizations, the private sector, older persons, and government; derives added value and development opportunities from aging populations; and recognizes the importance of gender equality and the roles played by the family and IG interdependence, solidarity, and reciprocity.<sup>14</sup> An IG policy approach that pays attention to all age groups, with the objective of creating a society for all ages, and a shift from developing policies for older persons towards the inclusion of older persons in the policy making process were important outcomes of the Madrid Assembly.

IG interaction remains a crucial characteristic. Worldwide trends in that regard, however, have been sobering. The willingness of persons of different generations to live under the same roof is clearly waning, reflected in a widespread trend towards independent living arrangements among older persons. While that trend has been almost universal, differences are still great, depending on the level of development. For instance, in European

countries, on average, 25 percent of older persons live with their child or grandchild, while the large majority (about three-quarters) in developing countries live with their children.<sup>15</sup> According to the above-mentioned UN DESA study “Living Arrangements of Older Persons Around the World,” in many countries with high rates of HIV infection, the proportion of older persons living with grandchildren, but not with children (skipped-generation households) has increased. In countries in which at least 10 percent of adults have been infected with HIV, the proportion of older persons in skipped-generation households grew by 2.7 percentage points, in a period averaging only seven years.<sup>16</sup> This fact alone illustrates altruism and IG solidarity in the context of the sad circumstances related to the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

Almost everywhere income security for older people is decreasing. Pension coverage is low, generally covering the salaried labor force and leaving out a large portion of informal workers. When pensions exist, they are inadequate and not indexed to inflation, still an important issue in many countries, which leads to a high incidence of poverty among older persons. Economic growth by itself and reforms in social security systems have not increased the coverage of pension programs. Informal workers are not affiliated with fully funded pension schemes and the high transaction costs of the latter create evasion and noncompliance. As a result, an increasing number of people will retire without a pension. To address this situation, policy makers have considered various mechanisms to increase the income security of older persons, such as minimum pension guarantees in contributory schemes with minimum periods of contributions; social (noncontributory) pensions for the very poor or for all older persons (such as in Bolivia and Botswana); and supplementary income (allowances) to families that support older parents. Minimum pension guarantees have the advantage that eligibility requires contributions to a retirement savings fund during active work, thus eliminating moral hazard.

Social pensions<sup>17</sup> provide basic income support, but this option may be costly to administer. Given its vital importance for poverty reduction, however, this option should be carefully studied under various national circumstances and adopted when feasible, particularly when the nationwide coverage of contributory pension schemes is at a low level and other types of social assistance are limited. In a number of countries, universal social pensions have helped older persons to maintain dignity in the family as they support themselves and help financially, for example, with food and school fees.<sup>18</sup>

Another option is supplementary income for families supporting aging parents in the form of family allowances. This program may require enrollment of the worker in the national social security system—which can be

difficult in countries with a large number of nonaffiliated informal workers and a weak social security system. An additional possibility is a long-term savings instrument offered by a microfinance institution. However, the financial capacity of microfinance clients to save for retirement is small, given the incidence of poverty among this population.

The argument has been made that social pensions may be affordable if the grant consists of \$1 per day and that the cost of it would be approximately 1 percent of GDP (in 2005, for 66 out of 100 developing countries; United Nations, 2007, pp. 7–9). At first glance, it may appear that the income security of older persons in the developing world represents a small public expense allocation; however, this fraction may amount to a sizable share in total tax revenues for any given country with a limited tax base and other competing allocations of public funds. Aggregation across developing countries may hide sharp differences in the proportion of older persons eligible for the grant, the size of the grant, life expectancy, the purchasing power of \$1 per day, and the opportunity cost of grants in view of other social policy priorities. Countries that have introduced a social pension scheme (universal or targeted) are Bolivia, Brazil, Botswana, India, Mauritius, Lesotho, Namibia, Nepal, and South Africa (United Nations, 2008, pp. 49–56). These grants can help alleviate destitution (not only for older persons, but also for members of the extended family in rural areas), reduce gender inequity by redistributing income to older women who live longer, and funnel some cash into rural economies. Notwithstanding the issue of the affordability of social pensions and the negative impact on retirement savings by active workers, social pensions have strong potential to reduce poverty among children and older persons. To make universal pension schemes sustainable, governments may need to establish a separate pension fund or a specially designated tax (such as a solidarity tax) and make budget allocations from general revenues to ensure an actuarially sound program.

With limited resources to provide adequate income security for older persons, and often for children, filial support or support from close friends is usually the only way for them to survive. When these relationships are broken or not properly maintained, older adults and children face a grave situation. IG family solidarity constitutes the main source of support for vulnerable persons in the absence of publicly led social protection systems. Since caregiving is mostly delivered by women, it is important to encourage men to be more active in supporting others. To promote men's greater role as caregivers, governments and communities need to implement changes regarding gender-sensitive division of labor at home, which will come as an outcome of changing gender power relations.

The feminization of old age is an important process globally, particularly among the oldest of the old. The likelihood that older women will live alone is high. This is especially the case in developed countries, in which independent living of older persons is highest. In Africa and Asia, more than half of women over 65 are widowed, but only 10 to 20 percent of the men. In the United States, one-third of all persons over 65 live alone—80 percent of them are women. In Switzerland and Germany, the probability of older women living alone is four times higher and six times higher, respectively, than that of older men living alone. The reason more older women than older men live alone is that older women are less likely to be married. Worldwide, about 45 percent of women aged 60 or over are currently married, while among men the comparable proportion is approximately 80 percent. Among the unmarried, however, more men than women live alone in most countries.<sup>19</sup> Older women in developing countries often live with their extended families, but their situation is precarious because of their financial dependence on adult children and because of inadequate health, education, and employment opportunities.

The issue of the neglect and abuse of older persons in general, and older women in particular, should not be overlooked in the context of IG relations. Older women tend to be most at risk, as they live longer than men and are often, culturally, more vulnerable to abuse. On June 15, 2006, the International Network for Prevention of Elder Abuse, in partnership with the World Health Organization, along with individuals and nongovernmental organizations from around the world, launched the first World Elder Abuse Awareness Day to raise awareness of the widespread prevalence of elder abuse and the need to combat it.<sup>20</sup>

Long-term care for older persons who are sick and disabled is an important concern in families and communities around the world. Often caregivers do not have adequate training and lack the institutional support from professionals in the field of gerontology and medicine that would help provide the quality services that their loved ones need. Family caregiving should be strengthened and reinforced by public policy through training and education, and incentives for formal care services at home (such as payments made directly to care providers). As importantly, healthy lifestyles and personal participation in one's care is self-empowering and promotes independence. Aging, however, leads inevitably to situations in which the provision of care to older persons is required, and programs should be established to meet this increasing need, particularly in the developing world.

Older persons represent a vital asset in society and should be viewed as such. They can be important transmitters of knowledge, culture, and values to the next generation. Creating opportunities for multigenerational

coresidence, and the development of new forms of mutual support and dependency can increase the level of satisfaction of older persons, families, and communities. The productivity, well-being, and independence of older persons may increase when nationwide policies and programs facilitate contributions provided by older persons in their role as caregivers, mentors, or labor market participants. It is important to educate youth and society at large on the challenges and opportunities of aging. Through appropriate education and training, and health promotion and prevention strategies, families and communities can learn how to take care of each other.

The existence of international human rights instruments on the rights of older persons would be helpful in improving their situation around the world and promoting a society for all ages. Protecting their rights is a fundamental way to provide safeguards against the marginalization of older persons, as stipulated in the Madrid Plan on Ageing.

The Madrid Plan, however, is not a legally binding document. Given that age-based discrimination, as well as other infringements of rights, remains a long-standing issue in almost all societies, a dedicated human rights instrument, such as an international convention on the rights of older persons, may enhance national capacity to deal with such infringements. A convention would clearly define the obligations of member states with regard to the rights of older persons, and would strengthen and complement existing international policy documents on aging, at the same time providing redress for the violations of human rights of older persons. Filling the existing “normative gap,” the elaboration of the convention would empower older persons and provide the framework for creating or strengthening pertinent national legislation. Such an option as the negotiation of a convention on the rights of older persons does not preclude other policy measures, such as, for example, establishing the position of a Special Rapporteur on the rights of older persons within the United Nations or establishing a national ombudsman or national human rights commission focusing on various issues that are pertinent to rights of older persons.<sup>21</sup> Given their enormous significance and financial implications, the above issues require further study and a careful approach at the national and intergovernmental levels.

### **Policy Recommendations**

In most countries, IG relations are part and parcel of social identity. IG practice has important implications for the experiences and quality of life of all age groups, and for social cohesion. The following recommendations are intended not only for policy makers, but also for all stakeholders, including those in civil society and the private sector.<sup>22</sup>

### *1. Adopt Intergenerational "Lenses"*

While IG solidarity may mean different things to different individuals, evidence shows that all societies experience similar problems and need to care for their vulnerable populations. For example, neglect of older persons, abuse, and violence against children remain widespread. And yet, solidarity as a notion and as a process is strong in many countries, in spite of their problems. It could be even stronger and more robust, if there were some dedicated institutions or agencies that supported and fostered IG relationships by connecting familial initiatives with community resources. Examples of such resources are IG solidarity offices in ministries, cross ministry working groups to protect the IG contract, or appointment of a high-ranking officer to oversee progress in this area.

The affirmation of the IG contract should consider three important factors. First, bridges between familial and nonfamilial relationships should be established which would enable the mobilization of resources to cover the various needs of different generations. Governments can help support the seamless connections that are required to take care of vulnerable populations. Second, research and research-based evidence can inform practice through recommendations on best practices and the adoption of strategies that have been effective in similar settings. This dimension is particularly important in the developing world, where research on these issues is still scarce. And third, policy makers and development practitioners should adopt an IG lens that considers the well-being of young and older people in a joint manner. IG dialogues on effective strategies for the satisfaction of the needs of all ages should be promoted. It would help if social policies in education, housing, health, community services, and volunteerism were framed with an IG approach in mind.

In order to achieve a society for all ages, local communities, civil societies, and governments should adopt perspectives toward human development and equity that are inspired and guided by values of active citizenship in multiage and multicultural societies. An educational curriculum that incorporates the essential capability of critical thinking using an IG lens is a highly effective way to address the complexities associated with living in a multiage setting, and understanding the needs and wants of multiage societies. The incorporation of IG issues and experiences in preschool, primary, secondary, and higher education can take a variety of forms including the following: welcoming all generations as learners and teachers to encourage lifelong learning; introducing mentoring of youth by adults and adults by youth; adding components to existing courses that deal with IG issues, and creating new courses and new academic programs that provide an expertise in IG issues; offering "community learning courses



(experiential learning) that promote the interaction of people of all ages through academic and community work, thus instilling a commitment to lifetime citizenship and engagement; and creating spaces for multiage recreation opportunities in schools. The possibilities, of course, are not limited to the above points and this list could easily be expanded.

## *2. Build Capacity*

All social groups could be—and often are—partners in promoting IG solidarity. Youth is one such fundamental partner in the establishment of IG ties. IG solidarity begins with every single generation, from childhood until old age, and throughout the lifespan each person's participation in the “give” and “take” of the IG continuum evolves and plays the roles that pertain to childhood, youth, adulthood, and old age. The evolutionary nature of IG solidarity should be intentionally addressed and discussed in educational programs and in the learning and training for the person's productive insertion in the labor market. Thus, two main policies for youth with reference to producing more IG solidarity are the strengthening of educational programs and the strengthening of programs that prepare youth for productive employment.

The next generation of leaders will require an interdisciplinary expertise in topics pertaining to economics, demographics, education, family counseling, gerontology, human development, regional studies, religious studies, social psychology, and sociology, among the disciplines that would have developed scholarship in the complex areas of IG studies. Among the first type of programs, pedagogies at school should introduce curricular initiatives that are rich in opportunities for experiential learning in settings in which young and elderly persons interact. The content of courses should make reference to the needs of people throughout their human development, and students should be expected to attain a competency in IG themes. In addition, educational programs should provide the skills and abilities that youth need for smooth and productive labor market insertion. It means that there should be a good match between the quality and direction of the educational system and the types of skills and specializations that are required by establishments seeking workers. Firms, policy makers, and communities should collaborate for the establishment of internship opportunities for youth, as well as training programs, mentorships, and apprenticeships that will provide young people with first-hand experience and on-the-job training.

The debate about the needs of different age groups shows a tension regarding which age group should be the target of policy efforts and command primary attention. Policy makers, practitioners, and researchers

working on youth issues may feel that there is too much emphasis on aging, and, vice versa, those engaged in the aging agenda often believe or feel that youth issues take precedence. Instead of fruitless arguments, “a genuine IG” approach implies that strategies and programs focus on issues vital for all persons in all age groups. To attain this goal, people should strive to create emotional bonds of affinity and solidarity, making a consistent effort if necessary. The difficulty is that IG programs by themselves do not create the necessary bonding and connections. Therefore, it is essential that interpersonal connections become the basis of IG solidarity.

Leadership and vision, along with “the adoption of an IG lens” and the setting of clear goals, will provide momentum for the design of IG strategies and their implementation. First, explicit IG programs should be identified and made part of existing budget allocations. Second, governmental officers, practitioners, educators, and care providers should have expertise and training on the lifespan perspective. Third, communities should work together and make joint decisions on the allocations of resources. Fourth, they should assess the impact of IG strategies on community solidarity. And fifth, the effectiveness of resource allocations and strategies should be assessed in terms of the attainment of generational equity. To initiate this change, IG solidarity will need to receive positive and constant attention in the media, with leaders supporting the adoption of the IG lens at all levels of society life. The participation of persons from different age groups in policy making and in debates around key issues will help create a new discourse in which IG relationships and solidarity is promoted.

### *3. Promote Intergenerational Programming*

IG programs should be framed in ways that promote service in both directions between old and young, thus moving beyond the rigid categories of “caregiving” and “care receiving.” It means that when a person cares for somebody else, young or old, the “caregiver” is also enriched by the relationship. Similarly, the person who receives the care may seem to be passive when, in fact, this person gives back in different ways, for example, exchanging stories and experiences, affection, and friendship. Using this IG solidarity approach, even programs with a clear direction of service can become opportunities for mutually beneficial value. Student service learning can provide home services or recreational activities for elderly residents. This pedagogical program is a two way street that engages both students and older persons in mutually beneficial activities. On the one side, students can learn from the experiences and advice from older persons. On the other, older persons can feel more reassured and happy when they help with educational goals.

IG programs are key instruments to engage older persons in work, volunteering, and mentoring, as well as in family life. Older workers have the potential of becoming a reserve labor pool. Because of their expertise and skills, they can fill the professional spaces that younger workers leave or may not want to perform, and contribute to the economy as producers. In cases in which they already earn a pension or have health coverage, their contribution to the marketplace will impose fewer demands. Older persons who choose to continue to work and feel productive will live a happier and more fulfilling life as they do so. Initially, this may be the case mostly in developed countries that already have extended coverage (such as health care, social assistance and retirement income support) in old age. In many developing countries, in which older persons often need to work long hours, even after what is considered retirement age, to make a living, this goal is equally important, but its attainment may take time.

Examples of IG programs (familial or not), are residential multigenerational settings in which older residents contribute to the community by volunteering time for tutoring, playground supervision, and guarding school crossings; home visits by which high school or college students visit community seniors and help them with domestic chores; care settings for both young children and the elderly (day care centers for small children, adult day services, assisted living, and nursing home care); educational settings in which university students have service learning experiences, and older adults volunteer; and community service settings for young children, youth, and senior residents.

#### *4. Conduct Research*

It is important to conduct evidence-based research on how longevity, changes in the age structures of labor markets, transformation of family structures, and shifts in government responsibilities and in the market mechanism are affecting “generational equity.” The impact of gender roles and ethnic differences, living arrangements, migration, and so on, are issues that also need examination as they can generate greater conflict or more solidarity among generations. Measurement of IG ties and programs, their diversity and impact, and the opportunities and points of interaction that they generate need to be assessed through surveys, questionnaires, guided interviews, and field experiments. An emphasis should be put on the development of standardized instruments to measure the impact of strategies and programs that help identify “best practices.” It has been suggested that IG comparisons can be examined using cohort, lineage, and period effects. Cohort effects imply the analysis of particular sociopolitical

events that occur to a generation. Lineage effects are the two-way relationships among generations leading to continuities despite cohort and maturation differences. And period effects are sociopolitical events that affect all groups within society.

Differences in ethnicity and in religious beliefs affect models of IG support within the family and in the larger society. Additional research is needed to better understand how IG programs and delivery systems should be designed and implemented to meet the demands of these populations. The needs of ethnic groups in many countries, including the United States, have not been addressed adequately by existing programs and, frequently, these groups have experienced a lack of understanding and sensitivity to their own identities. In the United Kingdom, it has also been documented that older ethnic minorities experience extreme economic and health disadvantages that are often explained by their postmigration experiences (Nazroo, 2006). These groups have, however, strived to rebuild their ethnic communities, create closer bonding, and support their vulnerable segments, such as older persons. Generally, services provided by communities are informally arranged and clearly separated from formal programs. Greater attention should be given to develop links between formal and informal systems of care and support and create links that connect communities with families and friends who provide and receive care.

Using a mapping of family policies, practitioners and researchers may examine the way these policies impact interactions among generations in similar or different ways and to what comparative extent. The diversity of cultures and policies should be considered in the assessment of the effectiveness of programs, and in the lessons that can be drawn from successful experiences and applied elsewhere. Does solidarity within families translate to positive IG relationships in the community? This important question needs to be considered in future research with evidence from a diversity of regions and cultures. Presumably, positive familial solidarity would translate into positive community solidarity, but this is not necessarily the case.

Sharing methodological tools and findings among researchers, governments, and civil society organizations may allow for the cross-comparison of trends and the identification of best practices that help build social cohesion and solidarity between generations. Indicators used to measure IG solidarity should take specific country, cultural, and local conditions into consideration in order to promote a country-specific and culturally sensitive approach. Multilateral, financial, and nongovernmental organizations should create strategic initiatives to promote further research and the analysis of public policy.

### Notes

1. David Willetts, *The Pinch: How the Baby Boomers Took Their Children's Future—And Why They Should Give It back*, Atlantic Books, London, 2010.
2. Ibid.
3. George Magnus, "The 'Boomerangst' Generation," "The Globalist," February 3, Washington, DC, 2009.
4. Ivan Turgenev, "Fathers and Children" (Russian edition, "Otcy i Deti," first published 1862), W. W. Norton and company, English translation, December 2007.
5. Isaiah Berlin (1978), "Fathers and Children: Turgenev and the liberal predicament," in Isaiah Berlin, *Russian Thinkers*, The Viking Press, New York, p. 277.
6. Rachel Pain, Intergenerational relations and practices in the development of sustainable communities, Durham University, International Centre for Regional Regeneration and Development, Stockton-on-Tees, 2005, accessed on [www.matesproject.eu/](http://www.matesproject.eu/).
7. Ibid.
8. Making a presentation during the 2010 AARP-UN Briefing Series on Global Aging, and mentioning multigenerational families, Rick Martinez, Director of Medical Affairs from Johnson and Johnson company (USA) noted that "the current generation of IG experts, many of them are boomers themselves, may be complicit in perpetuating the culture clash of aging issues. We need to keep in mind that our American boomer values are shaped by a very different set of realities than families living in developing nations. Multi-generational families may actually be the rule outside the U.S. We must avoid exporting the exaggerated boomer sense of autonomy and independence to other parts of the world where INTER-dependency of generations is the rule and the instincts of filial responsibility are strong and highly valued" (accessed May 25, 2010, at [www.aarpinternational.org/.../conference\\_sub\\_show.htm](http://www.aarpinternational.org/.../conference_sub_show.htm)).
9. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, in collaboration with Doha International Institute for Family Studies and Development, "Family Policy in a Changing World: Promoting Social Protection and IG Solidarity," Doha, Qatar, 14–16 April 2009, p. 24.
10. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Guide to the Implementation of the World Programme of Action for Youth*, United Nations, New York, 2006.
11. United Nations, *World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, Highlights* (2009), Working Paper No.ESA/P/WP.210.
12. Ibid.
13. For more details see Sergei Zelenev, "The Madrid Plan: a comprehensive agenda for an aging world," in UN DESA study "Regional Dimensions of the Aging Situation," United Nations, New York, 2008 (ST/ESA/318).
14. UN DESA (2008b). *The Guide to the National Implementation of the Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing* presents a framework that can be used by governments and stakeholders to mainstream aging into their national development policies.
15. UN DESA "Living Arrangements of Older Persons Around the World," New York 2005 (ST/ESA/STAT/SER.A/240).

16. *Ibid.*, page xiv.
17. Social pensions are noncontributory benefits that are available to targeted populations including persons of a determined age who do not have a retirement benefit from a contributory scheme or individuals and their families living below a poverty threshold.
18. United Nations, General Assembly. Follow-up to the Second World Assembly on Ageing. Report of the Secretary-General, A/64/127, dated 6 July 2009, para. 55.
19. *Ibid.*
20. For more details see United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission for Social Development, 45th Session, "Major developments in the area of aging since the Second World Assembly on Aging," Report of the Secretary-General, E/CN.5/2007/7, 21 November 2006.
21. For more details, refer to United Nations, General Assembly. Follow-up to the Second World Assembly on Ageing. Report of the Secretary-General, A/64/127, dated 6 July 2009, paras. 53–66.
22. Most of the recommendations below are based on the deliberations of the above-mentioned United Nations Expert Group Meeting "Intergenerational Solidarity: strengthening economic and social ties" organized by UN DESA in 2007 and selected contributions in this volume.

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